March 8, 1862 (Saturday): War Order No. 3

Civil War Blockhouse in Washington Defenses (NPS)

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL,
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WAR ORDER, No. 3. Washington, March 8, 1862.

  Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of all the army corps shall leave said city entirely secure.
    That no more than two army corps (about 50,000 troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.
   That any movement as aforesaid en route for a new base of operations which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th day of March instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so move as early as that day.
    Ordered, That the Army and Navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.



A. LINCOLN.
LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 3, Page 58.

History likely records no campaign begun on such a resounding vote of no confidence by civilian authority in the general embarking upon it.  Lincoln here mandates McClellan may leave for the Peninsula with no more than 50,000 men until the largely ineffectual Confederate batteries on the Potomac are abandoned, requires a consensus of all Army corp commanders as to what constitutes a sufficient force to defend Washington, and implies a lack of confidence McClellan will actually undertake the campaign by giving him an explicit date to begin.  The question of the batteries was more political than military, as their presence was a major issue with the largely Republican Committee on the Conduct of the War.  By not specifying a specific force required to be maintained in Washington, the order set the stage for the attack on his right flank as he neared Richmond, that force which should have secured it (McDowell) being withheld.  And the entire tenor of relations between the two only added to an almost paranoia felt by McClellan toward the administration.