May 30, 1862 (Friday): Pendleton, Rain, and a River

Bank of the Chickahominy River (Library of Congress)

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS,
Oakwood Cemetery, May 30, 1862-7.30 p.m.

General J. E. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Department of Northern Virginia:
    GENERAL: I venture to offer a suggestion based upon some information respecting the Chickahominy River. It is said to rise immediately after a rain like this and to continue in flood some twenty-four hours. Would not this seem a providence to place all the Yankee force this side that stream almost certainly in your power? Might not an active, sudden, and adequate movement of troops to-night and at dawn in the morning so overwhelm the divisions confronting General Hill as to crush and capture them with next to certainty? I submit it with great deference. Your judgment will, I know, determine sagaciously on the subject.
    Yours, most truly,


    W. N. PENDLETON.
    Brigadier-General, &c.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 3, Page 685.

Pendleton commanded Johnston's artillery and was no doubt aware of plans to attack the Union forces to the east of Richmond, which were on opposite sides of the Chickahominy River.  The river is not at all wide under normal circumstances, but with extensive lowlands it floods easily, as noted here by Pendleton.  Jefferson Davis had anticipated an attack on the 29th, but it was put off when it became clear McDowell's forces had been turned back and were headed north.  Johnston was hesitant to attack and while it is not likely Pendleton's note spurred him to action, it did support the idea of an attack on the Union left.  In hindsight, it is easy to read accounts of the isolation of the Union forces south of the river, and think a massive deluge caused immense flooding which everyone was easily aware of.  In reality, the rain started in Washington, D.C. (according to records in Krick's 'Civil War Weather in Virginia') only in the afternoon of the 30th, and rain had been sporadic in the week leading up to this letter.  So it is likely the possibility of flooding played no major role in the decision making leading up to Johnston's attack, and was more noted after the fact in the inability of the Union forces North of the river to reinforce the southern elements, as opposed to a major factor in the decision to attack the Union left.