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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Savage Station, June 28, 1862-12.20 a.m.
I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both side is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war.
The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow I could and save the material and personnel of the army.
If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.
I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, those the best we have.
In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory.As it is the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.
I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost.
If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.
You have done your best to sacrifice this army.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, June 28, 1862.
Major-General McCLELLAN:
Save your army at all events. Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed re-enforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that re-enforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government are to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things.
A. LINCOLN.
P. S.-General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better toward York River than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.
CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 28, 1862.
The commanding general directs that you immediately cause your command to be provided with three days' rations in haversacks; ammunition sufficient to fill the boxes of the infantry and artillery; that the wagons that can be spared for the purpose be at once sent to the depots at Orchard Station and Savage Station for supplies of hard bread, sugar and coffee, and forage. These wagons, after being so loaded, will at once be sent through the White Oak Swamp via Savage Station, where they will wait further orders.
The usual reserve ammunition must be taken. Please acknowledge.
By command of Major-General McClellan:
S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
PETERSBURG, VA., June 28, 1862-9 a. m.
Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR:
The enemy have suddenly and unexpectedly left the Appomattox. Just received the following dispatch by signals from Cobb's Station, below Port Walthall, viz:
The gunboats opposite our station aground set on fire and abandoned by the enemy. Monitor has gone; all the gunboats are following toward City Point.
Your obedient servant,
J. F. MILLIGAN,
Captain and Signal Officer.
McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
June 28, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
Your dispatch and that of President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., on other side of the Chickahominy.
It is impossible to tell where re-enforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe and thence according to state of affairs, when they arrive. It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communications more than an hour or two longer.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.
JUNE 28, 1862.
Major-General MAGRUDER:
My second note. Seems first was error, the men turning out to be your own. The possession of that point would seem to liberate all the forces to his left, guarding Garnett's plateau. They can be used in driving the enemy from his other positions. We shall proceed on this side. How far [does] his right extend up the Chickahominy? Jackson's division is at Grapevine Bridge; Ewell sent to Dispatch Station. I will communicate whenever I can discover anything of importance; you do the same, and operate on the principle before established-to hold your lines at all hazards, defending the approaches to Richmond, moving against the enemy whenever you can do so to advantage.
By order of General Lee:
R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., June 28, 1862.
General DIX:
Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you can. Report to me.
A. LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1862.
Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH,
Fort Monroe:
Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or near that place. McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there.
A. LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862. General BURNSIDE:
I think you had better go with any re-enforcements you can spare to General McClellan.
A. LINCOLN
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 28, 1862 - 5. 30 p. m.
Brigadier General F. J. PORTER:
There is quite a brisk firing at railroad bridge and at Bottom's Bridge, and as we have but a very small force here the commanding general desires that you at once order down Sykes' division, provided everything is quiet in your front. Please let them leave camp if possible so as to have the troops observed by the enemy. Please acknowledge.
S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant - General.
WASHINGTON CITY,
June 28, 1862-6 p.m.
Major-General BURNSIDE, New Berne:
Since the dispatches of the President and myself to you of to-day we have seen a copy of one sent to you by General McClellan on the 25th, of which we were not aware.
Our directions were not designed to interfere with any instructions given you by General McClellan, but only to authorize you to render him any aid in your power.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK, Corinth:
The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you immediately to detach 25,000 of your force, and forward it by the nearest and quickest route, by way of Baltimore and Washington, to Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio River. But is detaching your force the President directs that it be done in such way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the forces to be detached and the route they are to be sent is left to your own judgment.
The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday, the full extent of which is not yet known.
You will acknowledge the receipt of this dispatch, stating the day and hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so that we may take measures to aid in river and railroad transportation.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
GENERAL: General Jackson writes at 11 p. m. that he is working at the bridge, and would attempt an advance at once if the bridge were passable. The enemy must have withdrawn the battery mentioned by General Jackson this morning. General Stuart is near White House, and says that everything there was burned last night; the enemy before him.
Captain White reports to General Ewell that the enemy near Bottom's Bridge are throwing up a redoubt on the left of the Williamsburg road on this side. General Ewell is at Dispatch [Station], and reports that the enemy has one field work on railroad bridge and a battery on railroad. This is the substance of General Jackson's dispatch.
C. MARSHALL,
Major and Aide-de-Camp.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862.
Hon. W. H. SEWARD:
MY DEAR SIR: My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows:
The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy has enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact, there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the Western army be brought here to McClellan they will let us have Richmond and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, &c. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for this protection. Then let the country give us 100,000 new troops in the shortest possible time, which,added to McClellan, directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.
Yours, very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 2 and 3 various.
The 28th was spent by McClellan's forces beginning their move to the James River. The Confederates were waiting on McClellan, trying to figure which of three options he would choose (falling back down the Peninsula, moving across White Oak Swamp to the James River, or making a lunge at Richmond with his troops on the left who had seen little combat. On that side of the line, Toombs made an impetuous attack at Golding's Farm which amounted to a relatively minor affair. Lee knew McClellan and did not believe he would make an attempt on Richmond after the heavy fighting on his right. That left the option of falling back on White House landing and his supplies (which Stuart confirmed was not in play once he found supplies being burned and abandoned there). By mid-afternoon Lee knew McClellan would be headed across the swamp. Now he had to organize his dispersed commands to move across difficult terrain and attempt to cut up his retreating opponent.
History has treated Lincoln better, and rightfully so, than McClellan on the 28th. Lincoln treated McClellan better in his worst moment than he had up to this point, while McClellan made wild accusations which crossed the border from bad judgment to hysteria. (So much so the military telegraph office removed the last two sentences of his 12:20 a.m. message). It was a singular unravelling. Lee, his opposite number, is focused and steadying in dispatches, a calm professional.
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