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HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
Winchester, Va., December 24, 1861.
Maj. Thomas G. Rhett,
Asst. Adjut. Gen., Hdqrs. Department of Northern Virginia:
MAJOR: I have good reason to believe that the enemy in Hampshire are nearly 10,000 strong, and that he continues to receive re-enforcements.
As yet General Loring has not arrived, and he has not reported to me the strength of his command I am unable to give it, except by estimate based upon the number of his regiments. According to this estimate I suppose my entire volunteer command, exclusive of McDonald’s cavalry, will, after General Loring’s regiments, now en route for this place, arrive, amount to 7,500. But I must be borne in mind that the accessions from the Army of the Northwest are not well drilled, having passed the present campaign in the mountains, where the opportunities for drilling were very limited.
As I have reason to believe that the enemy has been re-enforced more rapidly than I have been, and as additional re-enforcements are expected, and they already outnumber me, I would respectfully urge upon the commanding general of the department the importance of sending me at once 5,000 good infantry and the First Virginia Cavalry, or its equivalent, and also a battery of four guns. These forced asked for can be immediately returned to their present stations after the Federal forces shall have been captured or driven out of Hampshire County. It may be thought that I am applying for too many troops,; but it is a miserable policy to merely base the estimate for troops on one side for future operations upon the enemy’s present strength when he is continually receiving re-enforcements.
It appears to me that General Kelley’s true policy would be not to march direct from Romney upon this place, but to move first to Martinsburg, form a junction with General Banks, and then, with their united strength, move on Winchester over a road that presents no very strong defensive positions.
If this place is to be held by us, our true policy, in my opinion, is to attack the enemy in his present position before he receives additional re-enforcements, and especially never to permit a junction of their forces at or near Martinsburg.
There is reason to believe that the recent break in Dam No. 5 will destroy any vestiges of hope that might have been entertained of supplying Washington with Cumberland coal by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and consequently their only prospect of procuring that coal must be the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and for this purpose near 25 miles of track west of Harper’s Ferry must first be relaid, and this can be done under a much smaller protecting force stationed at Winchester than would be required if distributed along the railroad, and consequently I must anticipate an attempted occupation of this place by the enemy. My present force of 7,500 volunteers, 2,234 militia, and 664 (McDonald’s) cavalry is insufficient for defending my position.
General Loring has arrived. He states that the Secretary of War left it optional with him whether to bring his troops from the Monterey line or not, and he has decided not to bring any more of these troops here.
I have given the subject much thought, and as the enemy appears to be continually receiving accessions, and as I may receive no more, it appears to me that my best plan is to attack him at the earliest practicable moment, and accordingly, as soon as the inspection of General Loring’s forces shall be finished and the necessary munitions of war procured, I expect to march on the enemy, unless I receive orders to the contrary.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. J. JACKSON,
Major-General, Commanding Valley District.
Official Records, Series I., Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 1004.
From the time Jackson left Manassas his mind was set toward offensive operations. While strategy was giving way to the logistics of wintering an army in most quarters, Jackson remained determined to move to the attack. Having applied for Loring’s force from southwestern Virginia, Jackson here prepares for re-enforcement and a forward movement. Denied Alleghany Johnson’s forces (who the government thought needed to guard the western approaches to the Valley), Jackson had moved from earlier ideas of crossing the Potomac and ultimately into Pennsylvania and was now fixed on the more achievable goal of moving on Romney, disrupting the Union’s line of communication and supply to the west. Jackson was ready to move.
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