General Randolph Marcy |
SANDY HOOK, February 28, 1862. (Received 9.30 p. m.).
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President:
It is impossible for many days to do more than supply the troops now here and at Charleston. We could not supply and move to Winchester for many days, and had I moved more troops here they would have been at a loss for food on the Virginia side. I know that I have acted wisely, and that you will cheerfully agree with me when I explain. I have arranged to establish depots on that side so we can do what we please. I have secured opening of the road.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.
Official Records, Series I., Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 730.
The President believed McClellan finally was going to move, going across the Potomac to take Winchester. He waited for word of the movement, only to discover McClellan was not going to move toward his objective because, after arranging to build a bridge of canal boats to carry supplies over the Potomac, it was discovered nobody had measured the size of the boats in relation to the locks which opened onto the Potomac. McClellan proposed to advance as far as Charlestown, secure his bridgehead, and wait for other means of getting the supplies over. This was either a supreme example of bad planning or evidence, as Lincoln put it, that "The general impression is daily gaining ground that the General does not intend to do anything." While this bizarre episode was going on, Johnston was preparing to abandon Manassas, which would open Winchester to the Union without opposition in two weeks. It would also open the door for McClellan to change base to the Peninsula and, temporarily, avert the questions which had arisen concerning his reluctance to commit to the offensive.
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