February 3, 1862 (Saturday); "The Great Result"

Lincoln and McClellan

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, February 3, 1862.

   MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River, mine to move directly to a point on the railroads southwest of Manassas.*

  If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

   1^st Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

  2d  Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

  3^d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

  4th.  In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great       line of the enemy’s communications, while mine would?

   5^th.  In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

    Yours, truly,

                                                                                    ABRAHAM LINCOLN

*For the President’s memorandum accompany this note, see under same date in “Correspondence, etc,” post.

Memorandum accompanying letter of President to General McClellan dated February 3, 1862.*
1st. Suppose the enemy should attack us in force before we reach the Occoquan, what? In view of the possibility of this, might it not be safest to have our entire force to move together from above the Occoquan?
2nd. Suppose the enemy in force shall dispute the crossing of the Occoquan, what? In view of this, might it not be safest fore us to cross the Occuquan at Colchester rather than at the village of Occoquan? This would cost the enemy two miles more of travel to meet us, but would, on the contrary, leave us 2 miles farther form our ultimate destination.
3rd. Suppose we reach Maple Valley without an attack, will we not be attacked there in force by the enemy marching by the several roads from Manassas; and, if so, what?

Official Records Series I., Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 41.

McClellan replied to this letter the same day making these points.  1)When he assumed command there was no organized army fit for service. 2)The capital was now secure against attack.  3)He had not been given a force “far exceeding the aggregate” opposed to him.  4)He had voluntarily sent some of his more qualified officers west to Kentucky and Missouri.  5)He sought not just to move, but to achieve a decisive result.  6)The enemy is in anticipation of the move the President proposes.  6)To move forward as described would be to leave the right flank of the advancing army exposed. 7)The results of the President’s plan offer little beyond the field of battle.  The advantages of McClellan’s plan (in his words).  1)The shortest route to the Confederate base of power.  2)Better roads.  3)If beaten, the line back down to Fort Monroe will be secure. 4)The movement better fits with Burnside’s Expedition, Buell’s advance to eastern Tennessee, Hallack’s towards Nashville, and Sherman’s possible move on Charleston from Port Royal.  He closes by saying “Let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished and disregard everything else.”  After this sparring, Lincoln did not press the Occoquon plan, eventually permitting the advance by Fort Monroe up the Peninsula.