January 1, 1863 (Thursday): Unhappy New Year

General Henry Halleck

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, January 1, 1863
Major-General HALLECK:
    MY DEAR SIR: General Burnside wishes to cross the Rappahannock with his army, but his grand division commanders all oppose the movement. If in such a difficulty as this you do not help, you fail me precisely in the point for which I sought your assistance. You know what General Burnside's plan is, and it is my wish that you go with him to the ground, examine it as far as practicable, confer with the officers, getting their judgment and ascertaining their temper; in a word, gather all the elements for forming a judgment of your own, and then tell General Burnside that you do approve or that you do not approve his plan. Your military skill is useless to me if you will not do this.
     Yours, very truly,


    A. LINCOLN.
    [Indorsement.]


    JANUARY 1, 1863
    Withdrawn, because considered harsh by General Halleck.


    A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, January 1, 1863
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:
    SIR: From my recent interview with the President and yourself, and from the President's letter of this morning, which you delivered to me at your reception, I am led to believe that there is a very important difference of opinion in regard to my relations toward generals commanding armies in the field, and that I cannot perform the duties of my present office satisfactorily at the same time to the President and to myself. I therefore respectfully ask that I may be relieved from further duties as General-in-Chief.*
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January, 1, 1863
HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
   Since leaving you this morning, I have determined that it is my duty to place on paper or not, as you see proper.
    I am in command, as you know, of nearly 200,000 men, 120,000 of whom are in the immediate presence of the enemy,and I cannot conscientiously retain the command without making an unreserved statement of my views.
    The Secretary of War has not the confidence of the officers and soldiers, and I feel sure that he has not the confidence of the country. In regard to the latter statement, you are probably better informed than I am. The same opinion applies with equal force in regard to General Halleck. It seems to be the universal opinion that the movements of the army have not been planned with a view to co-operation and mutual assistance.#
     I have attempted a movement upon the enemy, in which I have been repulsed, and I am convinced, after mature deliberation, that the army ought to make another movement in the same direction, not necessarily at the same points on the river; but I am not sustained in this by a single grand division commander in my command. My reasons for having issued the order for making this second movement I have already given you in full,and I can see no reasons for changing my views. Doubtless this difference of opinion between my general officers and myself results from a lack of confidence in me. In this case it is highly necessary that this army should be commanded by some other officer, to whom I will most cheerfully give way.
    Will you allow me, Mr. President, to say that it is of the utmost importance that you be surrounded and supported by men who have the confidence of the people and of the army,and who will at tall times give you definite and honest opinions in relation to their separate departments, and at the same time give you positive and unswerving support in your public policy, taking at all times their full share of the responsibility for that policy? In no positions held by gentlemen near you are these conditions more requisite than those of the Secretary of War and General-in-Chief and the commanders of your armies. In the struggle now going on, in which the very existence, of our Government is at stake, the interests of no one man are worth the value of a grain of sand, and no one should be allowed to stand in the way of accomplishing the greatest amount of public good.
     It is my belief that I ought to retire to private life. I hope you will not understand this to savor of anything like dictation. My only desire is to promote the public good. No man is an accurate judge of the confidence in which he is held by the public and the people around him, and the confidence in my management may be entirely destroyed, in which case it would be a great wrong for me to retain this command for a single day; and, as I before said, I will most cheerfully give place to any other officer.
     I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1863-8.10 p.m.
General J. G. PARKE, Chief of Staff:
     Am still detained by the President and General Halleck, but hope to be down by daylight in the morning. What have you new?


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General.
---------------
*As duplicates are found among General Halleck's papers, and no copy is found in the War Department files, it is presumed that the application was withdrawn upon withdrawal of the President's letter.

#This letter is printed from General Burnside's copy; it does not appear among Mr. Lincoln's papers. See also Burnside to Lincoln, January 5 (p.944), and Halleck to Burnside, January 7 (p. 953.)
---------------

Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 940-942.

An extraordinary exchange.  The President has been approached by Burnsides' corp commanders and told they and the troops have no confidence in his plan to resume the offensive.  Lincoln turns to Halleck for counsel and does not receive it.  Halleck asks to resign.  Burnside asks to resign and states in his letter the troops have no confidence in Stanton and Halleck.  It is hard to imagine a less auspicious start to the new year.

December 31, 1862 (Wednesday): New Year's Eve on Stones River

Stone's River (Google Earth)

GENERAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
No.--
In front of Murfreesborough, December 31, 1862.
    The general commanding desires to say to the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he was well pleased with their conduct yesterday; it is all he could have wished for; he neither saw now heard of any skulking; they behaved with the coolness and gallantry of veterans He now feels perfectly confident, with God's grace and their help, of striking this day a blow for the country the most crushing, perhaps, which the rebellion has yet sustained.
    Soldiers, the eyes of the whole nation are upon you; they very fate of the nation may be said to hang on the issue of this day's battle. Be true, then, to yourselves, true to your own manly character and soldierly reputation, true to the love of your dear ones at home, whole prayers ascend to God this day for your success.
    Be cool! I need not ask you to be brave. Keep ranks. Do not throw away your fire. Fire slowly, deliberately; above, all, fire low, and be always sure of your aim. Close steadily in upon the enemy, and, when you get within charging distance, rush on him with the bayonet. Do this, and the victory will certainly be yours. Recollect that there are hardly any troops in the world that will stand a bayonet charge, and that those who make it, therefore, are sure to win.
    By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans:


    J. P. GARESCHE,
    Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

    Major-General H. W. HALLECK,
     General-in-Chief.


JACKSON, December 31, 1862. [Received January 1, 1863.]
General COOPER:
    General Bragg attacked the enemy at 7 o'clock this morning; drove him from all his positions except his extreme left, taking thirty-one pieces of artillery and 4,000 prisoners, including two brigadier-generals and 200 wagons and teams.


     J. E. JOHNSTON,
     General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 20, Part 1, Pages 183, 472.

When the sun came up on December 31 Rosecran's and Bragg's armies faced each other just west of Stones River, each planning to attack the others right flank.  Hardee had two divisions (McCown and Cleburne), totaling 11,500 men ready to attack McCook's corp of 15,900 men. Two assaults on the Federal right flank were pulsed, but a third effort enveloped the extreme right, forcing a retreat by Davis, exposing Sheridan's right.  About 0930 Sheridan counterattacked and stabilized the situation.  A renewed attacked along the entire front finally forced Sheridan to withdraw, leaving a gap between Negley and Rousseau which the Confederates  wedged into.  Hazen's brigade held strong in a wooded position astride the railroad known as the round forest.  By noon the Union forces had formed their final defensive line.  After receiving part of the reinforcements from Breckinridge he requested, Hardee made a strong assault with on the round forest.  Finally Donaldson's Brigade penetrated the forest  before being driven out.  Late in the afternoon the other four brigades of Breckinridge were committed, but repulsed with heavy loss.  This ended the first day of the Battle of Stones River.

It is noteworthy although there is a great deal of documentation in the O.R. of the days leading up to the battle, there is little preserved of communication between commanders during the battle itself.  Telegraph wires had been downed in advance of the battle and much communication was by courier with messages not preserved.

In the Google Earth image above, most of the first day's battle took place moving from left to right from what is now Interstate 24 to the thickly wooded area of the National Park Service unit at Stones River.  The Union line formed a rough V with the point midway along Wilkenson's Turnpike.

December 30, 1862 (Tuesday): Two Armies

General George H. Thomas

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, D. C., December 30, 1862-3.30 p.m.
Major-General BURNSIDE:
     I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know.


    A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 30, 1862.
The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
    Your dispatch is received. I have rescinded some orders that had already been given. I am summoned to give evidence in court-martial to-morrow at Washington, and will see you.


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General.





HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION,
Near Stewartsborough, December 30 1862-1 a.m.
Major-General THOMAS:
GENERAL: Shall I order Colonel Starkweather back in the morning, and, as the night is inclement, and had I not better defer marching from this camp till daylight? It is now 1 a.m.
   Very truly, &c.,
LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU,


   Major-General.
   [Indorsement.]
General ROUSSEAU:
General Thomas has been absent since morning, and I do not know how important it is for troops to follow. I received an order from him to-night to follow him at early dawn. You will use our own discretion in regard to marching. I understand the enemy is leaving, or have left Murfreesborough, and that our troops are pursuing.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    GEO. E. FLYNT,
    Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp near La Vergne, December 29, 1862-1.50 a.m.
Colonel WALKER,
Commanding First Brigade, First Division, Center, Nolensville:
A cavalry reconnaissance made this evening has developed the presence of the enemy (apparently heavy force) at the ford of Stewart's Creek, 2 miles in advance of the outposts of our right. Such being the case, the general desires you to be wary, guarding well your front and exposed flank.
     I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


     J. P. GARESCHE,
    Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

DECEMBER 30, 1862.
Major-General ROSECRANS:
I am going to General Negley's headquarters. I will probably see General McCook. What shall I tell him?


     GEO. H. THOMAS,
     Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS, December 30, 1862.
Major-General THOMAS:
   Tell him to report to me the nature of the country in front of him; the progress made; the routes. How long will you be gone?


     ROSECRANS,
     General, Commanding.

DECEMBER 30, 1862.
General ROSECRANS:
    General McCook is up with two divisions in line.


    THOMAS,
    General.


DECEMBER 30, 1862.
General THOMAS:
     I have been trying all day to get up communication with him.


    ROSECRANS.
    DECEMBER 30, 1862. 


General ROSECRANS:
     We have repulsed the enemy. Sheridan's division is up with Negley.


GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, Commanding.
[DECEMBER 30, 1862.]
General NEGLEY:
You will move on and keep even with General Crittenden's advance, and have camp ready to move at any time.
THOMAS,
General.

HEADQUARTERS CENTER, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS, December 30, 1862.
General ROSECRANS:
            I have ordered General Negley to push the enemy as far as possible.


     GEO. H. THOMAS,
     Major-General, Commanding.


HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS, December 30, 1862.
Major-General THOMAS:
   That's right.


    ROSECRANS.


HEADQUARTERS CENTER, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp before Murfreesborough, December 30, 1862.
Brigadier-General NEGLEY:
    Make arrangements to hold your position as you are. If your troops are too far advanced, draw them in a little. Keep out strong skirmishing parties, and be prepared to advance early to-morrow morning. General Thomas has gone to his camp, back 1 mile, but will see you in person before you advance.
   Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


   [GEO. E. FLYNT,]
   Major and Chief of Staff.


HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,
LEFT WING, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, December 30, 1862.
Colonel HAZEN,
Commanding Second Brigade:
   The order of battle and of march to-day, as suggested by General Rosecrans, is that there shall be intervals between the first and second lines of advance brigade of about 300 yards. General Cruft and Colonel Grose, will immediately examine the ground, to see if such positions can be found for their rear lines as will afford that interval, and, if possible, will withdraw them. This is only important in case of a battle himself ready to move in any direction, and will gradually gain the interval between the leading brigades, holding himself in proper supporting distance. Second line will not be advanced until absolutely needed, and will then be used to relieve or support exhausted men. Fight by brigades.
    By order of Brigadier-General Palmer:


    D. W. NORTON,
    Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.


HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, December 30, 1862-9.50 a.m.
Lieutenant-General POLK:
   GENERAL: The dispatch of General Wharton is received. The general commanding directs me to say that the indications of the enemy now are to cross the river in front of General Hardee.


    GEORGE WM. BRENT,
    Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
December 30, 1862-11 a.m.
Major-General THOMAS:
    Firing heard in the direction of Jefferson. Have sent to ask Rousseau if brigade there has been withdrawn, and to order it back if it has left, unless there is a strong regiment left there. Write a note to Walker, which I will send by courier, to come up as soon as possible.
    By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans:


   C. GODDARD,
   Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS, December 30, 1862-12.46 p.m.
Major-General THOMAS:
   It seems there is some delay in the movements of McCook. Until the fight is south, Negley ought not to separate from him.
    By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans:


   FRANK S. BOND,
   Acting Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, December 30, 1862-1.30 p.m.
Major GEORGE E. FLYNT:
    Colonel Starkweather, at 10.30 a.m. to-day, sent dispatch (just reached me) saying he was attacked in force, and it would not do to leave one regiment alone at Jefferson Crossing; it would be captured, and he awaited further orders; that a part of his train had been captured; that the enemy was reported 3,000 strong on the opposite side of the river, but that half that number was probably correct; that he had lost some men. Inclosed you have dispatch from General Rosecrans, in answer to which I inclosed Colonel Starkweather's report, deeming it necessary to give to him an immediate reply, with such information as I had; but my dispatch was directed to you or Colonel Garesche. If you receive it, will you please forward it to General Rosecrans, and I will make no further reply to him.
   Very respectfully,



     LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU,
     Major-General.
     [Indorsement.]


Received in answer to a dispatch from General Wharton, announcing that the enemy's right did not extend as far as our left at 10.25 a.m.

DECEMBER 30, 1862-2.30 p.m. [Received 2.45 p.m.]
Lieutenant-General POLK:
    GENERAL: I have three regiments in the enemy's rear; the remainder are held to prevent a movement on our left. As yet the enemy are not farther left than Manigault's center. As soon as they develop their left I will do all I can to ruin them in their rear. General Cheatham will be advised promptly.
    Respectfully,


   JNO. A. WHARTON,
   Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Murfreesborough, December 30, 1862-1.50 p.m.
[Major-General WITHERS:]
    GENERAL: The general commanding directs that a vigorous assault be made by our left on the right of the enemy to-morrow morning as early as it is light enough to see. Your right will remain stationary, and be the pivot on which the movement will be made. Your left will swing around and correspond with the movement of General McCown's division on your left. In making this movement, the general desires that your attack shall be vigorous and persistent. In so doing, keep up the touch of elbows to the right, in order that the line may be unbroken. The movement of the second line will correspond with that of the first.
    Very respectfully,





   GEORGE WM. BRENT,
   Assistant Adjutant-General.


HEADQUARTERS CENTER, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp before Murfreesborough, December 30, 1862.
Major-General ROUSSEAU,
Commanding Third Division:
    Move with your command at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning to the ground occupied by General Crittenden on the night of the 29th, 1862, and await orders from General Thomas. Send orders to Colonel Starkweather to join his division as soon as relieved by General Stanley, but on no account to move unless relieved.
    Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    [GEO. E. FLYNT,]
    Major and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS CENTER, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp before Murfreesborough, December 30, 1862.
Colonel M. B. WALKER,
Commanding First Brigade:

    March with your brigade on the Murfreesborough pike join Major-General Rousseau's division as soon as relieved by General Stanley's  troops. In case you do not see the general commanding on your arrival, you will take position in rear and to the left of Rousseau's command, to act as a reserve, or to attack, if necessary. Bring forward your train and park it with Rousseau's, and furnish your men with two days' rations in haversacks.

    Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    [GEO. E. FLYNT,]
    Major and Chief of Staff.


OFFICE CHIEF OF POLICE,
Nashville, December 30, 1862.
Major-General ROSECRANS:
   C. H. Ball and Miss Collins, whom I had sent to Murfreesborough Friday night, by way of Lebanon, just in. On their way all troops were moving toward Murfreesborough. Were in Murfreesborough from Saturday nigh to Sunday, at 1 p.m. Found troops moving out toward La Vergne, evidently concentrating on Murfreesborough, drawing in right and left wings. General Bragg himself said that his force was 60,000, well armed and clothed. Were loading munitions of war in large amounts on railroad cars. No fortifications. Left there at 1 p.m. Sunday, on Shellbyville pike. Passed train of 29 wagons of flour, going into Murfreesborough. All their wagon transportation concentrated in Murfreesborough, loaded and loading. Was informed by Major McConnico, in personal conversation, that they had about 40,000 troops. These officers informed me that they should probably retreat back to the flat lands below Murfreesborough, and there could easily outflank the Federals.


    WM. TRUESDAIL,
   Chief of Police.


HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, December 30, 1862.
General DAVIS,
Commanding First Division, Right Wing:
   The following will be the programme to-morrow: If the rebels attack you in the morning, you must refuse your right, and fall back slowly, contesting the ground inch by inch, and fight as well as the rebels fought you to-day. If they do not attack you, you will attack warmly, not vigorously. General Crittenden's corps will cross the river and take Murfreesborough, and attack any force in rear that falls in front of him, and try and work on the line in your front. Be sure that each and every one of your brigade commanders understand the orders. The time of the attack on our side will be designated. I will go over to see General Rosecrans to-night.
    By command of Major-General McCook:


    G. P. THRUSTON,
    Ordnance Officer and Acting Aide-de-Camp.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 900...Series I., Vol. 20, Part 2, Pages 271, 275-280, 469.

Generals Newton and Cochrane had gone to see the President and indicated in its demoralized state the Army of the Potomac could not effectively fight.  The leadership of the Army of the Potomac was, in the aftermath of McClellan's removal, divided and ineffective.

In Tennessee Rosecrans is forming his army into a line parallel to that of Bragg's.  The various dispatches indicate how difficult the task of a battlefield commander was in bringing an army onto the field in proper position.

December 29, 1862 (Monday): Wheeler Buys Time

Confederate Cavalry Attacks Union Wagons (NPS.GOV)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp near La Vergne, December 29, 1862-1 a.m.
Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Center, Stewartsborough:
GENERAL: General Crittenden reports that the regiment of cavalry sent down to Lizzard's had just returned, having encountered the enemy in such force at the ford, 2 miles in advance of our outposts, as to think it imprudent to go on. Their fires extended considerably to the right of our position, and they had been on this side of the creek during the day. Under these circumstances the general wishes you to throw out at once a strong picket of cavalry, supported by at least a regiment of infantry, along that road on this side of the creek, directing them to keep a sharp lookout and themselves concealed. In the morning he wants a strong infantry and cavalry reconnaissance pushed forward in that direction.
    I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


   J. P. GARESCHE,
   Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp near La Vergne, December 29, 1862-1.50 a.m.
Colonel WALKER,
Commanding First Brigade, First Division, Center, Nolensville:
    A cavalry reconnaissance made this evening has developed the presence of the enemy (apparently heavy force) at the ford of Stewart's Creek, 2 miles in advance of the outposts of our right. Such being the case, the general desires you to be wary, guarding well your front and exposed flank.
    I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    J. P. GARESCHE,
    Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.


HEADQUARTERS, December 29, 1862-7.50 a.m.
Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Center:
    The general commanding desires an immediate report from you of the state of things along your lines, and those of the enemy in front of you.
     By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans:


    J. P. GARESCHE,
    Chief of Staff.

DECEMBER 29 (?), 1862.
Major-General POLK:
    GENERAL: Wheeler is evidently premature, and will probably prevent any attack to-day. He was deceived by the heavy guns we heard about 9.30 a.m. We have no new developments from any direction. Should it prove no enemy is in front of McCown, I propose withdrawing two of his brigades as the reserve; now I have none.


    Yours, very truly,
    BRAXTON BRAGG.


HEADQUARTERS CENTER, December 29, 1862.
Major-General CRITTENDEN:
Negley is moving up, and General Rosecrans desires you to move on. Your teams have been ordered to follow.


    GEO. H. THOMAS,
    Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-EIGHTH BRIGADE,
Camp north side of Stone's River, December 29, 1862.
WILLIAM P. McDOWELL,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Division:
    SIR: I have the honor to report that we arrived here all safe, and that I have occupied the position as per orders. The enemy were here in force on Saturday, but left here on hearing that our forces were advancing, burning the bridge over the East Fork of Stone's River, and barricading the highway with rails, &c.; consequently it is impossible to advance farther on the pike in this direction, as the river (East Fork) is not fordable at this point; may be below. Will examine the country as thoroughly as possible under the circumstances, and report by courier in the morning.
    Yours, truly,


    JOHN C. STARKWEATHER,
    Colonel, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp near La Vergne, December 29, 1862-2 p.m.
Major-General McCOOK:
    Your dispatch just received. The general commanding directs me to say that you had better leave Stanley to observe your flank and rear south of Triune. He is informed that there is no doubt plenty of ammunition in Nashville for any caliber of arms Stanley has. It is his fault if he is out, and he must provide without delay; if he can do no better, he must go back. Walker's three regiments have been ordered to be left at Nolensville to close that line. He thinks it would be well if you could leave some force, one or two regiments, at Triune. Your choice of Bole Jack line is approved. If that road is good, you can place a brigade south of Lane's store, if you deem it prudent.
    I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    J. P. GARESCHE,
    Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

HDQRS. RIGHT WING, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, [December 29, 1862.]
[General ROSECRANS:]
GENERAL: I neglected to inform you that I have failed to find Negley, Thomas, or Rousseau. I heard Negley was coming up right bank of Stewart's Creek. He is not here. I will persevere, and try and find him by morning.


    McCOOK,
    Major-General.


    [Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING,
Three Miles from Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, December 29, 1862-3 p.m.
Colonel GARESCHE,
Chief of Staff:
    The rebels appeared in strong force in my front, but retired. I think they came out to burn the bridge over Overall's Creek. I will not go beyond Wilkinson's Cross-Roads until further orders. I send you notes from Stanley and Sheridan, which will be of importance to you. They are undoubtedly in force, and intend to fight at Stone's River. You are now in about half hour communication of me. I have had Zahm and three regiments of cavalry on the Franklin road. Two of my divisions have already passed Lizzard's, and Johnson, my reserve, left one brigade at Triune, and on in charge of the ammunition train; consequently he has but one brigade. I can, if you wish, picket that road by a brigade of infantry, but Zahm will sleep there to-night. I will have all up to Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, snug, and wait your orders.


    A. McD. McCOOK,
    Major-General, Commanding.

    [Inclosure.]

WILKINSON'S CROSS-ROADS.
Major-General McCOOK:
GENERAL: Our cavalry are about 2 miles beyond this. Zahm is abreast with us; he has been fighting some. The burning going on seems to be the Nashville pike bridge over Stone's River. The prisoners and negroes say the rebs are in line of battle from the Franklin to the Nashville pike. They have moved all their camps. I will arrange to bivouac if you have no orders.


    D. S STANLEY,
    Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Stewart's Creek, December 29, 1862-3.20 p.m.
Major-General McCOOK:
GENERAL: Your dispatch commanding intelligence conveyed by Mr. Lane, General Sheridan's scout, is received. This, if true, makes it very important that we should know in what direction Hardee has retired. Try and ascertain, adn report as soon as you possibly can. Let us know, too, the position of your troops, of the advanced division particularly, and what were the obstacles which interposed, if any, besides the fog, in the way of your advance yesterday. Since my last dispatch, in which I announced to you that Crittenden has taken and holds the bridge over Stewart's Creek, on the Murfreesborough pike, we have learned that Hazen has also taken and was in possession of that on the Jefferson pike.
    I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    C. GODDARD,
    Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Stewart's Creek, Murfreesborough Pike, December 29, 1862-4.02 p.m.
Major-General McCOOK:
    GENERAL: Your dispatch, 12.20 m., just received. Palmer's division is within 3 miles of Murfreesborough. No firing since early this morning. Crittenden's corps has crossed Stewart's Creek; his trains are following. Your conjectures are probably correct. There is no necessary of your going into Murfreesborough to-night, if that is the case. Come on until you reach the Wilkinson pike, whenever you can find forage. Should it prove,as we now believe, the enemy has made a precipitate retreat from Murfreesborough, you had better move on Salem, where you will probably find forage, and where you can receive your supplies by Murfreesborough pike. If you can find forage, push a reconnoitering party of two brigades down the road toward Shelbyville to Middleton.
     If you see General Stanley, tell him to direct his cavalry to look out particularly for forage west of Salem, and to push on down to Shelbyville. Negley is moving on Wilkinson's Cross-Roads.
     I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    C. GODDARD,
    Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. RIGHT WING, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Wilkinson's, 5 miles from Stone's River, December 29, 1862-4.25.
General CRITTENDEN:
     DEAR TOM:I am up and ready for work. My cavalry, I hear, have just made an unfortunate dash on some rebel infantry, on the right of Wilkinson pike. I have not heard of Thomas, Rousseau, or Negley to-day. The rebels, so far as my information goes, are in line of battle, their left on the Franklin road and extending to the Murfreesborough pike. All their camps have been struck and baggage sent out on the McMinnville road. I have not heard from Rosecrans to know what to do. I suppose I will get instructions to-night. We all should meet and have a conference; don't you say so? I have had a miserable road to-day.  Was sick yesterday, but am well to-day. Would be glad to see you.
      Respectfully,


    A. McD. McCOOK,
    Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Stewartsborough, December 29, 1862-5.30 p.m.
Major-General McCOOK:
GENERAL: Report from Crittenden's advance, 3.45 p.m. says the enemy in line of battle on the east side of Stone' River-infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Crittenden has been ordered to form in order of battle out of cannon range, covering his flank down Stone's River to Jefferson pike, two divisions in front across Murfreesborough road, one in reserve, Negley to come in on his right. Place your left division on Negley's right, in two lines. Put your right facing a little more to the south, I should judge, from what I know of the country, and then reconnoiter in force south toward Franklin road. Send cavalry to the west down toward Salem, the main point being to cover your right against a possibility of a surprise, and to ascertain if the enemy intend to fight altogether behind Stone's River. Establish signal stations, if you can, to communicate. I expect to be down at the front.
     By order of General Rosecrans:


    C. GODDARD,
    Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. RIGHT WING, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, December 29, 1862-10.20 p.m.
Colonel GARESCHE,
Chief of Staff;
     COLONEL: I have ordered the brigade of Johnson's division left at Triune to march by night to join me here. They will be here by daylight in the morning. It gives me 2,000 more good men, and as all is concentrated at Murfreesborough and Triune, not in our line of communication, I deem it useless there. All quiet in my front. I will attend to my right. I have Colonel Zahm and three regiments of cavalry on that road, and one-half of his men in the saddle patrolling. I will have timely warning. I have cavalry in search of Negley, but have failed to find him as yet. Zahm drove the rebels in within sight of Murfreesborough, when he was shelled from other side of Stone's River. How will I communicate with you now, as the courier line is withdrawn? Stanley will attend to the roads south. Your idea about the line is right. My right is retired, and, I think, safe. The cars are very busy, running in and out of Murfreesborough, to what effect none but a rebel knows. My headquarters are exactly on the cross-roads. I have no baggage, and am staying with Johnson, and I hope to see you to-night or early in the morning.


    A. McD. McCOOK,
    Major-General.



HEADQUARTERS, December 29, 1862-11 p.m.
[General ROSECRANS:]
GENERAL: This just received. I have not answered it, as you gave direction to have General McCook found, and as he (McCook) says he will persevere,and try to find Negley till morning, answer would do no good.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,




    C. R. THOMPSON,
    Captain and Aide-de-Camp.

Series I., Vol. 20, Part 2, Pages 261-270, 468

Rosecran's forces are near Murfreesboro but they have been severely delayed by Wheeler's Cavalry, which rode completely around their advance and destroyed a number of wagon trains.  Rosecrans has a small advantage in numbers (about 40,000 versus 35,000) but Bragg is in a position of his own choosing.

December 28, 1862 (Sunday): Moving on Murfreesboro

Stone's River (nps.gov)

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp on Murfreesborough Pike, December 28,[1862]-11.45 a.m.
Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Center:
    Your dispatch of this date, hour not given, is just received. Information just received, and considered perfectly reliable, shows a stubborn determination on the part of the enemy to fight this side of Murfreesborough. Bragg says, if we defeat him, our victory shall cost us 10,000 men. Kirby Smith has positively gone to Mississippi with 10,000 men, leaving behind McCown's division, 5,000 strong, and his cavalry under Pegram. We must, therefore, close in upon them as rapidly as possible. The general desires me to say to you that Rousseau must be on Stewart's Creek this night, and, as the road is so bad, you must lose no time in putting him in motion. Take forage enough only for the horses of the staff and artillery. Walker's brigade can cover your rear and right flank. Take care of your wagons, and bring them up afterward. McCook is ordered to push on toward Murfreesborough with all his available force. I am about to send a courier down to Nashville to order Rousseau's supply train, if not started, up the Murfreesborough pike, so as to avoid the bad cross-road from Nolensville over to Stewartsborough. To make assurance doubly sure, had you not better send a courier down to Nolensville pike to intercept the train, and, if not too far advanced, send it back and round? We shall move up in a few hours to La Vergne, where general headquarters will be established,and from which point we shall run a line of couriers out to Nolensville pike.
     I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    J. P. GARESCHE,
   Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 20, Part 2, Page 258.

Wheeler's cavalry slowed Rosecrans' advance southeast along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga R.R. and to the right.  Bragg deployed his forces between Triune and Murfreesboro to confront the 45,000 man force advancing on him.  Rosecrans had nearly 80,000 men at his command, but had to leave large portions of his force along his route to defend his line of communication.

December 27, 1862 (Saturday): Rosecrans Advances

Benjamin S. Ewell

CHATTANOOGA, December 27, 1862.
Lieutenant General E. K. SMITH,
Knoxville, Tenn.:
     The following dispatch just received from General Gragg:
Enemy advancing in heavy force. Send forward all troops and notify officers on trains to return by first cars.


     B. BRAGG.

    Had not all troops within reach of this place better be immediately sent on? Advise me by telegraph.
    Respectfully,

    BENJ. S. EWELL,
   Assistant Adjutant-General.

 
CHATTANOOGA, December 27, 1862.
General J. E. JOHNSON, Jackson, Miss.:
    General Gragg designated no troops, but wanted any that could be sent. I telegraphed to General E. K. Smith. He has only 1,200 troops in this part of his command. He will concentrate them at Kingston. I will send him your orders, and will in the meantime send part of the troops from this place and from all points near where there are any that can be spared, however few. General Stevenson's troops have all gone. The telegraph line to Murfreesborough does not work. Wire probably cut.*
    Respectfully,


    BENJ. S. EWELL,
    Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series. I., Vol. 52, Part 2, Page 401.

*This in reply to Johnson's first dispatch, VOL. XX, Part II, p.463. 

Rosecrans is on the march and Bragg knows he is coming.  The first telegraph was used in war only eight years previously in the Crimean War, but already was becoming a factor.  Cutting the wires of the enemy was considered a priority and here Rosecrans is successfully limiting Bragg's ability to communicate.  The Ewell here is the older brother of Dick Ewell and former (and postwar) President of William & Mary College.  He is serving here as A.A.G. to Joe Johnston.

 

December 26, 1862 (Friday): False Alarm

Harper's Ferry

HEADQUARTERS,
Baltimore, Md., December 26, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    The following telegram just received from Brigadier-General Kelley, at Cumberland, dated 9.30 p.m. yesterday:
    General Cluseret sends me dispatch, dated at 9 o'clock last evening had appeared in his front, on the Strasburg and Front Royal road, in strong force, with cavalry and artillery. I have sent him all the cavalry I had to spare from Martinsburg and North Mountain. Please advise General Kenly, and, if possible, have Harper's Ferry strengthened. I intended to have gone there to-day, but cannot now.


    B. F. KELLEY,
    Brigadier-General.

   Cannot Harper's Ferry be re-enforced from Washington?

   ROBT. C. SCHENCK,
   Major-General, Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 26, 1862.
Major-General BURNSIDE,
Falmouth, Va.:
    General Kelley reports that the enemy are reappearing in large force at Strasburg and Front Royal, and it is probable that he will take advantage of the vicinity of the Army of the Potomac to make another raid on Harper's Ferry. This is certainly very disheartening. We have no forces here to send to Harper's Ferry, without again stripping Washington. I am almost at a loss what to say or do.


    H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 26, 1862-4 p.m. (Received 4 p.m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    You can take the whole of General Slocum's corps, if you choose, and I will replace him with General Sigel's. I will communicate further in half an hour.


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 26, 1862-7.30 p.m.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington:
     Do you desire the whole of General Slocum's corps? If you desire it, I will order him to at once proceed to Harper's Ferry, and replace him by General Sigel's command.


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 26, 1862.
Major-General BURNSIDE,
Falmouth, Va.:
     General Dix is also of the opinion that the enemy's force against him has increased, and asks for re-enforcements.


     H. W. HALLECK,
     General-in-Chief.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Pages886, 887.

Halleck was no doubt alarmed by the reports of an advance on Harper's Ferry.  It would develop that the advance was merely probes by cavalry forces in the area.  It says something about the state of intelligence gathering that on the strength of such sketchy reports Burnside was willing to offer to send a complete corp to Harper's Ferry.

December 25, 1862 (Thursday): A Truce Broken

General Horatio P. Van Cleve

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
Near Nashville, Tenn., December 25, 1862.
MAJOR:Pursuant to directions from Major-General Rosecrans, I have the honor to report the circumstances connected with the capture of a portion of the outposts in my front on the 15th instant, and the alleged detention of Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkins, of the Confederate Army, while at my lines with a flag of truce. Colonel Hawkins came to my outposts about 2 p.m. of the 15th instant, with communication for the general commanding, accompanied by several civilians and ladies, who desired to go to Nashville. Word was immediately sent to department headquarters, but, before a messenger could return, a scouting party of the First Alabama Cavalry attacked and captured all the cavalry outposts,and immediately retreated to the rebel lines. Colonel Hawkins was at this time waiting at my outposts for the arrival of a staff officer from the general commanding, and, when the enemy retreated, went with them beyond my lines. He presented himself the next morning at my infantry outposts, when he was placed under guard by Colonel Knifler [Knefler?], Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania [Indiana?] Volunteers, and the case reported to me for instructions. Colonel Knifler [Knefler?] believed Colonel Hawkins was in some respect responsible for the attack on the pickets the day before, and proposed to guard against a repetition of the occurrence. Soon after, Lieutenant-Colonel Hepburn, of General Rosecrans' staff, arrived, and Colonel Hawkins' dispatches received, and he sent beyond our lines. Of his subsequent arrest by Captain Knox and Lieutenant-Colonel Dickinson I know nothing, no report of
the occurrence having been made to me. Colonel Hawkins, while at my outpost, was treated with the utmost courtesy, and was not placed under arrest until he presented himself at my infantry outposts under suspicious circumstances, before the position formerly occupied by my cavalry had been retaken, and was very shortly released.
      Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


     H. P. VAN CLEVE,
     Brigadier-General, Commanding Fifth Division.


    Major LYNE STARLING,
    Assistant Adjutant-General, Left Wing.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 20, Part 1, Page 83.

Flags of truce were usually not an issue, but in this case two Union companies had been captured on December 15th following the arrival of a Confederate officer (Hawkins) under a flag of truce. The correspondance related to the matter is extensive and fraught with accusations of violations of the usages of war.  Bragg finally proposed setting up regular hours (Monday and Thursday from 12-4) in order to reduce misunderstandings.

December 24, 1862 (Wednesday): Those Rascals

General John Hunt Morgan

NASHVILLE, December 24, 1862.
Brigadier-General GRANGER,
Bowling Green:
    General Reynolds has the best evidence that Morgan crossed with about 3,000 cavalry or mounted infantry, and a few pieces of artillery. Their object will be to stampede everybody by stories of the magnitude of their force. Be on your guard on that score. Where is Bruce, and where is the Tennessee cavalry? We will catch and kill those rascals yet.


     W. S. ROSECRANS,
     Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 20, Part 2, Page 222.

Confederate cavalry raids under Morgan and Forrest disrupted Union lines of communication, but were not of such force as to do permanent damage.  Rosecrans assessment of their intent appears to have been correct.  He began to look on these raids as an opportunity to move closer to Bragg's main body at Murfreesboro.   

December 23, 1862 (Tuesday): Hearts to Feel and Hearts to Serve

Men of the 5th Company, Washington Artillery

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
Near Fredericksburg, Va., December 23, 1862. Colonel J. B. WALTON,
Commanding Battalion Washington Artillery:
    COLONEL: By direction of the lieutenant-general commanding, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your check for $1,391, the contribution of the troops of your battalion to the fund for the relief of the Fredericksburg sufferers. In making this acknowledgment I and directed to express his admiration for the generous and feeling manner in which your command has responded to the call for relief. The members of the Washington Artillery show that they have hearts to feel as well as hearts to fight.
     I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    G. M. SORREL,
    Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 51, Part 2, Page 666.

The destruction, by war and vandalism, of homes and property in Fredericksburg elicited both outrage for the acts and sympathy for the civilians of the town.  The Washington Artillery was comprised of prominent men of New Orleans and fought in every battle of the Army of Northern Virginia.  It was attached to Longstreet's Corp, for whom Sorrell was A.A.G.

December 22, 1862 (Monday): Saving Mississippi

General John Pemberton

VICKSBURG, MISS., December 22, 1862.
Mr. PRESIDENT:
    From such information as I have been able to obtain, I think that we shall require, to hold this department and the Mississippi River, an active army of about 40,000 men to oppose the troops of Grant and Banks, and garrisons Vicksburg and Port Hudson capable of holding those places against combined attacks until succored by the active army.
    Major-General Smith has about 5,900 artillery and infantry for duty, to defend a line of 10 miles, exclusive of the position of Snyder's Mills, which requires three of his eight regiments. Should the enemy attack by land as well as by water, which is highly probable, almost certain, we would require at least eight more regiments, of 500 or 600 men each.
    I have not seen Port Hudson, but map of the ground gives me the opinion that it requires a garrison as strong as that necessary here. It now amounts to about 5,500 of all arms, so that an addition of as many more will be required there, in all 11,000 or 12,000.
    For the active force, we have now 21,000 men near the Yalabusha.  About 9,000 have been ordered to this department from Lieutenant-General Smith, and it is supposed that an equal force is on its way from Arkansas.
    No more troops can be taken from General Bragg without that danger of enabling Rosecrans to move into Virginia, or to re-enforce Grant. Our great object is to hold the Mississippi. The country beyond the river is as much interested in that object as this, and the loss to us of the Mississippi involves that of the country beyond it. The 8,000 or 10,000 men which are essential to safety ought, therefore, I respectfully suggest, to be taken from Arkansas, to return after the crisis in this department. I firmly believe, however, that our true system of warfare would be to concentrate the forces of the two departments on this side of the Mississippi, beat the enemy here, and then reconquer the country beyond it, which he might have gained in the mean time. I respectfully as Your Excellency's attention to the accompanying letter* of Major-General Smith in relation to the inadequacy of the garrison of Vicksburg, begging you to take his estimate of the force needed, instead of mine, as his is based upon accurate calculation.#
    Most respectfully, your obedient servant,


    J. E. JOHNSTON,
    General.

*Not found.

#Copy was referred by Mr. Davis to General Holmes. See Holmes to Johnston, December 29, 1862, Series, I, Vol. XXXII, Part I. 

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 20, Part 2, Pages 459-460.

Johnston here espouses the entirely logical viewpoint that a)the Mississippi must be held (specifically Vicksburg), and b)the forces needed cannot be supplied by taking them from Bragg in Tennessee.  His best, and only, option was to take men from Arkansas to supply the deficit in Mississippi, the thinking being if Vicksburg was lost Arkansas would soon follow.

December 21, 1862 (Sunday): Ice on the Potomac

U.S.S. Ice Boat (navsource.org)

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington City, December 20, 1862.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington City:
GENERAL: I respectfully request that the Navy Department be requested to cause a powerful gunboat to be ordered into the Potomac, to assist in keeping open the river, which the cold weather threatens to obstruct with ice. I made verbal application, some time since, to the Secretary of the Navy, suggesting the propriety and necessity of such a precaution. I have been informed that the boat formerly known as the Philadelphia City Ice Boat, probably the best boat fitted for this purpose, is now in the Navy, employed as a gunboat. I have given orders to endeavor to charter two steamers in New York or Philadelphia, but fear that it will not be possible to procure efficient vessels for this purpose, and, if the cold continues to increase, there will be full employment for all that can be collected in transporting supplies through the ice to Aquia Creek.
    I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,


   M. C. MEIGS,
   Quartermaster-General.

[Indorsement.]

DECEMBER 21, 1862.
Respectfully referred to the Secretary of War.
It is deemed important that this application be made immediately.


     H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief.


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 868

It was 12 degrees at 7 a.m. on December 21, ("Civil War Weather in Virginia"-Krick) and the Potomac had begun to ice over.  Supplies to the Capital generally came up river to Washington, so keeping the river open was essential.  Unfortunately, the U.S.S. Ice Boat had just been returned to the City of Philadelphia, which had loaned it to the war effort.

December 20, 1862 (Saturday): "...a pair of socks and a pair of drawers".

General William B. Franklin

HEADQUARTERS LEFT GRAND DIVISION, December 20, 1862.
To the PRESIDENT:
The undersigned, holding important commands in the Army of the Potomac, impressed with the belief that a plan of operations of this army may be devised which will be crowned with success, and that the plan of campaign which has already been commenced cannot possibly be successful, present, with diffidence, the following views for consideration. Whether the plan proposed be adopted or not, they consider it their duty to present there views, thinking that, perhaps, they may be suggestive to some other military mind in discussing plans for the future operations of our armies in the East.
1. We believe that the plan of campaign already commenced will not be successful for the following reasons: First. The distance from this point to Richmond is 61 miles. It will be necessary to keep up our communication with Aquia Creek Landing from all points of this route. To effect this, the presence of large bodies of troops on the road will be necessary at many points. The result of making these detachments would be that the enemy will attack them, interrupt the communications, and the army will be obliged to return to drive them away. If the railroad be rebuilt as the army marches, it will be so enormous that a great deal of the strength of the army will be required to guard them, and the troops will be so separated by the trains, and the roads so blocked by them, that the advance and rear of the army could not be within supporting distance of each other.
2. It is the power of the enemy at many points on this route to post himself strongly and defy us. The whole strength of our army may not be sufficient to drive him away, and even were he driven away, at great sacrifice of blood on our part, the result would not be decisive. The losses to him in his strong positions would be comparatively slight, while ours would be enormous.
3. In our opinion, any plan of campaign, to be successful, should possess the following requisites, viz: First. All of the troops available in the East should be massed. Second. They should approach as near to Richmond as possible without an engagement. Third. The line of communication should be absolutely free from danger of interruption.
    A campaign on the James River enables us to fulfill all these conditions more absolutely than any other, for-
1. On the James River our troops from both north and south can be concentrated more rapidly than they can be at any other point.
2. They can be brought to points within 20 miles of Richmond without the risk of an engagement.
3. The communication by the James River can be kept up by the assistance of the Navy without the slightest danger of interruption.
    Some of the details of this plan are the following:
We premise that by concentrating our troops in the East we will be able to raise 250,000 men. Let them be landed on both sides of the river, as near Richmond as possible, 150,000 on the north bank, and 100,000 or more on the south bank, all of them to carry three days' provisions on their persons, and 100 rounds of ammunition, without any other baggage than blankets and shelter tents and a pair of socks and a pair of drawers. Let it be understood that every third day a corps or grand division is provisioned from the river. If this arrangement be practicable (and we think it is), we get rid of all baggage, provisions, and infantry ammunition wagons, and the only vehicles will be the artillery and its ammunition wagons and the ambulances. The mobility of the army, caused by carrying out these, views, will be more like an immense partisan corps than a modern army. The two armies marching up the banks may meet the enemy on or near the river. By means of pontoons, kept afloat, and towed so as to be reached at any point, one army can in a few hours cross to assist the other. It is hardly supposable that the enemy can have force enough to withstand the shock of two such bodies. If the enemy decline to fight on the river, the army on the south bank, or a portion of it, will take possession of the railroads running south from Richmond, while the remainder will proceed to the investment or attack upon Richmond, according to circumstances. Whether the investment of Richmond leads to the destruction or capture of the enemy's army or not, it certainly will lead to the capture of the rebel capital, and the war will be on a better footing than it is now or has any present prospect of being. The troops available for the movement are the Army of the Potomac, the troops in Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, with the exception of those necessary to hold the places occupied, the regiments now in process of organization, and those who are on extra duty and furlough, deserters and stragglers. The number of these last is enormous, and the most stringent measures must be taken to collect them. No excuse should be received for absence.     Some of the troops in Western Virginia might also be detached. The transports should consist of ordinary steamers and large ferry-boats and barges. The ferry-boats may become of the greatest use in transporting troops across James River. With the details of the movement we do not trouble you.
Should the general idea be adopted, these can be thoroughly digested and worked out by the generals and their staffs to whom the execution of the plans is committed.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servants,


    W. B. FRANKLIN,
    Major-General, Commanding Left Wing.


   WM. F. SMITH,
   Major-General, Commanding Sixth Army Corps.

Official Records, Series I. Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 868-870.

Franklin was first in his class (1843) at West Point.  He obviously did not study diplomacy there.  Here he communicates directly with the President.  Smith (known as "Baldy") finished 4th in the class of 1845.  In joining with Franklin he aligned himself with the general who the Republican dominated Committee on the Conduct of the War would blame for the debacle at Fredericksburg (a notion shared by Burnside).  The Committee wanted both generals cashiered from the Army, but Lincoln interceded on Smith's behalf to prevent it (although he could not stop Congress from stalling his approval as Major General).  In January, Burnside would request the removal of both from the Army.

Franklin would bounce around to various lesser commands before being captured during the Monocacy Campaign.  He ended the war "awaiting orders" which never came.  For his troubles, Smith would be sent to Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania.  For Lincoln's part, he believed the letter (received while Burnside was in Washington to consult with the President and Stanton) presented "the old question" of the overland advance against the line of the James and noted a good portion of the troops described will still have to be maintained in Northern Virginia.

December 19, 1862 (Friday): Davis Visits the Troops

General Martin Luther Smith

JACKSON, MISS., December 19, 1862
Major-General MARTIN L. SMITH, Vicksburg:
    President Davis and myself leave here by train this evening for Vicksburg, with 6 staff officers.


    J. E. JOHNSTON,
    General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 20, Part 2, Page 454.

Davis and Johnston were on the way to visit Pemberton at Vicksburg.  Davis wanted to reinforce Pemberton with Bragg's army, which Johnston opposed.  This would leave Tennessee open to the Union and create an opportunity to shift forces eastward to threaten Lee in Virginia.  Johnston proposed using Holmes army in Arkansas to serve the same purpose, but Davis didn't believe this force was sufficient.  Smith was an engineer by trade and designed the defenses of Vicksburg.  He was a rarity in the army, a native of New York state who fought for the Confederacy.

December 18, 1862 (Thursday): Official Notice Taken

General T. R. R. Cobb

GENERAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS, Numbers 53.
Near Fredericksburg, Va., December 18, 1862
     The general commanding the First Corps desires to express his gratitude for the good conduct of his troops in the late encounter with the enemy. They had so often attested their valor upon the battle-fields of Virginia and Maryland that he looked for nothing less than steadiness in them when the shock of battle should come; yet notwithstanding he knew them to be steadfast veterans, they still kindle in him a new admiration by the remarkable firmness with which defended Marye's Hill. A more frightful attack of the enemy has not been seen during the war; they approached within thirty paces of your lines, again and again returning with fresh men to the assault. But you did not yield a step; you stood by your posts and filled the field before you with slain. The general commanding congratulates the troops upon the humiliating retreat to which the invader has been forced. Every such disaster to his arms brings us nearer to the happy and peaceful enjoyments of our homes and our families; at the same time he hopes to interest officers and men of this command in the afflictions which have come upon the people of Fredericksburg. Their conduct from the time the two armies appeared before the town has [been] marked with the most self-sacrificing devotion to their country; and now that their homes have been sacked by the foe let not their patience and cheerfulness under these calamities remove from our mind the remembrance of their losses and their wants. The general therefore directs that the commanding officers of this corps will open subscription lists for the relief of the sufferers of Fredericksburg.
     By command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet:


    G. M. SORREL,
    Assistant Adjutant-General.


CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, December 18, 1862.
His Excellency FRANCIS W. PICKENS,
Governor of South Carolina:
    SIR: While South Carolina is mourning the loss of the gallant and distinguished son, General Maxcy Gregg, permit me to join in your sorrow for his death. From my first acquaintance, when you sent, him with his gallant regiment to the defense of our frontier in Virginia, I have admired his disinterested patriotism and his unselfish devotion. He has always been at the post of duty and of danger, and his services in this army have been of inestimable value, and his loss is deeply lamented. In its greatest triumphs and its bloodiest battles he has borne a distinguished part. On the Chickahominy, on the plains of Manassas, at Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Shepherdstown he led his brigade with distinguished skill and dauntless valor. On the wooded heights of Fredericksburg he fell, in front of his brigade, in close conflict with the advancing foe. The death of such a man is a costly sacrifice, for it is to men of his high integrity and commanding intellect that the country must look to give character to her councils, that she may be respected and honored by all nations. Among those of his State who will proudly read the history of his deeds, may many be found to imitate his noble example.
     I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,


    R. E. LEE,
    General.


CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 18, 1862.
General H. COBB:
    GENERAL: I beg leave to express my sympathy in your great sorrow. Your noble and gallant brother has met a soldier's death, and God grant that this army and our country may never be called upon again to mourn so great a sacrifice.
Of his merits, his lofty intellect, his genius, his accomplishments, his professional fame, and above all his true Christian character, I need not speak to you, who knew him so intimately and well. But as a patriot and soldier, his death has left a gap in the army which his military aptitude and skill renders it hard to fill. In the battle of Fredericksburg he won an immortal name of himself and his brigade. Hour after hour he held his position in front of our batteries, while division after division of the enemy was hurled against him. He announced the determination of himself and his men to leave their post until the enemy was beaten back, and, with unshaken courage and fortitude, he kept his promise. May God give consolation to this effected family, and may the name and fame of the Christian statesman and soldier be cherished as a bright example and holy remembrance.
    With great esteem, your obedient servant,


    R. E. LEE,
    General.


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 51, Part 2, Pages 663, 1067, 1068.

The conclusion of a battle brings administrative duties.  For General Longstreet the paying of due honors to his troops.  For Lee, expressions of sympathy to South Carolina's Governor for the loss of Maxcy Gregg and to Howell Cobb for the loss of his brother, T.R.R. Cobb.

 

December 17, 1862 (Wednesday): Burnside's Answer

General Ambrose Burnside

Major-General HALLECK.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 17, 1862.
    I have the honor to offer the following reasons for moving the Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock sooner than was anticipated by the President, Secretary, or yourself, and for crossing at a point different from the one indicated to you at our last meeting at the President's:
    During my preparations for crossing at the place I had at first selected, I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the river and elsewhere, thus waking his defenses in front; and I also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg; and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place, to separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces behind and on the crests in the rear of the town, in which case we should fight him with great advantages in our favor. To do this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest, which height commanded a new road, lately built by the enemy for purposes of more rapid communication along his lines; which point gained, his positions along the crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he could have been driven from them easily by an attack on his front, in connection with a movement in rear of the crest.
    How near we came to accomplishing our object future reports will show. But for the fog and unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours more to concentrate his forces in his strong positions, we would almost certainly have succeeded; in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days-long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds and fight us with his infantry. After which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, and without the loss of men or property.
    As the day broke, our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade; not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.
    To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of this recrossing in the face of the enemy I owe everything. For the failure in the attack I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them was never excelled, and would have carried the points, had it been possible.
To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathy, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayers for their comfort and final recovery.
    The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton onto this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary, and yourself, and that you have left the whole management in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible.
    I will visit you very soon and give you more definite information, and finally will send you my detailed report, in which a special acknowledgment will be made of the services of the different grand divisions, corps, and my general and personal staff departments of the Army of the Potomac, to whom I am much indebted for their hearty support and co-operation.
    I will add here that the movement was made earlier than you expected, and after the President, Secretary, and yourself requested me not to be in haste, for the reason that we were supplied much sooner by the different staff departments than was anticipated when I last saw you.
    Our killed amounted to 1,152; our wounded, about 9,000; our prisoners, about 700, which have been paroled and exchanged for about the same number taken by us.* The wounded were all removed to this side of the river before the evacuation, and are being well cared for, and the dead were all buried under a flag of truce. The surgeon reports a much larger proportion than usual of slight wounds, 1,630 only being treated in hospitals.
    I am glad to represent the army at the present time in good condition.
    Thanking the Government for that entire support and confidence which I have always received from them, I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

*But see revised statement, pp.129-142. 

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 67.

Burnside steps through the decision making process during the campaign, beginning with the decision not to move toward Warrenton and attempt to interpose between Longstreet and Jackson.  With hindsight, this was not a bad decision.  Lee believed Jackson could move to Culpeper and hold Burnside's troops, but still reunite with Longstreet before Burnside could finish the movement.  In any case, Jackson made the point moot by crossing at Fisher's Gap and coming up by way of Madison Court House.

At this point Burnside desired, and the administration seems to have concurred, with a move in the vicinity of Port Royal.  But the slowness of the arrival of pontoon bridges, and the alacrity with which Lee posted Jackson's troops in the area negated this move.  Where Burnside appears to have erred was in believing he could move directly on Fredericksburg before Lee could bring up Jackson front the Port Royal area.  Instead of seizing the key military road behind the Confederate line described here, and compromising the rebel positions on Marye's Heights after breaking through, his forces were fed into the grinder piece meal to no good effect.

The comments regarding the ratio of wounded requiring hospital treatment (1,630) to total wounded (9,000) is interesting if this number is accurate.  It would means the ratio of killed to seriously wounded was very high, but the number wounded to the extent of being out of action was not high. 

At this point Burnside, Halleck, and Lincoln are considering the options to renew the offensive, primarily by moving across the river either above (as at Chancellorsville) or below (at Port Royal).

December 16, 1862 (Tuesday):The President Desires

Part of the Potomac Flotilla in Action at Aquia Creek (history.navy.mil)

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, December 16, 1862.
Major-General BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Va.:
     The President desires that you report the reasons of your withdrawal as soon as possible.


     H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 16, 1862-5.30 p.m. [Received 6 p.m.]
     Your dispatch is received. The army was withdrawn to this side of the river because I felt the positions in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us.
     I hope this explanation will be satisfactory to the President. The army was withdrawn at night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men.
     I have sent Colonel Aspinwall to you this afternoon, who can give you full accounts of the affairs at the present moment. I will send you a more full dispatch to-morrow.


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General, Commanding.


Off Oaken Brow, Va., December 16, 1862.
General AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding the Army, &c.:
    MY DEAR GENERAL: I had the pleasure last evening of inclosing a copy of my notification to the authorities at Port Royal, and also a copy of Lieutenant-Colonel McGruder's reply.
We were all ready this morning, and some of the vessels under way to go to the town, when your message came that you were recrossing the Rappahannock, and that both Colonel Davis and myself must be governed accordingly.
     As we heard no firing above, and as all the effect of our feint had been produced as far as a diversion of troops was concerned, I deemed the destruction of the town at present unnecessary, and I therefore decided not to attack it. We are now lying as before, within twenty minutes' steaming of Port Royal, and awaiting further instructions from you.
     I am, your obedient servant,


     SAMUEL MAGAW,
     Lieutenant-Commander, &c.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Pages 66, 858.

As usual, Lincoln was meeting with various military leaders, most recently Generals Irwin McDowell and Herman Haupt (the engineer par excellence).  Haupt was advancing the idea of a seven man council to plan campaigns.  There was also discussion about this time of a cabinet restructuring.  Lincoln is often portrayed as the calm voice of reason in military councils, but a review of this period of the war shows he was struggling to find generals he could have confidence in and was prone to second guessing the ones he had.  The second item here describes a neglected aspect of the Fredericksburg campaign, which is the Navy's role.  With ships laying off Pratt's Bluff (where the Confederates had batteries), the Navy was prepared to head up river with the Potomac flotilla and destroy the town, if requested.  But, as Burnside had already retreated, this was not done.

December 15, 1862 (Monday): Burnside Prepares to Exit

Barnard House, Fredericksburg, Destroyed in Battle (Library of Congress)

HEADQUARTERS, December 15, 1862-7.15.
Yesterday was spent by the enemy in caring for his wounded and burying his dead. He retains his position under cover of his guns on the north bank of the Rappahannock.


    R. E. LEE,
    General, Commanding.

    Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON.

HEADQUARTERS, December 15, 1862.
    No attempt to advance has been made by the enemy to-day. He has been busy collecting his dead and wounded, and this afternoon sent a flag of truce to obtain those within our lines. He commenced this evening to fortify his position. General [George D.] Bayard, U. S. Cavalry, and General [C. Feger] Jackson, of Pennsylvania, were killed on the 13th.


     R. E. LEE.

     Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 15, 1862.
Major-General HOOKER,
Commanding Center Grand Division:
    GENERAL: The commanding general directs that all the troops now occupying the right bank of the Rappahannock be withdrawn to-night, excepting General Butterfield's corps, which will occupy and hold Fredericksburg. Major-General Sumner has given orders that his command be removed, under your directions. The two divisions of your command now on the left will be ordered to rejoin you as soon as they cross the river.
    Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    JNO. G. PARKE,
    Chief of Staff.


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 548, 76.

Burnside had decided to return, after much consideration, to the northern banks of the Rappahanock.  This ended the campaign for the moment, but left the status quo in place. 

December 14, 1862 (Sunday): Aftermath

The Sunken Road, Fredericksburg (NPS)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 14, 1862-4 a.m. [Received 4.30 a.m.]
    I have just returned from the field. Our troops are all over the river. We hold the first ridge outside the town, and 3 miles below. We hope to carry the crest to-day. Our loss is heavy-say, 5,000.


A. E. BURNSIDE,
Major-General.

The PRESIDENT.
[Copy to General Halleck.]


HEADQUARTERS LEFT GRAND DIVISION,
December 14, 1862-10.10 a.m.
Major-General BURNSIDE, Phillips House:
    Several new batteries of the enemy appear to have been placed on our front and the left. An attack of the enemy seems to be expected soon.


    JAS. A. HARDIE,
    Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS [LEFT GRAND DIVISION],
December 14, 1862-12 m. (Received 12.30 p.m.)
General BURNSIDE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
    Nothing new; awaiting attack from the enemy moment. They are placing two new batteries in our front. Constant and annoying skirmish fire. Enemy endeavoring to pick off gunners and horses of our batteries. Franklin maintains a skirmish fire to keep them off.


     JAS. A. HARDIE,
     Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS LEFT GRAND DIVISION,
December 14, 1862-12.40 p.m. (Received 1.35 p.m.)
Major-General BURNSIDE:
    No development yet of enemy. Skirmishers of enemy very spiteful. Battery of enemy on river enfilades our left. De Russy to play on it.
    All agree that the indications are threatening of an attack of massed troops soon, on our left and front, probably. Enemy digging rifle-pits however. Must have a development soon of enemy's design. Franklin wants to hear from you. It is very important to know of the movements of the Ninth Corps, for Franklin wants to assist by a demonstration, if not attacked before long.


    JAS. A. HARDIE,
    Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS LEFT GRAND DIVISION,
December 14, 1862-2 p.m.
General BURNSIDE:
    Nothing new as yet. What news from the right?


    JAS. A. HARDIE,
    Brigadier-General of Volunteers.


FREDERICKSBURG, December 14, 1862.
Colonel LEWIS RICHMOND,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac:
     COLONEL: I desire to call the attention of the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac to the great number of troops and batteries in this city, and to the danger to which they are exposed.
Should the enemy be disposed to shell it, the consequence of this would necessarily cause loss of life and destruction of property. I respectfully suggest that all the troops be transferred to the opposite side of the river, except two divisions, that number being all that will be required to hold the city. The troops will be much more comfortable and much less likely to demoralizing influences in their camps than here. I also recommend that instructions be given the provost-marshal-general to have every house in town searched, and all soldiers found in them sent to their regiments.
     I make these suggestions on the presumption that no immediate advance is contemplated from this point.
     Everything is quiet here to-night.
     My headquarters are at the corner of Hanover and Princess Anne streets.
     I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS CENTER GRAND DIVISION,
Fredericksburg, Va., December 14, 1862.
Brigadier-General COUCH,
Commanding Corps:
    The major-general commanding Fredericksburg requests that you will relieve two brigades of General Sykes' division to-night and that you will give directions, in case of an alarm, for your troops in the city to stand to their arms.
    The general is of the opinion that the advanced line of pickets is unnecessarily large, and he requests that it be considerably reduced.
    Please give instructions to the officer in command of your relieving arty to confer with General Sykes before proceeding to relieve his troops.
    Headquarters to-night will be at the corner of Hanover and Princess Anne streets.


    Very respectfully, &c.,
    JOS. DICKINSON,
    Assistant Adjutant-General.


Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR.
FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 14, 1862.
    I am informed by chief of ordnance of this army that the train now on the road contains all the ammunition prepared in Richmond. I beg that every exertion be made to provide additional supplies, as there is every indication that it will be needed.


    R. E. LEE,
    General, Commanding.


Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, December 14, 1862.
    SIR: On the night of the 10th instant, the enemy commenced to throw three bridges over the Rappahannock, two at Fredericksburg and the third about 1 1/2 miles below, near the mouth of Deep Run. The plain on which Fredericksburg stands is so completely commanded by the hills of Stafford (in possession of the enemy) that no effectual opposition could be offered to the construction of the bridges or the passage of the river without exposing our troops to the destructive fire of his numerous batteries. Positions were, therefore, selected to oppose his advance after crossing. The narrowness of the Rappahannock, its winding course, and deep bed afforded opportunity for the construction of bridges at points beyond the reach of our artillery, and the banks had to be watched by skirmishers. The latter, sheltering themselves behind the houses, drove back the working parties of the enemy at the bridges opposite the city, but at the lowest point of crossing, where no shelter could be had, our sharpshooters were themselves driven off, and the completion of that bridge was effected about noon on the 11th.
     In the afternoon of that day, the enemy's batteries opened upon the city, and by dark had so demolished the houses on the river bank as to deprive our skirmishers of shelter, and under cover of his guns he effected a lodgment in the town. The troops which had so gallantly held their position in the city under the severe cannonade during the day, resisting the advance of the enemy at every step, were withdrawn during the night, as were also those who, with equal tenacity, had maintained their post at the lowest bridge. Under cover of darkness and of a dense fog on the 12th, a large force passed the river and took position on the right bank, protected by their heavy guns on the left.
     The morning of the 13th, his arrangements for attack being completed, about 9 o'clock (the movement veiled by a fog) he advanced boldly in large force against our right wing. General Jackson's corps occupied the right of our line, which rested on the railroad; General Longstreet's the left, extending along the heights to the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg. General Stuart, with two brigades of cavalry, was posted in the extensive plain on our extreme right. As soon as the advance of the enemy was discovered through the fog, General Stuart, with his accustomed promptness, moved up a section of his horse artillery, which opened with effect upon his flank and drew upon the gallant Pelham a heavy fire, which he sustained unflinchingly for about two hours.
    In the mean time the enemy was fiercely encountered by General A. P. Hill's division, forming General Jackson's right, and, after an obstinate combat, repulsed. During this attack, which was protracted and hotly contested, two of General Hill's brigades were driven back upon our second line. General Early, with part of his division, being ordered to his support, drove the enemy back from the point of woods he had seized, and pursued him into the plain until arrested by his artillery. The right of the enemy's column, extending beyond Hill's front, encountered the right of General Hood, of Longstreet's corps. The enemy took possession of a small copse in front of Hood, but were quickly dispossessed and repulsed with loss.
     During the attack on our right, the enemy was crossing troops over his bridges at Fredericksburg and massing them in front of Longstreet's line. Soon after his repulse on our right, he commenced a series of attacks on our left with a view of obtaining possession of the heights immediately overlooking the town. These repeated attacks were repulsed in gallant style by the Washington Artillery, under Colonel [J. B.] Walton, and a portion of McLaws' division, which occupied these heights. The last assault was made after dark, when Colonel [E. P.] Alexander's battalion had relieved the Washington Artillery (whose ammunition had been exhausted), and ended the contest for the day.
     The enemy was supported in his attacks by the fire of strong batteries of artillery on the right bank of the river, as well as by his numerous heavy batteries on the Stafford Heights.
     Our loss during the operations since the movements of the enemy began amounts to about 1,800 killed and wounded. Among the former I regret to report the death of the patriotic soldier and statesman, Brigadier General Thomas R. R. Cobb, who fell upon our left, and among the latter that brave soldier and accomplished gentleman, Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg, who was very seriously, and it is feared mortally, wounded during the attack on our right.
     The enemy to-day has been apparently engaged in caring for his wounded and burying his dead. His troops are visible in their first position in line of battle, but, with the exception of some desultory cannonading and firing between skirmishers, he has not attempted to renew the attack. bout 550 prisoners were taken during the engagement, but the full extent of his loss is unknown.
     I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    R. E. LEE,
    General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 14, 1862-12 p.m. [Received 12.50 a.m.,15th.]
     No movements to-day. Will telegraph you in full in the morning.


    A. E. BURNSIDE,
    Major-General.


    General G. W. CULLUM,
    Chief of Staff.

 Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Various.

The day after the battle of Fredericksburg passed without a renewal of fighting.  As Hooker pointed out, the Union army was in an exposed position in the town and demoralized.  It is a point of considerable debate as to whether Lee should have renewed the attack.  However, a telling point is his letter to the Secretary of War regarding the scarcity of ammunition.  Lee also is fearful the Union force is not through attacking.