Thursday, November 28, 2013

November 24, 1863 (Tuesday): "Your Success Is Glorious"

Grant at Battle of Chattanooga (Thure de Thulstrop)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Missionary Ridge, November 24, 1863.
Lieutenant-General HARDEE:
     GENERAL: The enemy is moving a large force up the river toward your right in the direction of the place where he is reported crossing the Tennessee. The general commanding has directed General Cleburne and his division to move to the right in that direction.
      I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

      Assistant Adjutant-General.

Major-General THOMAS:
    GENERAL: The enemy are moving by flank to our left on Missionary Ridge. [Signal from Colonel Barnett's battery, opposite side of river.]

     G. M. L. JOHNSON,
     Captain, and Acting Assistant Inspector-General.

LOOKOUT VALLEY, November 24, 1863-11 a.m.
Major-General REYNOLDS:
     I am in condition to cross the creek, but as it will be attended with some considerable loss, I have deemed it advisable to await the arrival of Geary's command down its right bank before doing so. I think that he will be up as early as 12 o'clock.

      Major-General, Commanding.
LOOKOUT VALLEY, November 24, 1863-12.15 p.m.
Major-General REYNOLDS:
     The valley is now clear. General Geary's division is on the crest of the slope of Lookout Mountain.

     Major-General, Commanding.

BALD MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, November 24, 1863-12.20 p.m.
Major-General THOMAS:
     General Howard's column has formed junction with Sherman.

     C. A. DANA.

SIGNAL STATION OPPOSITE SIDE OF RIVER, November 24, [1863]-12.30 p.m.
General THOMAS:
     Bridge completed.


CAMERON HILL SIGNAL STATION, November 24, [1863.] [Received 12.30 p.m.]
Captain MERRILL:
     Our forces have carried the works near white house, on Lookout.


General THOMAS:
    Woods is about to cross.


HOOKER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 24, [1863]-1.25 p.m.
Major-General REYNOLDS:
     In announcing the fact of our great success this morning I had no time to state its results. The conduct of all the troops has been brilliant, and the success has far exceeded my expectations. Our loss has not been severe, and of prisoners I should judge that we had not less than 2,000. The bulk of my infantry is now assembling on the east side of Lookout Mountain. Of course the routes do not admit of the passage of artillery.


HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., FOURTH ARMY CORPS, White House, Lookout Mountain, Nov.24, [1863]-2 p.m.
Major-General REYNOLDS,
Chief of Staff:
     I have established my headquarters in the white house, on Lookout Mountain. The enemy are massing rapidly on my right. Support me. Have taken two guns.

     W. C. WHITAKER,

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., 4TH ARMY CORPS, White House, on Lookout, November 24, [1863]-2 p.m.
Lieutenant-Colonel FULLERTON,
Chief of Staff:
     I am in possession of the white house, on Lookout Mountain, and if I get ammunition I can hold it. The enemy are massing on my right.


HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Chattanooga, Tennessee, November 24, 1863.
     CAPTAIN: Can you let General Whitaker have ammunition? We have no ordnance officer, and General Granger is in the front.
    Very respectfully,

    Lieutenant-Colonel, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, November 24, [1863]-2.30 p. m.
Major General C. L. STEVENSON,
Lookout Mountain:
     GENERAL: The general commanding instructs me to say that you will withdraw your command from the mountain to this side of Chattanooga Creek, destroying the bridges behind. Fight the enemy as you retire. The thickness of the fog will enable you to retire, it is hoped, without much difficulty.
     I am, general, very respectfully, yours,

     Assistant Adjutant-General.

Major-General HOOKER:
     General Thomas has just ordered the Moccasin Point battery to open on the Summertown road. Order sent by courier.

     J. P. WILLARD,
     Captain, and Aide-de-Camp.

Lookout Mountain, Tennessee, November 24, 1863-2.45 p.m.
Major General D. BUTTERFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps:
     GENERAL: We are pressed heavily, and need re-enforcements. We must have ammunition. I have sent for some, but it does not come. My rear should be well looked to.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     JNo W. GEARY,
     Brigadier-General, Commanding.
November 24, 1863.

General HOOKER:
      Do you want any help?

      J. M. PALMER,

NOVEMBER 24, [1863]
General PALMER:
     Can hold the line I am now; can't advance. Some of my troops out of ammunition; can't replenish.


Captain WILLARD,

Captain LEONARD:
     Naylor's and Aleshire's batteries are firing at enemy in line of battle on our right, beyond rolling mills.

     Lieutenant, and Signal Officer.

DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, November 24, 1863-3.45 p.m.
General HOOKER:
     Hold position until you can replenish ammunition. Brigade getting across Chattanooga Creek to support you.
     By command of Major-General Thomas:

     J. J. REYNOLDS,

Major-General HOOKER:
      Your success is glorious. Resupply ammunition if possible. We are crossing a brigade to connect with you. Send prisoners to Kelley's Ferry to be guarded. Take accurate list.

    Major-General, Chief of Staff.

Lookout Mountain, Tennessee, November 24, 1863-4 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
      After the fog lifts I except to descend into the valley, unless I receive orders to the contrary. The force I have there now should be able to hold it until that time. Our communications on the left with Chattanooga is established. In all probability the enemy will evacuate to-night. His line of retreat is seriously threatened by my troops.
     Very respectfully,

    Major-General, Commanding.

LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, November 24, 1863-4 p.m.
Major-General REYNOLDS:
     It is so dark in Chattanooga Valley that it is impossible for me to see the position of the enemy or his numbers, and I deem it very imprudent to descend into it to-night. I hold the line from the white house to the point were the railroad passes beneath the mountain down the river on the Chattanooga side.
     We have smart skirmishing along the line, particularly the upper part of it, but my troops are unflinching, and cannot be driven from their position, which they are strengthening every moment. The enemy continue to hold the top of Lookout Mountain, and I cannot prevent it until I can move around and take possession of the Summertown road, which, as I am informed, requires me to descend into the valley.

      Major-General, Commanding.

Lookout Mountain, Tennessee, November 24, 1863-4.50 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
    Commanding Division: I congratulate you and your command on their glorious achievements of to-day. As the upper part of the line is most exposed, it has been stiffened with re-enforcements. As every inch of ground we have wrenched from the enemy to-day must be held until a renewal of the conflict, perhaps to-morrow, see that your troops get up their ammunition and strengthen their defenses.
     Very respectfully,

     Major-General, Commanding.

LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, November 24, 1863-5.15 p.m.
Major-General REYNOLDS:
     General Carlin's brigade just reported to me. I have sent it to the right of my line, resting on the white house, as this was held by troops exhausted from the labors of to-day. At this point they will be in position to threaten the enemy's rear, if he does not retire before morning.

     Major-General, Commanding.

LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, November 24, 1863-6.40 p.m.
Major-General REYNOLDS:
     I am all right for to-night. In the morning I shall be short of batteries, though I hope to have the road and the bridges in condition to enable me to bring forward some of mine by the time I shall require them. The enemy had felled trees across the Chattanooga road over the mountain, and a slide in the road made it necessary to expend a good deal of labor upon it. From the dense fog to-day I have not been able to learn much of the topography of Chattanooga Valley in my front. For this reason I suggest that the operations of to-morrow be suspended until the fog lifts, if it should not require too much detention. I request that General Smith will forward me the map of which he spoke a day or two since.

     Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, November 24, 1863-9.30 p.m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Lookout Valley:
     The general commanding the department congratulates you most heartily upon your glorious success to-day, and desires that you convey his warmest thanks to the troops under your command for their valorous conduct. General Grant has just directed that General Sherman move along Missionary Ridge to-morrow with his force, while our force advances to the front, co-operating with Sherman and compelling the enemy to show whether he occupies his rifle-pits in our front. Be in readiness to advance as early as possible in the morning into Chattanooga Valley and seize and hold the Summertown road and co-operate with the Fourteenth Corps by supporting its right. Map sent by courier at 8 o'clock this evening.

     J. J. REYNOLDS,
     Major-General, Chief of Staff.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 2, Pages 108-112, 333-334, 678.

Hooker used three divisions (Geary's, Cruft's, and Osterhaus's) against Lookout Mountain.  Grant did not authorize a full assault, agreeing only for Hooker to move forward if he met limited resistance.  Hooker moved forward anyway, with Geary finding a defile between the mountain and river which was undefended.  Greary swept along the base of Lookout Mountain and pushed the Confederaes under Walthall back to the Craven House. By 3PM thick fog enveloped the mountain.  Sherman's three divisions crossed the river on the morning of the 24th and ended up misdeployed on a separate rise known as Billy Goat Hill.  He took no further action.  In the evening Bragg called a council of war and was persuaded to stick it out, while Grant adapted his plan and called for a double envelopment by Sherman and Hooker on the 25th.

Monday, November 25, 2013

November 23, 1863 Monday): Grant Takes Orchard Knob

Grant's HQ (Library of Congress)

ORCHARD KNOB, November 23, 1863-3 p.m.
General THOMAS:
     The enemy's rifle-pits in front, 1,200 yards, very strong and filled with rebels. They cannot be carried without heavy loss.

     G. GRANGER,

NOVEMBER 23, 1863-4.15 p.m.
General THOMAS:
     Heavy columns are passing to our left to the front of Howard. They have double lines of rifle-pits in his front.


FROM THE POINT, November 23, 1863-5 p. m.
    I observed closely the movements of the enemy until dark. An object seemed to be to attract our attention. All of the troops in sight were formed from center to left. Those on their right moved to center. The troops from Raccoon were in line in full sight. If they intend to attack, my opinion is it will be upon our left. Both of their bridges are gone.*


No demonstration anywhere upon line so far as heard. Signal corps thinks they have advanced nearly to road leading down from Simonton [Summertown?]. They have opened from their batteries
*Copy of this found also among the Thomas papers as of 11 p. m.

Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
CHATTANOOGA, November 23, 1863-8 p.m.
     Our casualties are about 75 in all, including both killed and wounded. After 4 p.m. rebels opened artillery from top of Missionary Ridge; the total number of cannot they displayed about twelve, all small caliber. Just before dark they displayed a force on our left where Howard had taken up his position. Nothing shows decisively whether enemy will fight or fly. Grant thinks latter; other judicious officers think former. River has risen 5 feet since yesterday morning. Enormous quantities of drift. Both Chattanooga bridge and Brown's Ferry bridge broken. Current furious; difficult to anchor pontoons firmly. Woods' division still remains in Lookout Valley.

    [C. A. DANA.]
    Honorable E. M. STANTON,

Camp opposite Chickamauga, November 23, 1863.
Major General U. S. GRANT,
    DEAR GENERAL: I received your letter at the hands of Captain Audenried, and immediately made the orders for the delay of twenty hours. I need not express how I felt, that my troops should cause delay, but I know Woods must have cause, else he would not delay. Whitaker's and Cruft's troops fill the road, doubtless, and it must be a ditch full of big rocks. But Ewing is up, and if possible Woods or Osterhaus (for I got an orderly in the night announcing that he had overtaken and would resume command to-day) will be also. But in any event we will move at midnight, and I will try the Missionary Ridge to-morrow morning, November 24, in the manner prescribed in my memorandum order for to-day. I will use the Second Division in place of the First as guide, and Jeff. C. Davis' division will act as reserve, and bring me forward the artillery as soon as the bridge is put down. I will try and get out at least six guns in the first dash for the hills.
     As you ask for positive information, I answer: No cause on earth will induce me to ask for longer delay, and to-night at midnight we move. What delays may occur in the pontoons I cannot foretell. I will get Jeff. C. Davis to make some appearances opposite Harrison, to make believe our troops are moving past Bragg to interpose between him and Longstreet.
     Every military reason now sanctions a general attack. Longstreet is absent, and we expect no more re-enforcements, therefore we should not delay another hour, and should put all our strength in the attack.
     Yours, truly,

     W. T. SHERMAN,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 2, Pages 23, 66, 103, 674.

Based on reports from deserters that Bragg was withdrawing some of his brigades, Grant became convinced Bragg was reenforcing Longstreet.  To prevent this Grant sent 14,000 men to engage a rear guard of only 600 Confederates at Orchard Knob.  The rebels fired a volley and were over run.
Grant established his headquarters in this new position and waited for a chance to renew the attack with Sherman's newly arrived troops in the morning.

Thursday, November 21, 2013

November 22, 1863 (Sunday): Moment of Decision In Tennessee

Defenses of Knoxville

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Missionary Ridge, November 22, 1863.
Lieutenant-General LONGSTREET:
    GENERAL: Your dispatch of this morning and your letter of 18th induce me to send General Leadbetter to confer with you, and to express my views more in full than can well be done by telegram or letter. Nearly 11,000 re-enforcements are now moving to your assistance; but if practicable to end your work with Burnside promptly and effectively, it should be done now. I fear he has already grown much stronger than when you drove him to cover. General Jones is supposed to be pressing down to your assistance.
    As the enemy may attempt to drive you from your position by sending troops up the Tennessee or Sequatchie Valley, or even by McMinnville, you should keep yourself well guarded in those directions and well informed. Should he gain your rear between Loudon and Knoxville in too great force to be defeated, you can retire by crossing above Loudon or Concord. You should, accordingly, keep a route open in that direction.
    At your distance it is impossible for me to decide the details of your movements, but they should be such as to close up your expedition promptly. From the great strength of the enemy here you will see the importance of the return of General Cleburne's force as soon as possible. Write immediately and give me your decision as to future operations, and in future report daily.
     I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     General, Commanding.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 3, Page 736.

Bragg was faced with a force under Grant which had just received heavy reinforcements under Sherman.  Although Bragg was besieging Chattanooga and Longstreet Knoxville, the fulcrum could shift quickly and either of the two could go from being the aggressor to being cutoff.  If Longstreet was to act he would need to do so before the need arose to send all or part of his force back to Bragg.  But Longstreet did not believe the threat to Bragg or himself to be pressing, and delayed attacking. Time was on the Union side, as every day the threat to Bragg in Chattanooga, and thus the need to recall Longstreet there, was growing.

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

November 21, 1863 (Saturday): Longstreet Advises Bragg

Bleak House (Longstreet's HQ at Knoxville)

HEADQUARTERS, November 21, 1863.
General B. BRAGG,
Missionary Ridge:
    The enemy's threat against your left is for the purpose of inducing you to retire. If you fail to do so, he will be obliged to retire himself, or throw a very strong force in your rear. If he does put a force behind you, you can fall upon it and destroy it, and then resume your position. With the present bad roads, I doubt if he can put a very large force behind you. If he does, and you let it get well out to your rear, I think it cannot escape you.
     I remain, very respectfully, &c.,


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 3, Page 733.

Longstreet feared Bragg would recall him from independent command in front of Knoxville, besieging Burnside.  His response was to minimize the difficulties faced by Bragg and offer him advice, and in this case not very good advice.  Longstreet misunderstood both Grant's intentions and the change in the balance of forces brought on by Sherman's arrival.  This memo is similar to ones Longstreet sent Lee when Longstreet had independent command in Suffolk during the Chancellorsville campaign.  Longstreet, in that instance, insisted Lee faced a threat he could not readily overcome without the First Corp being available.  Here, he takes the same tack with Bragg.

November 20, 1863 (Friday): Grant Plans An Asault.

Summit of Lookout Mountain

Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
CHATTANOOGA, November 20, 1863- 11 a.m.
    One brigade of John E. Smith's division, of Sherman's army, crossed the Brown's Ferry bridge just before dark last evening, leaving the other brigades 5 or 6 miles behind in Lookout Valley. They were moved over during the night, and got out of sight on the road to the proposed place of landing, but the operation was performed so slowly that it was impossible to get Howard's corps over until after daylight. As Ewing's division moves from Trenton down the valley this morning, all in full view of the enemy, he will understand that he is to be attacked. As yet, however, there is no evidence that Bragg surmises where the precise point is that is to be assailed. There are to be only two attacking columns, the idea of a demonstration on Lookout Mountain having been abandoned. Sherman's column will consist of his own troops and part of Jeff. C. Davis' division, not over 20,000 men in all.  The co-operating column from here, moving across Citico Creek, will be 18,000 men, under Granger. Howard's corps is posted north of the Tennessee, ready to cross at Sherman's bridges or at the bridge here, to support the one or the other column. A brigade and a half of Stanley's division comes from Shellmound and Bridgeport to take the place in Lookout Valley vacated by Howard, or possibly a brigade from this division may be added to Howard's reserve. Sherman's landing will be covered by eighty guns from the heights north of the Tennessee. The ground where he lands is bottom, a little more than 2 miles wide before reaching the ridge he is to seize and occupy. Bragg's total force here cannot exceed 50,000 men, and, judging from the great number of deserters, they are not as dangerous as formerly.

      [C. A. DANA.]

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 2, Pages 61-62.

Sherman had just arrived with 20,000 men from Vicksburg.  Grant, Sherman, and Thomas planned an attack by Sherman against the northern end of Missionary Ridge, supported by Thomas in the center.  Hooker was supposed to capture Lookout Mountain and then move across the valley to Rossville, Georgia where he would block Bragg's retreat route.  Grant was, at this point, still not entirely convinced of the plan.  Bragg was not aware of how much danger his center was in and was not prepared for what was about to come.  Dana, who wrote this memo, was a journalist who visited the armies at the behest of Secretary of War Stanton.  His role was to give feedback to Stanton on the condition of the armies and the capacity of their commanders.


Sunday, November 17, 2013

November 19, 1863 (Thursday): To Lincoln at Gettysburg

Tad Lincoln with President Lincoln

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 19, 1863-10.10 a.m.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT,
Gettysburg, Pa.:
    Dispatch from Grant, dated November 18, 9 o'clock p.m., states that Sherman's movement had commenced, and that a battle or falling back of the enemy by Saturday, at furthest, is inevitable. He had received Burnside's dispatch down to 10 o'clock Tuesday night, but says nothing concerning his opinion of Burnside's position. Four dispatches from Dana at Chattanooga, dated respectively yesterday, 18th, 12 o'clock, 1,3, and 7 p.m. He reached Chattanooga Tuesday night. Speaks of Burnside's position as safe at Knoxville, and gives details of matters occurring while with Burnside. The details of movements at Chattanooga are given, but you could not understand them without a map. His latest dispatch 7 o'clock, reports everything in successful progress to that hour. There is nothing from Burnside later than my telegram of last night. Nothing from elsewhere, except that Kelley reports Averell's return and that the enemy have been entirely driven out of West Virginia. Averell did not succeed in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. Mrs. Lincoln reports your son's health as a great deal better, and that he will be out to-day.

      Secretary of War.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 3, Page 190.

This telegram was sent to Lincoln in Gettysburg, who was at that hour attending dedication ceremonies at the Gettysburg National Cemetery.  Secretary of War Stanton sends news that Lincoln's son Tad, who was recovering from Scarlett fever, was on his way to a full recovery.  The news from Tennessee was a mixed bag, although Burnside was now safely with his lines in Knoxville.  After the battle at Droop Mountain, Confederate troops were, as reported here, driven out of West Virginia.

November 18, 1863 (Friday): Longstreet Closes In On Knoxville

Bullet in Oak Log From Battle of Campbell's Station (

HEADQUARTERS, Four Miles from Knoxville, November 18, 1863.
General B. BRAGG:
    Your note of the 14th is received. I am very much occupied at present with our affairs with the enemy. I will furnish the copy you desire as soon as I have a little time, provided the paper has not been misplaced.
    May I ask that you will send me 1 or 2 telegraph operators. We have driven the enemy into his fortifications around Knoxville and he now confines himself closely to the town, the only road from is that is not guarded being the road across the river by his pontoon bridge.
     We have captured 100 wagons, many of them injured by cutting the spokes and some partially burned; 400 or 500 prisoners have been taken; four or five stand of colors, and a considerable amount of ammunition and other property and baggage. We got greatly the advantage of the enemy in our moves after crossing the river, but were an hour or two too late on one day in reaching him, and he retreated hastily during the night. The next day we failed to get to our points by about fifteen minutes, so that he got his position behind the point where I had proposed to intercept him-Campbell's Station. Then, after getting his position, we were unable to make our plan and arrangements for attack, but he escaped and got into another position a little before night. It was then too late to make other plans and arrangements, night coming on.
     General Leadbetter promised to send up engineer companies to rebuild the railroad bridge at Loudon. May I ask that you will have this attended to for us as soon as possible, as I have no means myself of having the bridge rebuilt.
      We have been occupied to-day in driving the enemy from his advance line of defenses, only succeeding a little before night. Though we had no general battle, we have been skirmishing every day since we crossed the river and have sustained considerable loss. Various rumors here state that the enemy expects relief from the army at Chattanooga.
     I remain, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

     Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 3, Page 707.

On the 16th Longstreet had confronted two Union divisions and Sander's cavalry covering Burnside's withdrawal into Knoxville.  Hartranft's division beat McLaw's in a race to secure the crossroads.  This enabled Burnside to get his trains by safely, while other troops formed a line for Hartranft to withdraw to.  In the skirmishing the Union forces lost 318 men and the Confederates 174.  Had Longstreet's troops gotten there first, the outcome of the Knoxville campaign would likely have been much different.

November 17, 1863 (Thursday): The Partisan Mosby

Major John Singleton Mosby

Report of Major John S. Mosby, C. S. Army.
September 30, 1863.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the force under my command from about August 20 to the present time:
    On the morning of August 24, with about 30 men, I reached a point (Annandale) immediately on the enemy's line of communication. Leaving the whole command, except 3 men who accompanied me, in the woods concealed, I proceeded on a reconnaissance along the railroad to ascertain if there were any bridges unguarded. I discovered there were three. I returned to the command just as a drove of horses, with a cavalry escort of about 50 men, was passing. These I determined to attack and to await until night to burn the bridges. I ordered Lieutenant Turner to take one-half of the men and charge them in front, while with the remainder I attacked their rear.
     In the meantime the enemy had been joined by another party, making their number about 63. When I overtook them they had dismounted at Gooding's Tavern to water their horses. My men went at them with a yell that terrified the Yankees and scattered them in all directions. A few taking shelter under cover of the houses opened fire upon us. They were soon silenced, however.
    At the very moment when I had succeeded in routing them I was compelled to retire from the fight, having been shot through the side and thigh. My men, not understanding it, followed me, which gave time to the Yankees to escape to the woods. But for this accident the whole party would have been captured. As soon as I perceived this I ordered the men to go back, which a portion of them did just as Lieutenant Turner, who had met and routed another force above, came gallantry charging up.
     Over 100 horses fell into our possession, though a good many were lost in bringing them out at night; also 12 prisoners, arms, &c. I learn that 6 of the enemy were killed.
      Lieutenant Smith, of the Black House, then on duty with me, acted, as he always does, with conspicuous gallantry. Lieutenant Turner, on whom the command devolved, showed himself fully competent for the trust.
     In this affair my loss was 2 killed and 3 wounded. Among the killed was Norment E. Smith, who, thus early terminating a career of great usefulness and of brilliant promise, has left the memory of a name that will not be forgotten till honor, virtue, courage, all, shall cease to claim the homage of the heart.
     I afterward directed Lieutenant Turner to burn the bridges. He succeeding in burning one.
During my absence from the command Lieutenant Turner attacked an outpost of the enemy near Waterloo, killing 2 and capturing 4 men and 27 horses. About September 15, he captured 3 wagons, 20 horses, 7 prisoners, and a large amount of sutler's goods near Warrenton Junction.
     On the 20th and 21st instant, I conducted an expedition along the enemy's line of communication, in which important information obtained was forwarded to the army headquarters, and I succeeded in capturing 9 prisoners and 21 fine horses and mules.

     On the 27th and 28th instant, I made a reconnaissance in the vicinity of Alexandria, capturing Colonel Dulaney, aide to the bogus governor Peirpoint, several horses, and burning the railroad bridge across Cameron's Run, which was immediately under cover of the guns of two forts.
     The military value of the pieces of warfare I have waged is not measured by the number of prisoners and material of war captured from the enemy, but by the heavy detail it has already compelled him to make, and which I hope to make him increase, in order to guard his communications, and to that extent diminishing his aggressive strength.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     JNO. S. MOSBY.
     Major General J. E. B. STUART,
     Commanding Cavalry Division.


October 5, 1863.
    Respectfully forwarded, and recommended that Major Mosby be promoted another grade in recognition of his valuable services. The capture of these prominent Union officials, as well as the destruction of bridges, trains, &c., was the subject of special instructions which he is faithfully carrying out.

     J. E. B. STUART,

November 17, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded.
    Major Mosby is entitled to great credit for his boldness and skill in his operations against the enemy. He keeps them in constant apprehension and inflict repeated injuries. I have hoped that he would have been able to raise his command sufficiently for the command of a lieutenant-colonel, and to have it regularly mustered into service. I am not aware that it numbers over four companies.

    R. E. LEE,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 1, Pages 80-81.

Mosby had served as a scout for Stuart and in January of 1863 formed a band of partisan rangers engaging in guerrilla warfare in the Loudoun Valley of Northern Virginia.  His command was usually less than 300 men and while effective in tying down Union resources was not large enough to warrant the promotion requested by Stuart.  In any event, it was not likely Mosby would have wanted his command to be brought into normal military organization and convention.

Saturday, November 16, 2013

November 16, 1863 (Wednesday): Distributing Supplies In the Kirby-Smithdom

General Edmund Kirby Smith

Shreveport, La., November 16, 1863.
     All quartermaster's stores, clothing, camp and garrison equipage, or material for manufacturing the same, received at any point upon the Rio Grande, or through the Gulf ports of this department, will, until further orders, be distributed as follows:
      For the troops of the District of Arkansas, Indian Territory, and Northern Sub-District of Texas, four-tenths. Depots at Bonham and Jefferson, Tex.
     For the troops of the District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, except the Northern Sub-District of Texas, two-tenths. Depots at San Antonio and Houston.
     For the troops of the District of Western Louisiana, three-tenths. Depot of Shreveport, La.
     For the department at large, one-tenth. Depot in charge of Major W. H. Haynes, quartermaster and chief of clothing bureau, at department headquarters.
     All officers receiving quartermaster's stores, clothing, camp and garrison equipage, or material thereof, at any of the points designated, are directed to report at once to these headquarters the amount of each article received, and will forward the stores without delay to the depots herein mentioned. The officers in charge at the issuing depots will report each arrival of stores, in anticipation of requisitions, prepare them for issue to the troops.
      By command of Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith:

     S. S. ANDERSON,
     Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 22, Part 2, Page 1071.

When Kirby Smith succeeded Theopolis Holmes in chage of the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederacy it became to be knpwn as the Kirby-Smithdom.  It included all the territory between Fort Smith, Arkansas and the Rio Grande River.  Because Union forces stood between this area and the supply and communications network of the Confederate government, Smith functioned as almost a head of state.  He often operated without communication to Richmond and even more often without supplies from outside the department.  His kingdom, or Smithdom as it were, was as independant a command as circumstances would allow on either side of the Civil War.

Thursday, November 14, 2013

November 15, 1863 (Tuesday): Grant Steels Burnside to the Task at Hand

US Engineers Babcock at Poe at Fort Sanders In Knoxville

November 15, 1863.
     I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the dispatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess. Holding to that point, should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it sacrificed half of the cavalry of the Ohio Army. By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing anything this winter. I can hardly conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did so at all it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of more importance than any one point in East Tennessee. But my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it possessed, ignoring that place entirely. I should not think it advisable to concentrate a force near Little Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be in danger of capture, but I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy.

     U. S. GRANT,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 2, Page 30.

Bragg had detached Longstreet to make an attack on Burnside at Knoxville.  Grant hoped to forestall that by bringing up Sherman's troops to Chattanooga and using them in an effort to take Missionary Ridge.  By doing so he hoped to have Longstreet recalled, as there was fear in Washington (and with Burnside) that he was in a precarious position.  East Tennessee was always a focal point of the Lincoln administration, and Grant understood the importance of maintaining Union forces in the region.


November 14, 1863 (Thursday): The Ram "Albemarle"

CSS Albemarle (after being raised by Union forces)

New Berne, N. C., November 14, 1863.
Commanding Dept. of Virginia and North Carolina:
     GENERAL: During a recent visit at Plymouth, I found the senior naval officer somewhat nervous, in consequence of a report having reached General Wessells of an examination of the Roanoke, with a view of bringing down a ram at Edwards Ferry, some 12 or 15 miles below Halifax. All sorts of reports are put afloat, for the purpose of influencing our operations. My latest advices are that the is not yet complete. Since assuming the command in North Carolina, I have kept strict watch over this matter, and frequently advised General Forster respecting the progress of the work on the iron-clad. I suggested the propriety of burning it in August, but the general did not feel very apprehensive, and replied that the troops at our command would not warrant the enterprise.
    The fortifications at Plymouth have been pushed with great vigor, and I have added materially to the armaments. A water battery is in progress for a 200-pounder rifle with a center pintle carriage, which will complete the river works. While waiting for the 200-pounder, I have moved a 100-pounder from Hatteras, which is the only available gun of the kind in North Carolina. I do not feel very apprehensive, unless the ram moves in conjunction with a land force. The reported examination of the channel is explained by deserters from Fort Branch, at Rainbow Bluff, who state that week before last torpedoes were placed in position in the river below. The destruction of the ram now will be attended with great difficulty, as an earthen battery for four guns has been constructed, and a guard of from 200 to 500 infantry is maintained there. They Twenty-fourth North Carolina and a six-gun battery are at Hamilton, while detachments are usually on all the approaches. Its proximity to Weldon renders any raid very uncertain, in consequence of the activity of the rebels.
    Fort Branch is at Rainbow Bluff, and is and inclosed work of much strength. At present it is armed with twelve rifles, including one 64-pounder and three 24-pounders.
    Doubtless General Foster advised you that he had withdrawn all the best and available troops from North Carolina. There is no reserve force here or in any of the sub-districts. In case of an advance upon the lines, the force would be quite too small for a proper defense.
    I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 2, Page 456.

The ram "Albemarle" was built during 1863 and occupied a great deal of the attention of Union planners.  Ever since the CSS Virginia (Merrimack) the value of these vessels in controlling constricted waterways had been respected, owing to the difficult involved in damaging them with munitions available at the time.  After being put in service the ram would dominate the Roanoke River and threaten the Union position at Plymouth, before being sunk by a spar torpedo attached to a small boat in 1864.  It was later raised, put into Union service, and taken out of commission quickly after the war.

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

November 13, 1863 (Wednesday): An Army At Large

Major General Grenville Dodge

Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,
On Road from Winchester to Bridgeport:
    I sent you full reports by messenger yesterday. I have not my troops on railroad, and am holding it from Lynnville to Athens. Will move south as fast as any one relieves me. If I leave any portion of the railroad unguarded it will be entirely destroyed. I have sent trains for provisions. Shall live mostly off of the country. Have all mills running. When you get my letter please say if my disposition of troops meets your order. There appears to be no movement toward repairing railroad by any on except me. I have my men to work all along the line, and will soon have them up. A great deal of works is to be done yet between Nashville and Columbia. Duck River bridge is down. I will soon have telegraph up to here. I have placed my command so as to feed and forage it with as little transportation as possible. Am obliged to get rations before I can move much farther south. On the 8th General Lee, with his entire cavalry force, was at Courtland.

      G. M. DODGE,

BRIDGEPORT, November 13, 1863.
General G. M. DODGE,
Pulaski,-via Columbia:
    Anything you do as to road will be all right. I will telegraph General Grant about the bridge at Columbia. I understand it is contracted for, the timbers to come from the North, but I will advise you at length in a day or so. It will take me two days to collect my forces here. The mountain roads have scattered us. I am this minute arrived at Bridgeport.

     W. T. SHERMAN,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 3, Page 141.

Sherman and Dodge were in south central Tennessee. Dodge was off the hook, subsisting off the countryside.  The Confederates lacked sufficient force to concentrate against these invaders, and the chief limiting factor to their operations was subsistence.  Dodge was doing what Sherman would do more extensively the next year, subsist off the land unencumbered by formal supply lines. Bridgeport was a central point on the Memphis to Charleston railroad.

Monday, November 11, 2013

November 12, 1863 (Tuesday): "I fear our horses will die in great numbers.."

Civil War Horse and Rider (

November 12, 1863.
President Confederate States, Richmond:
    Mr. PRESIDENT: Our scouts report the Orange and Alexandria Railroad finished as far as Bealeton. They report, moreover, that the road from Union Mills to that point is almost entirely stripped of troops, nearly all the road guards having been sent forward. Trains have lately passed up bringing artillery. Cavalry has passed up with led horses. The route from Bealeton to Kelly's Ford is almost as short as that from Brandy Station to the same point, and the above movements indicate, I think, an advance on the part of General Meade. There are indications also that this advance will take place on our right by lower fords, Germanna and Ely's, as if with the intention of striking for the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. Should he move in that direction, I will endeavor to follow him and bring him to battle, but I do not see how I can do it without the greatest difficulty. The country through which he will have to pass is barren. We have no forage on hand and very little prospect of getting any from Richmond. I fear our horses will die in great numbers, and, in fact, I do not know how they will survive two or three days' march without food. I hope every effort will be made to send some up, and I think it would be well to stop the transportation of everything on the railroad excepting army supplies.
    One of the scouts brings an extravagant report coming from an official in Washington, that the Union States Government is collecting a large number of horses-40,000-to mount a body of infantry for the purpose of making a raid on Richmond, with a view to the release of their prisoners. The rescue of these prisoners has been for some time a theme with the Northern papers. I think they should, for many reasons, be removed from that city as soon as practicable.
     I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

    R. E. LEE,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 2, Page 832.

The rationale behind the Gettysburg campaign remains obvious here months later.  The war had to be taken across the Potomac to relieve the strain on agricultural production and forage in Northern Virginia.  Lee knew Meade was better supplied, well enough to move forward over an extended line, whereas Lee himself was unsure as to whether he could keep the horses needed to move his artillery and trains fed.  The war had become not just a matter of moving armies like chess pieces across a board, but also of keeping horses fed.  Time was not on the Confederacy's side.


November 11, 1863 (Tuesday): Plot Against Johnson's Island

Johnson's Island

Washington, D. C., November 11, 1863.
Major-General COX,
Commanding in Ohio, Columbus or Cincinnati:
    The British minister, Lord Lyons, has to-night officially notified the Government that, from telegraphic information received from the Governor-General of Canada, there is reason to believe that a plot is on foot by persons hostile to the United States, who have found an asylum in Canada, to invade the United States and destroy the city of Buffalo; that they propose to take possession of some of the steam-boats on Lake erie, to surprise Johnson's Island, and set free the prisoners of war confined there, and to proceed with them to attack Buffalo. You will proceed immediately to Sandusky and take such measures for the security of the prisoners and the protection of the northern frontier of Ohio against invasion by rebels and their aiders and abettors from Canada as circumstances may require, reporting fully to this Department any information which you may have upon the subject. You are authorized to call upon the Governor of Ohio for any volunteer force that may be required, and to make requisition upon this Department for any ordnance, arms, or other supplies that may be necessary.

     Secretary of War.

Official Records, Series III., Vol. 3, Part 1, Page 1015.

Canada was not actively involved in the Civil War, but its citizens generally sympathized with the Union.  However, there was sympathy for the South in eastern Canada and Confederate agents were active.  After this plot was broken up, two fortifications were constructed at Johnson's Island and there were no more serious threats to security there.

November 10, 1863 (Monday): Cut Off From Five Million Pounds of Pork

Railroad Bridge at Weldon (

Raleigh, November 10, 1863.
Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON,
Richmond, Va.:
    DEAR SIR: Lest it may not be known to you, I desire to say that the position in which the enemy have established themselves at Winton, on the Chowan River, in this State, will effectually cut us off from four or five million pounds of pork, which we expected toget from the counties east of that stream. It would be a terrible loss to the army and the State. If possible for General Pickett to drive them off and prevent their fortifying (which I learn they are doing), it ought by all means to be done. It will be positively ruinous for our troops to stand at Weldon and surrender all the rich country below. I beg your attention to this matter.
      Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

      Z. B. VANCE.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 2, Page 831.

The role of North Carolina in supplying Lee's Army is not sufficiently documented by historians, but self-evident in this letter.  The foothold gained by Union armies in eastern North Carolina enabled them to threaten key railroads running to Petersburg.  Weldon was a critical point for the Confederacy and each time Union troops established themselves in the area it was a blow to Confederate supply lines.  The amount of supplies needed for the army were enormous.  Suffice it to say, 5 million pounds was not even one of the largest reserves.

November 9, 1863 (Monday): The President's Congratulations

General George Meade

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1863-7. 30 p. m.
Major-General MEADE:
    I have sent your dispatches about operations on the Rappahannock on Saturday, and I wish to say, "Well done. " Do the 1,500 prisoners reported by General Sedgwick include the 400 taken by General French, or do the whole amount to 1,900?


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 2, Page 443.

Meade could use Lincoln's good will.  The President was not convinced Meade was the right man to command he Army of the Potomac.  There was no "well done" coming for the Confederate command structure.  The failure to see the defects in the redoubts at Rappahannock Station resulted in the loss of 2,000 veteran infantrymen who would not be easily replaced.

November 8, 1863 (Sunday): Mines in Charleston

Confederate Mine (

CHARLESTON, S. C., November 8, 1863.
Lieutenant L. M. TUCKER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:
     LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report that on the 28th of October, under instruction from General Rains, I proceeded in company with Captains Bryan and Mickler to obstruct the channel in Skull Creek. In consequence of a lack of oars and the failure of Captain Gray to send them (a telegram having been dispatched from them on the 29th instant), nothing could be done until the 2nd of November, on the night of which we reach Buckingham Ferry. Owing to the near approach of daylight, we were succeeded in putting out 8 wooden-cask torpedoes, within 150 yards of the enemy's pickets. They were placed in position as to render it almost impossible for a vessel to pass without coming in contact. About 2 o'clock of the 3rd instant and explosion was took place, they were unable to ascertain the cause, but think, from the noise and commotion that ensued, a large steamer must come in contact with one of the torpedoes.
     Very respectfully, &c., your obedient servant,

     JNO. T. ELMORE,
     Lieutenant of Engineers, on Special Duty.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 28, Part 2, Page 494.

Confederate mines were an effective threat to Union ships throughout the war.  One key to their effectiveness was the ease with which they could be placed in narrow channels. It would be very difficult to move through shallow, mine infested, waters without incident.


November 7, 1863 (Saturday): Disaster at Rappahannock Station

Rappahannock Station (NPS)

November 7, 1863.
    SIR: The enemy advanced to-day to the Rappahannock and made an attack at Kelly's Ford, followed soon after by a demonstration in large force at Rappahannock Station. He forced a passage at the former place, and has laid down a pontoon bridge over which a considerable force has crossed, to be followed, I presume, by his main body. After some skirmishing and quite a heavy cannonade at the station, he advanced after sunset in overwhelming numbers on the troops on the north side of the river guarding our tete-de-pont, and succeeded in capturing the greater part of the two brigades there stationed (those of Hoke and Hays) and four pieces of artillery.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     R. E. LEE.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 1, Page 609.

(NPS) A single pontoon brigade at the town of Rappahannock Station was the only connection Lee retained with the northern bank of the river. The bridge was protected by a bridgehead on the north bank consisting on two redoubts and connecting trenches. Confederate batteries posted on hills south of the river gave additional strength to the position.

The bridgehead was an integral part of Lee's strategy to defend the Rappahannock River line. As he later explained, by holding the bridgehead he could "threaten any flank movement the enemy might make above or below, and thus compel him to divide his forces, when it was hoped that an opportunity would be presented to concentrate on one or the other part." 

Once both Sedgwick and French were safely across the river, the reunited army would proceed to Brandy Station.  The operation went according to plan. Shortly after noon on November 7th, French drove back Confederate defenders at Kelly's Ford and crossed the river. As he did so, Sedgwick advanced toward Rappahannock Station. Lee learned of these developments sometime after noon and immediately put his troops in motion to meet the enemy. His plan was to resist Sedgwick with a small force at Rappahannock Station while attacking French at Kelly's Ford with the larger part of his army. The success of the plan depended on his ability to maintain the Rappahannock Station bridgehead until French was defeated.

Sedgwick first engaged the Confederates at 3 p.m. when Major General Albion Howe's division, Sixth Corps, drove in Rebel skirmishers and seized a range of high ground three-quarters of a mile from the river. Howe placed Union batteries on these hills that pounded he enemy earthworks with a "rapid and vigorous" fire. Confederate guns across the river returned the fire, but with little effect.

Major General Jubal Early's division occupied the bridgehead defenses that day. Early posted Brigadier General Harry Hays's Louisiana brigade and Captain Charles A. Green's four gun Louisiana Guard Artillery in the works and at 4:30 a.m. reinforced them with three North Carolina regiments led by Colonel Archibald Godwin. The addition of Godwin's troops increased the number of Confederate defenders at the bridgehead to nearly 2,000.

Sedgwick continued shelling the Confederates throughout the late afternoon, but otherwise he showed no disposition to attack. As the day drew to a close, Lee became convinced that the movement against the bridgehead was merely a feint to cover French's crossing farther downstream. He was mistaken. At dusk the shelling stopped, and Sedgwick's infantry rushed suddenly upon the works. Colonel Peter Ellmaker's brigade advanced adjacent to the railroad, preceded by skirmishers of the 6th Maine Volunteers. No Union regiment gained more laurels that day nor suffered higher casualties. At the command "Forward, double-quick," it surged over the Confederate works and engaged Hays's men in hand-to-hand combat. Without assistance, the 6th Maine breached the Confederate line and planted its flags on the parapet of the easternmost redoubt. Moments later the 5th Wisconsin swarmed over the walls of the western redoubt, likewise wresting it from Confederate control.

On the right, Union forces achieved comparable success. Just minutes after Ellmaker's brigade penetrated Hays's line, Colonel Emory Upton's brigade overran Godwin's position. Upton reformed his lines inside the Confederate works and sent a portion of the 121st New York to seize the pontoon bridge, while the rest of his command wheeled right to attack the confused Confederate horde now massed at the lower end of the bridgehead.

Confederate resistance dissolved as hundreds of soldiers threw down their arms and surrendered. Others sough to gain the opposite shore by swimming the icy river or by running the gauntlet of Union rifle fire at the bridge. Confederate troops south of the Rappahannock looked on hopelessly as Union soldiers herded their comrades to the rear as prisoners of war. In all, 1670 Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured in the brief struggle, more than eighty percent of those engaged. Union casualty figures, by contrast, were small: 419 in all.

For the North the battle had been "a complete and glorious victory," an engagement "as short as it was decisive," reflecting "infinite credit upon all concerned." Major General Horatio Wright noted that it was the first instance in which Union troops had carried a strong entrenched Confederate position in the first assault. But perhaps the highest praise came from Harry Hays, who claimed to have been attacked by no less than 20,000 to 25,000 Union soldiers -- a figure ten times the actual number.

The battle had been as humiliating for the South as it had been glorious for the North. Two of the Confederacy's finest brigades, sheltered behind entrenchments and well supported by artillery, had been routed and captured by an enemy force of equal size. Colonel Walter Taylor of Lee's staff called it, "the saddest chapter in the history of this army," the result of "miserable, miserable management." An enlisted soldier put it more plainly. "I don't know much about it," he said, "but it seems to be that our army was surprised."

Lee would later call on subordinates to submit reports on the battle in an effort to determine what had gone wrong, but on the night of November 7th more pressing matters demanded his attention. Loss of the bridgehead destroyed his plans for an offensive and left his army dangerously extended on a now indefensible front. Meade, acting quickly, might pin Lee's army against the Rapidan River just as Lee had tried to pin John Pope's army against the Rappahannock River one year earlier. Lee immediately canceled his plans for an attack on French and within hours had his army marching south.


Sunday, November 10, 2013

November 6, 1863 (Friday): Destitution from Stafford to Culpeper Court-House

Culpeper Court-Hosue

November 6, 1863.
His Excellency JOHN LETCHER,
Governor of Virginia:
    GOVERNOR: At its late called session the legislature made an appropriation for the relief of the families of soldiers. I find that there is great suffering among the people in this region for want of the necessaries of life. The farms and gardens have been robbed, stock and hogs killed, and these outrages committed, I am sorry to say, by our own army to some extent, as well as by the Federals. I hear of like destitution in Stafford, where the Federal Army alone has been.
    Would it not be well to forward such supplies of flour and meat as can be obtained to Culpeper Court-House and Fredericksburg, with agents for its distribution to those soldiers' families in distress, so as to relieve their wants during the coming winter?
      Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

      R. E. LEE,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 2, Pages 823-824.

It is striking in some respects the war went on as long as it did without greater protests over the suffering it caused among the families of soldiers.  Not only was the Confederate Army often poorly provisioned, but the families of the men suffered as well.  And regions of the country most exposed to the passing of the armies suffered all the more, as seen in Lee's letter.  He notes the fact, sometimes overlooked, that some suffering among civilians came from the armies which were tasked with defending them.

Tuesday, November 5, 2013

November 5, 1863 (Thursday): Reducing Baggage in the Army of the Potomac

Union Army Encampment

November 5, 1863.
I. The following is the maximum allowance of transportation, camp and garrison equipage allowed this army while in the field engaged in active operations, and will be strictly conformed to, viz:
1. For the headquarters of an army corps, 2 wagons, or 8 pack-mules, for baggage; 1 two-horse spring wagon for contingent wants; 5 extra saddle horses for contingent wants; 1 wall tent for personal use and office of commanding general; 1 wall tent for every 2 officers of his staff.
2. For the headquarters of a division, 1 wagon, or 5 pack-mules, for baggage; 1 two-horse spring wagon for contingent wants; 2 extra saddle horses for contingent wants; 1 wall tent for personal use and office of commanding general; 1 wall tent for every 2 officers of his staff.
3. For the headquarters of a brigade, 1 wagon, or 5 pack-mules, for baggage; 1 wall tent for personal use and office of commanding general; 1 wall tent for every 2 officers of his staff.
4. To every 3 company officers, when detached or serving without wagons, 1 pack-mule; to every 12 company officers, when detached, 1 wagon, or 4 pack-mules; to every 2 staff officers, when not attached to any headquarters, 1 pack-mule; to every 10 staff officers, serving similarly, 1 wagon, or 4 pack-mules.
The above wagons and pack-mules will include transportation for all personal baggage, mess chests, cooking utensils, desks, papers, &c. The weight of officers' baggage in the field, specified by Army Regulations, will be reduced so as to bring it within the foregoing schedule. All excess of transportation now with army corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, or batteries over the allowance herein prescribed will be immediately turned in to the quartermaster's department, to be used in the trains.
5. Commissary stores and forage will be transported by the trains.
When these are not convenient of access, and where troops act in detachments, the quartermaster's department will assign wagons or pack animals for that purpose; but the baggage of officers, or of troops, or camp equipage, will not be carried in the wagons or on the pack animals so assigned. The assignment of transportation for ammunition, hospital stores, subsistence, and forage, will be made on the basis of the amount of each ordered to be carried in orders from general headquarters. The number of wagons is hereinafter prescribed, required by existing orders, to wit:
6. For each full regiment of infantry and cavalry of 1,000 men, for baggage, camp equipage, &c., 6 wagons; for each regiment of infantry less than 700 men and more than 500 men, 5 wagons; for each regiment of infantry less than 500 men and more than 300 men, 4 wagons; for each regiment of infantry less than 300 men, 3 wagons; for each regiment of infantry and cavalry, 4 wall tents for field and staff, 1 shelter tent for every other commissioned officer, 1 shelter tent for every 2 non-commissioned officers, soldiers, servants, and camp followers.
7. For each battery of 4 and 6 guns, for personal baggage, mess chests, cooking utensils, desks, papers, &c., 1 and wagons, respectively, for each 6-gun battery, 3 wall tents for officers; for each 4-gun battery, 2 wall tents for officers; shelter tents, same allowance as for infantry and cavalry regiments.
8. For artillery ammunition trains, the number of wagons will be determined and assigned upon the following rules: Multiply the number of 12-pounder guns by 122 and divide by 112; multiply the number of rifled guns by 50 and divide by 140; multiply the number of 20-pounder guns by 2; multiply the number of 4 1/2-inch guns by 2 1/2; multiply the number of rifled guns in horse batteries by 100 and divide by 140. For the general supply train of reserve ammunition of 20 rounds to each gun in the army, to be kept habitually with Artillery Reserve, the following formula will apply: Multiply the number of 12-pounder guns by 20, divide by 112 == number of wagons; multiply the number of rifled guns by 20, divide by 140 = number of wagons. To every 1,000 men, cavalry and infantry, for small-arm ammunition, 5 wagons; for Artillery Reserve, for carrying fuses, primers and powder, 2 wagons.
9. The supply trains will be as follows: To each 1,000 men, cavalry and infantry, for forage, quartermaster's stores, subsistence, &c., 7 wagons; to each cavalry division, for carrying forage for cavalry horses, 30 wagons additional; to each battery, for carrying its proportion of subsistence, forage, &c., 3 wagons; to each horse battery, for the same purpose, 4 wagons; to every 25 wagons of the artillery ammunition train there will be allowed 5 wagons additional for carrying forage for animals of ammunition and additional wagons, baggage, camp equipage, and subsistence of wagon-masters and teamsters. Nothing but ammunition will be carried in the artillery ammunition train. The baggage of the drivers of the wagon composing it will be carried in the additional wagons allowed for that purpose.
To each 1,500 men, cavalry and infantry, for hospital supplies, 3 wagons; to each brigade of artillery, for hospital supplies, 1 wagon; to each army corps, except the cavalry, for intenching tools, &c., 6 wagons; to each corps headquarters, for the carrying of subsistence, forage, and other stores not provided for herein, 3 wagons; to each division headquarters, for similar purposes as above, 2 wagons; to each brigade headquarters, for similar purposes as above, 1 wagon; to each brigade of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, for commissary stores for sales to officers, 1 wagon; to each division of cavalry and infantry, for hauling forage for ambulance animals, portable forges, &c., 2 wagons; to each division, cavalry and infantry, for carrying armorer's tools, parts of muskets, extra arms, and accounterments, 1 wagon. It is expected that each ambulance and each wagon, excepting those of the artillery ammunition train, will carry the necessary forage for its own team.
10. If corps, division, and brigade commanders take their guards or escorts from commands already furnished with the full allowance of transportation, a corresponding amount should be taken with them to headquarters; but if they have not been provided for at all, then a proper number of wagons will be transferred by the depot quartermaster, on the requisition of the chief quartermaster, certified to and approved by the commanding general. As a rule, neither quartermaster nor commissary sergeants will be allowed to the service,
II. It has been decided that there is no advantage to the service, commensurate with the expense, in keeping up regularly organized pack trains with mules independent of the wagons. Al pack-saddles now on hand will be carried in the wagons of the ammunition and supply trains, not to exceed 2 to a wagon.
There will be allowed to each corps 50 extra mules, to supply losses on marches an for packing.
The following modification of Paragraph 1121, Revised Army Regulations, approved by the War Department, General-in-Chief, Quartermaster-General, and the general commanding, is hereby established, as far as relates to this army, and will be observed until otherwise ordered:
The maximum allowance of forage per day will be, for horses, 10 pounds hay and 14 pounds grain; for mules, 10 pounds hay and 11 pounds grain, and when short forage only can be procured, 18 pounds of grain for horses and 15 pounds of grain for mules can be issued as the daily ration.
When the army is on the march, the above order will not apply. The wagons will carry only the marching ration (10 pounds average to each animal per day).
This increased allowance of grain is intended to be fed only when the animals are at rest, after long marches, to recuperate them, and when hay cannot be procured.
III. Private property shall not be taken, except when required for the public service, and then only on the written order of the general commanding the army, a general commanding a corps, or other independent commander.
A copy of the order and receipts for the property taken must be left with the owner thereof, and a report of all property captured from the enemy, or seized for the public service, will be made monthly to the chief of the department, at these headquarters, to which it appertains.
By command of Major-General Meade:
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 2, Pages 420-422.

The Army of the Potomac suffered from an excess of transportation, so much so that it bred the practice of accumulating yet more items to carry.  This made Meade's army much slower on the March, which he attempted to remedy by restricting the amount of baggage the army could carry on the march.

November 4, 1863 (Thursday): Longstreet Sent East

General James Longstreet

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE, Missionary Ridge, November 4, 1863.
Commanding Corps:
    GENERAL: You will move with your command (McLaws' and Hood's divisions and Alexander's and Leyden's artillery battalions) as indicated in our conference yesterday. Major-General Wheeler will make the necessary arrangements for the cavalry and probably accompany it, at least for a time. He is thoroughly acquainted with Middle Tennessee, and many of the officers with him will know the route there as well as all parts of East Tennessee. Every preparation is ordered to advance you as fast as possible, and the success of the plan depends on rapid movements and sudden blows. The country through which you move until you strike the mountains will subsist your command and forage your animals, besides giving a large surplus of breadstuffs. Your object should be to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee first, or better, to capture or destroy him.
    Major General Samuel Jones will be urged to press on him from Northeast Tennessee. You will please keep open the telegraphic communication with us here and see to the repair and regular use of railroad to Loudon. The latter is of the first importance, as it may become necessary in an emergency to recall you temporarily. I hope to hear from you fully and frequently, general, and sincerely wish you the same success which has ever marked your brilliant career.
     I am, general, very respectfully and truly, yours,


HEADQUARTERS, November 4, 1863.
General B. BRAGG,
    GENERAL: Your favor of this date is received. I was under the impression that Stevenson's division at least was to act in co-operation with McLaws' and Hood's in the expedition under contemplation. As your letter does not mention the forces, I am left in some doubt whether Stevenson's division will form a part of the command. May I ask of you the favor to have a statement of such information as you may have relative to the positions, conditions, strength of the enemy's forces, as well as his means of getting supplies, &c. I would also like to be advised of any fortified positions that may be in East Tennessee, and the nature of such fortifications.
    I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 31, Part 3, Page 634-635.

An inauspicious start to Longstreet's campaign to remove Burnside from East Tennessee.  Davis and Bragg were putting the main body of Bragg's army at considerable risk by sending Longstreet east.  At least some of the consideration was the considerable dissension in the officer corp against Bragg, lead at least in part by Longstreet.  The key to Longstreet's campaign would be swift movement to strike Burnside.  Quibbles about the size of the force involved indicate some lack of recognition that the blow must be struck not just well, but quickly.

November 3, 1863 (Wednesday): Lincoln Pulls Meade Up Short

General George Meade

Washington, November 3, 1863-10 a. m.
Major-General MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
     Your dispatch of 12 m. yesterday, received about 1 o'clock this morning, was submitted to the President at the earliest moment practicable. He does not see that the proposed change of base is likely to produce any favorable result, while its disadvantages are manifest. I have fully concurred in the views he has heretofore communicated on this subject. Any tactical movement to turn a flank or threaten a communication is left to your own judgment; but an entire change of base under existing circumstances, I can neighter advise nor approve.

      H. W. HALLECK,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 29, Part 2, Page 412.

Meade wanted to change his base of operations to Aquia Creek and turn Lee's right flank at Fredericksburg, securing the heights behind the town.  This sounded, to Lincoln and Halleck's minds, too much like a repeat of Burnside's plans the previous year.  Meade would not be told what to do, only that he could not do what he wanted to.

November 2, 1863 (Tuesday): Schenck and the Maryland Elections

General Robert A. Schenck

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1863.
His Excellency A. W. BRADFORD,
Governor of Maryland:
     SIR: Yours of the 31st ultimo was received yesterday about noon, and since then I have been giving most earnest attention, to the subject-matter of it. At my call General Schenck has attended, and he assures me it is almost certain that violence will be used at some of the voting places on election day, unless prevented by his provost guards. He says that at some of those places the Union voters will not attend at all or run a ticket unless they have some assurance of protection. This makes the Missouri case of my action, in regard to which you express your approval.
    The remaining point of your letter is a protest against any person offering to vote being subjected  to any test not found in the laws of Maryland . This brings us to a difference between Missouri and Maryland. With the same reason in both States, Missouri has by law provided a test for the voter with reference to the present rebellion, while Maryland has not. For example, General Trimble, captured fighting us at Gettysburg, is, without recanting his treason, a legal voter by the laws of Maryland. Every General Schenck's order admits, him to vote, if he recants upon oath. I think that is cheap enough. My order in Missouri, which you approve, and General Schenck's order here, reach precisely the same end. Each assures the right of voting to all loyal men, and whether a man is loyal, each allows that man to fix by his own oath.
     Your suggestion that nearly all the candidates are loyal I do not think quite meets the case. In this struggle for the nation's life I cannot so confidently reply on those whose elections may have depended upon disloyal votes. Such men, when elected, may prove true; but such votes are given them in the expectation that they will prove false. Nor do I think to keep the peace at the polls and to prevent the persistently disloyal from voting continues just cause of offense to Maryland. I think she has her own example for it. If I mistake not it is precisely what General Dix did when Your Excellency was elected Governor.
     I revoke the first of the three propositions in General Schenck's General Orders, Numbers 53, not that it is wrong in principle, but becausy exclusive judges as to who shall be arrested, the provisions is too liable to abuse. For the revoked part I substitute the following:
     That all provost-marshals and other military officers do prevent all disturbance and violence at or about the polls, whether offered by such persons as above described, or by any other person or persons whomsoever.
     The other two propositions of the order I allow to stand.
     General Schenck is fully determined, and has my strict orders besides, that all loyal men may vote, and vote for whom they please.
     Your obedient servant,

    President of the United States.

Official Records, Series III., Vol. 3, Part 1, Page 982.

Schenck's was a political general whose military command in Maryland had placed him in position to enforce his views of how the war should be waged.  He armed African-American soldiers and encouraged their recruitment, despite the fact they technically could not be freed under the Emancipation Proclamation since the state was not in rebellion.  With the elections coming up and great unrest over his actions, Schenck decided to enforce a loyalty oath in order to vote and issued orders for the arrest of disloyal individuals.  Lincoln took the language regarding those arrest out of the General Orders Schenck issued, but let stand the loyalty test.