Friday, June 29, 2012

June 30, 1862 (Monday): "Send More Gunboats."


Situation on June 30--Map by Hal Jespersen, www.posix.com/CW


NEW YORK, June 30, 1862.
To the GOVERNORS OF THE SEVERAL STATES:
    The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth by the national forces has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and about Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible delay; in fact, there will soon be done formidable insurgent force except at Richmond. With so large an army there, the enemy can threaten us on the Potomac and elsewhere. Until we have re-established the national authority, all these places must be held, and we must keep a respectable force in front of Washington. But this, from the diminished strength of our Army by sickness and casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with energy and success. Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troop by proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object stated we require without delay 150,000 men, including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus re-enforced, our gallant Army will be enabled to realize the hopes and expectations of the Government and the people.


A. LINCOLN.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, June 30, 1862.
Major-General WOOL:
McClellan has moved his whole force across the Chickahominy and rests on James River, being supported by our gunboats. The position is favorable, and looks more like taking Richmond than any time before. I will send you some service money.*


EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, June 30, 1862.
Major-General DIX,
Fort Monroe:
    It is not probable the enemy have abandoned the line between White House and McClellan's rear? He could have but little object to maintain it and nothing to subsist upon. Would not Stoneman better move up and see about it? I think a telegraphic communication can at once be opened to White House from Williamsburg. The wires must be up still.


A. LINCOLN.
FORT MONROE, June 30, 1862.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Received 11 a.m.)
The President, ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
Everything has been done that is possible to open communication with General McClellan. I have sent an armed tug up the Chickahominy. Commodore Goldsborough sent up the James River, and Colonel Ingalls went up last night. We expect to hear to-day. At 10 o'clock yesterday the enemy had not occupied the point at White House. Our gunboats were still lying in the river, and the enemy's re-enforcements were only seen on the high ground a mile or two back. I cannot learn as yet whether they came this side of the White House. I shall soon have a report from Williamsburg.


JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FORT MONROE, June 30, 1862-11 a.m.
Honorable E. M. STANTON:
   Will you please say to President Lincoln that the report from Williamsburg is just in? The enemy had not been at White House at 8 o'clock last evening. Our pickets extend to New Kent Court-House 6 miles this side.


JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FORT MONROE, June 30, 1862-2 p.m.
HONORABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
    We have no doubt that McClellan intended to abandon the White House. Our only line of communication with him by telegraph from that point would be along the railroad, which the enemy will hardly give up.
The communication of Commodore Goldsborough telegraphed to Gideon Welles, will have advised you that the general relies on the James River for all his communications hereafter. The commodore was with me an hour ago. I suggested that we should extend our wires from Williamsburg to the mouth of the Chickahominy and there communicate by the James River by steamers or carry them on the left bank of the river to Turkey Island Point, where the new depot is to be. The general has all the materials of the working party with him,
and will no doubt at once open a new line of telegraphic communication from his camp to the river, and thence to meet the old line at Williamsburg or Sole Point, higher up. We have no material here. I will make a reconnaissance in the vicinity of the White House, to ascertain whether the enemy are there.


JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WASHINGTON CITY, June 30, 1862-3 p.m.
Major-General HALLECK, Corinth:
    Your telegram of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition must not on any account be given up. The President regards that and the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important movements of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the capture of Richmond. He is not pleased with the tardiness of the movement toward Chattanooga, and directs that no force be sent here if you cannot do it without breaking up the operation against that point and East Tennessee. Infantry only are needed; our cavalry and artillery are strong enough.
    The first reports from Richmond were more discouraging than the truth warranted. If the advantage is not on our side it is balanced. General McClellan has moved his whole force onto the line of the James River and is supported by our gunboats. But he must be largely strengthened before advancing, and hence the call on you, which I am glad you have answered so promptly. Let me know to what point on the river you will send your forces, so as to provide immediately for transportation.


EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TURKEY BRIDGE, June 30, 1862-7 p.m.
(Received July 1, 11.30 a.m.)
Honorable E. M. STANTON:
    Another day of desperate fighting. We are hard pressed by superior numbers. I fear I shall be forced to abandon my material to save my men under cover of the gunboats. You must send us very large re-enforcements by way of Fort Monroe, and they must come very promptly. My army has behaved superbly, and have done all that men could do. If none of us escape, we shall at least have done honor to the country.
    I shall do my best to save the army. Send more gunboats.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CITY POINT, JAMES RIVER, June 30, 1862, 8 p.m.
(Received Washington, July 1, 12 m.)
M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General:
    The general is 6 miles above here, on the river. His army will probably fall back to Harrison's Bar, near here, to-morrow. It is nearly ex-hausted with constant and desperate fighting against fearful odds. If his army be not speedily re-enforced the results may prove disastrous.
    Our department has the means of providing stores in abundance. McClellan wants men now more than anything else.


RUFUS INGALLS.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 3 (various).

Events were fluid, reports conflicting.  Lincoln had retained some optimism, but was in the process of approving a call for an additional 150,000 men.  The wording of the call was likely that of Secretary of State Seward, as Lincoln himself was at the capital not New York (where Seward was).  This day he would indulge in the unrealistic hope he could retain McClellan in front of Richmond until at least some of the new levy could arrive and take the rebel capital, an idea he would soon drop.  At the same time he feared news of the call for more troops would leak out and start a panic once the North discovered the situation at Richmond.  Stanton, started the day incredibly believing McClellan was now situated better than ever to take Richmond.  The, at 8 p.m. communication was reestablished with McClellan who spoke in terms of "if none of us escape...."  Meanwhile, Jackson delayed yet again, this time engaging in a pointless artillery duel at White Oak Swamp.  Huger and Magruder both failed to execute their part in Lee's plan for the day.  Longstreet and A. P. Hill did get up promptly, and suffered nearly 4,000 casualties at Glendale (Frayser's Farm) on the road to Malvern Hill, inflicting a like number on the Union forces concentrated there.  About 1/3 of McClellan's army had now reached the James River and the general himself had traveled back to City Point to board the Galena and then return toward Harrison's Landing and Malvern Hill.  His was now a command literally afloat, figuratively taking on water.

Thursday, June 28, 2012

June 29, 1862 (Sunday): McClellan Out of Communication

Battle of Savage Station (hmbd.org)



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 29, 1862 - 1. 25 a. m.
Brigadier General E. V. SUMNER:
    I have just seen your dispatch to General Meagher directing him to return with his brigade and the regiment of infantry, by the railroad, to your position. Unless yor are threatened with a superior force of the enemy I prefer that these troops should remain here. Please answer immediately by telegraph.


G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major -General, Commanding.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 FORT MONROE, June 29, 1862 - 9 a. m.
[Received 10 a. m.]
Honorable EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    Colonel Campbell, commanding, telegraphs me that General Stoneman will arrive there from the White House in an hour. I have not yet been able to hear directly from him, but will keep you advised of all I learn. One hundred and fifty wagons partly laden have reached Williamsburg from the White House, and I have ordered them here.


John A. DIX,
Major - General.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, June 29, 1862.
Major-General MAGRUDER:
    SIR: My line is formed to the left and somewhat to the front of General Cobb. The enemy seem to be in large force in front of my right, and are or have moved a little to their right. I do not think it prudent for me to attack him with my small force unless there be a simultaneous attack all along our lines. I will keep a good lookout on my left. I had hoped that Jackson would have co-operated with me on my left, but he sends me word that he cannot, as he has other important duty to perform.
Respectfully, &c.,









D. R. JONES,
Brigadier-General.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PETERSBURG, VA., June 30, 1862-9 a. m.
Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR:
I have just received the following dispatch from Rhea's Farm Station, opposite City Point, viz:
Two gunboats gone down James River; one gunboat off City Point; six gunboats off Turkey Island, above City Point; heavy firing on up the James River; one gunboat hoisted a black flag.


J. F. MILLIGAN,
Captain and Signal Officer.
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FORT MONROE, June 29, 1862 - 1 p. m.
[Received 1. 15 p. m.]
Honorable EWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    Nothing since my last dispatch. Unless you desire me to continue hourly dispatches I will only telegraph when I have something to send. I have sent a dispatch to Colonel Ingalls, on the Pamunley, in regard to sending further supplies to the James River. I am also loading a schooner with mixed ammunition for same destination. I can get no direct communication with General Stoneman to learn what orders he has.


John A. DIX,
Major - General.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 FORT MONROE, June 29, 1862-2.45 p.m.
M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General:
    The White House depot was abandoned by me last night at sunset, in compliance with instructions previously given by General McClellan and directly in consequence of the movements of the enemy the two preceding days. At 12 yesterday he was in possession of our railroad. At Dispatch, 12 miles from White House, it was known he was marching down this side of the Chickahominy in great force-at least 30,000 strong-and that a column of 6,000 was moving rapidly on this depot. At 5 (afternoon) General Stoneman fell back from Tunstall's to White House, pressed by the enemy. About 7 (afternoon) General Casey, who had recently relieved me in command of the troops, had embarked his infantry on boats and dropped down the river. Stoneman, with the cavalry and artillery, retired toward Williamsburg, in which direction I had already sent all the wagons, animals, &c., not provided for on transports. It was presumed that our army was across the Chickahominy. F. J. Porter's corps crossed night before last, thus leaving the enemy's large force quite isolated on this side. In any event the depot was useless the moment our railroad was seized; therefore I perfected arrangements to abandon it at once, and succeeded in so doing without loss, confusion, or accident, moving out from the narrow and tortuous Pamunkey some four hundred vessels laden with supplies, quite all of which I now have with me, en route to James River by Fort Monroe, if our arms are successful to-day and to-morrow at Richmond. The gunboats were still at White House and other important points on the river. Everything not required to be taken away was burned before I left. The White House itself was burned, probably by some unknown hand. The officers of the staff department were one and all wonderfully zealous and energetic.


RUFUS INGALLS,

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FORT MONROE, June 29, 1862-4.15 p.m.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    I arrived here this morning, the enemy having driven our army from the left to the right bank of the Chickahominy, and having in force cut the railroad at Dispatch Station. The evacuating of White House Station became last evening a military necessity, and agreeably to orders from the Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac I evacuated. Every man was saved, and all public property that could not be saved was destroyed.


SILAS CASEY,
Brigadier-General Volunteers.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 29, 1862-6 p.m.
Honorable WM. H. SEWARD,
Astor House, New York:
    Not much more than when you left. Fulton, of Baltimore American, is now with us. He left White House at 11 a.m. yesterday. He conversed fully with a paymaster, who was with Porter's force during the fight of Friday and fell back to nearer McClellan's quarters just a little sooner than Porter did, seeing the whole of it. Staid on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy overnight and left for White House at 5 a.m. Saturday. He says Porter retired in perfect order under protection of guns arranged for the purpose, under orders and not from necessity, and with all other of our forces, except what was left on purpose to go to White House, was safely in pontoons over the Chickahominy before morning, and that there was heavy firing on the Richmond side, begun at 5 and ceased at 7 a.m. Saturday. On the whole I think we have had the better of it up to that point of time. What has happened since we still know not, as we have no communication with General McClellan. A dispatch from Colonel Ingalls shows that he thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at Richmond to-day and will be to-morrow. We have no means of knowing upon what Colonel Ingalls
found his opinion. All confirmed about saving all property. Not a single unwounded straggler came back to the White House from the field, and the number of wounded reaching there up to 11 a.m. Saturday was not large.


A. LINCOLN.

To what the President has above stated I will only add one or two points that may be satisfactory for you to know:
1st. All the sick and wounded were safely removed from the White House; not a man left behind.
2nd. A dispatch from Burnside shows that he is in condition to afford efficient support and is probably doing so.
3rd. The dispatch of Colonel Ingalls impresses me with the conviction that the movement was made by General McClellan to concentrate on Richmond, and was successful to the latest point of which we have any information.
4th. Mr. Fulton says that on Friday night between 12 and 1 o'clock General McClellan telegraphed Commodore Goldsborough that the result of the movement was satisfactory to him.
5th. From these and the facts stated by the President my inference is that General McClellan will probably be in Richmond within two days.


EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FORT MONROE, June 29, 1862-7.45 p.m. Honorable E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:
Colonel Ingalls is here, with most of the transports. He will go up the James River to-night and try to communicate with General McClellan. We expect to hear from him before morning.


JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FORT MONROE,, June 29, 1862- 8 p.m.
M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General:
I have seen General Dix, and arranged for boats to go up James River to-morrow with supplies and for wounded. General Casey is here on board of transports. Stoneman is at Williamsburg, en route to Yorktown. My trains arrived in safety. I leave immediately to-night for City Point, to ascertain the position and condition of the army.


RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FORT MONROE, June 29, 1862-8.30 p.m.
D. C. McCALLUM:
The rebels have possession of our railroad. White House is abandoned. Wentz and myself, with all our men, are here, waiting your orders. One locomotive, with forty cars, are at headquarters. The other locomotives are under the guns of the gunboats, with connecting-rods taken off and preserved. All the men are safe. We ran the railroad up to the last moment. The two locomotives last sent are still afloat and safe.


C. S. McALPIN,
Superintendent.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 29, 1862.
Major General J. B. MAGRUDER,
Commanding Division:
    GENERAL: I regret much that you have made so little progress to-day in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge you, then, again to press on his rear rapidly and steadily. We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely.
    Very respectfully, yours, &c.,


R. E. LEE,
General.

P. S.-Since the above was written I learn from Major Taylor that you are under the impression that General Jackson has been ordered not to support you. On the contrary, he has been directed to do so, and to push the pursuit vigorously.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 3 (various)

The Confederates found Union trenches empty and began marching across the swamp in pursuit.  Longstreet and A. P. Hill made good progress, moving close to 20 miles.  Huger, in yet another example of poor staff coordination marched to no good end.  Jackson did not, as Lee had intended, forcefully coordinate with Magruder.  Magruder was confused, fatigued, and overly cautious before attacking the Union rear guard at Savage Station (the second major supply area McClellan would give up).  The rest of the army and trains continued toward the James River.  The Confederates lost a golden opportunity to cut up the Union rear guard by a too cautious and uncoordinated pursuit.  It is interesting to read Lee's postscript to Magruder that Jackson had been positively directed to push the pursuit vigorously, while D. R. Jones had been told by Jackson he had other important duty to attend to.  The other interesting facet of the day is the inability of Union planners in Washington to coordinate the McClellan other than by way of Fort Monroe, the Confederates having cut the telegraph line.


 

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

June 28, 1862 (Saturday): "I am not responsible for this."

White House Landing (loc.gov)


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Savage Station, June 28, 1862-12.20 a.m.
    I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both side is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war.
    The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow I could and save the material and personnel of the army.
    If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.
    I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, those the best we have.
    In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory.As it is the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.
    I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost.
    If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.
    You have done your best to sacrifice this army.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, June 28, 1862.
Major-General McCLELLAN:
    Save your army at all events. Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed re-enforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that re-enforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government are to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things.


A. LINCOLN.
 
P. S.-General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better toward York River than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 28, 1862.
    The commanding general directs that you immediately cause your command to be provided with three days' rations in haversacks; ammunition sufficient to fill the boxes of the infantry and artillery; that the wagons that can be spared for the purpose be at once sent to the depots at Orchard Station and Savage Station for supplies of hard bread, sugar and coffee, and forage. These wagons, after being so loaded, will at once be sent through the White Oak Swamp via Savage Station, where they will wait further orders.
    The usual reserve ammunition must be taken. Please acknowledge.
    By command of Major-General McClellan:


S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

PETERSBURG, VA., June 28, 1862-9 a. m.
Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR:
    The enemy have suddenly and unexpectedly left the Appomattox. Just received the following dispatch by signals from Cobb's Station, below Port Walthall, viz:
    The gunboats opposite our station aground set on fire and abandoned by the enemy. Monitor has gone; all the gunboats are following toward City Point.
    Your obedient servant,


J. F. MILLIGAN,
Captain and Signal Officer.

McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
June 28, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    Your dispatch and that of President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., on other side of the Chickahominy.
    It is impossible to tell where re-enforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe and thence according to state of affairs, when they arrive. It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communications more than an hour or two longer.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.


JUNE 28, 1862.
Major-General MAGRUDER:
    My second note. Seems first was error, the men turning out to be your own. The possession of that point would seem to liberate all the forces to his left, guarding Garnett's plateau. They can be used in driving the enemy from his other positions. We shall proceed on this side. How far [does] his right extend up the Chickahominy? Jackson's division is at Grapevine Bridge; Ewell sent to Dispatch Station. I will communicate whenever I can discover anything of importance; you do the same, and operate on the principle before established-to hold your lines at all hazards, defending the approaches to Richmond, moving against the enemy whenever you can do so to advantage.
By order of General Lee:


R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.


WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., June 28, 1862.
General DIX:
    Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you can. Report to me.


A. LINCOLN.
 
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1862.
Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH,
Fort Monroe:
    Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or near that place. McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there.


A. LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862. General BURNSIDE:
   I think you had better go with any re-enforcements you can spare to General McClellan.

A. LINCOLN

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 28, 1862 - 5. 30 p. m.
Brigadier General F. J. PORTER:
    There is quite a brisk firing at railroad bridge and at Bottom's Bridge, and as we have but a very small force here the commanding general desires that you at once order down Sykes' division, provided everything is quiet in your front. Please let them leave camp if possible so as to have the troops observed by the enemy. Please acknowledge.


S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant - General.

WASHINGTON CITY,
June 28, 1862-6 p.m.
Major-General BURNSIDE, New Berne:
    Since the dispatches of the President and myself to you of to-day we have seen a copy of one sent to you by General McClellan on the 25th, of which we were not aware.
    Our directions were not designed to interfere with any instructions given you by General McClellan, but only to authorize you to render him any aid in your power.


EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK, Corinth:
    The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you immediately to detach 25,000 of your force, and forward it by the nearest and quickest route, by way of Baltimore and Washington, to Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio River. But is detaching your force the President directs that it be done in such way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the forces to be detached and the route they are to be sent is left to your own judgment.
    The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday, the full extent of which is not yet known.
    You will acknowledge the receipt of this dispatch, stating the day and hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so that we may take measures to aid in river and railroad transportation.


EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

   GENERAL: General Jackson writes at 11 p. m. that he is working at the bridge, and would attempt an advance at once if the bridge were passable. The enemy must have withdrawn the battery mentioned by General Jackson this morning. General Stuart is near White House, and says that everything there was burned last night; the enemy before him.
    Captain White reports to General Ewell that the enemy near Bottom's Bridge are throwing up a redoubt on the left of the Williamsburg road on this side. General Ewell is at Dispatch [Station], and reports that the enemy has one field work on railroad bridge and a battery on railroad. This is the substance of General Jackson's dispatch.


C. MARSHALL,
Major and Aide-de-Camp.


EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862.
Hon. W. H. SEWARD:
    MY DEAR SIR: My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows:
The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy has enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact, there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the Western army be brought here to McClellan they will let us have Richmond and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, &c. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for this protection. Then let the country give us 100,000 new troops in the shortest possible time, which,added to McClellan, directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.
Yours, very truly,


A. LINCOLN.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 2 and 3 various.

The 28th was spent by McClellan's forces beginning their move to the James River.  The Confederates were waiting on McClellan, trying to figure which of three options he would choose (falling back down the Peninsula, moving across White Oak Swamp to the James River, or making a lunge at Richmond with his troops on the left who had seen little combat.  On that side of the line, Toombs made an impetuous attack at Golding's Farm which amounted to a relatively minor affair.  Lee knew McClellan and did not believe he would make an attempt on Richmond after the heavy fighting on his right.  That left the option of falling back on White House landing and his supplies (which Stuart confirmed was not in play once he found supplies being burned and abandoned there).  By mid-afternoon Lee knew McClellan would be headed across the swamp.  Now he had to organize his dispersed commands to move across difficult terrain and attempt to cut up his retreating opponent.

History has treated Lincoln better, and rightfully so, than McClellan on the 28th.  Lincoln treated McClellan better in his worst moment than he had up to this point, while McClellan made wild accusations which crossed the border from bad judgment to hysteria.  (So much so the military telegraph office removed the last two sentences of his 12:20 a.m. message). It was a singular unravelling.  Lee, his opposite number, is focused and steadying in dispatches, a calm professional.





Tuesday, June 26, 2012

June 27, 1862 (Friday): "We have met a severe repulse today."

General John Bell Hood

FRIDAY, June 27, 1862.
Professor LOWE:
    DEAR SIR: Ascensions must be made throughout the day, if practicable, at short intervals and reports made of what is seen.


A. A. HUMPHREYS.

JUNE 27, 1862-8.15 a.m.
    The heaviest cannonading at this time is near where the last headquarters were, between Doctor Gaines" house and Mechanicsville. We have large reserves across the river; our forces are in line of battle. On our left the enemy appear to be in large force in and about their entrenchments on this side of the river in the vicinity of Doctor Friend's, and on this side very large.
    The dense smoke prevents me from seeing to Richmond. I am very unwell, and think it advisable for some good person to be constantly up.


Respectfully,
T. S. C. LOWE.


JUNE 27, 1862-9.20 a.m.
Brigadier-General HUMPHREYS, or
General MARCY,
Chief of Staff:
    Although I reported myself ill on this occasion I will remain constantly in the balloon, and if you will send me two orderlies I will keep headquarters constantly informed of what can be seen from the balloon. My assistants that you speak of are trying to save the property in their charge. In an exact north direction from here, and about two miles and a half from the river, in an open field, there are large bodies of troops, but I should judge they were too far down on our right to be the enemy. On a hill this side of Doctor Gaines" house there is a long line of skirmishers stationary. On the field near where General Morell was camped everything is on fire.
    About four miles to the west from here the enemy have a balloon about 300 feet in the air. By appearances I should judge that the enemy might make an attack on our left at any moment. We are firing occasional shots on our left.


T. S. C. LOWE.


McCLELLAN'S, June 27, 1862-10 a.m.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    The night passed quietly. During it we brought all wagons, heavy guns, &c., to this side, and at daybreak drew in McCall's division about 3 miles. This change of position was beautifully executed under a sharp fire, with but little loss. The troops on the other side are now well in hand, and the whole army so concentrated that it can take advantage of the first mistake made by the enemy. White House yet undisturbed. Success of yesterday complete.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.


JUNE 27, 1862-11 a.m.
Brigadier-General HUMPHREYS, or
General MARCY,
Chief of Staff:
    There is no firing on either side at this time. In a northerly direction, and about three or four miles from Woodbury's Bridge, there is a long line of dust running toward the York River Railroad. Quite a large body of the enemy are visible in the field where General Smith was camped, near the old headquarters. The rebel balloon suddenly disappeared about one hour since.
    The enemy in front of here remain silent in and around their earth-works and rifle-pits.


T. S. C. LOWE.

P. S.-Can Major Webb come over and ascend?

McCLELLAN'S, June 27-12 m. Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    My change of position on other side just in time. Heavy attack now being made by Jackson and two other divisions. Expect attack also on this side.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.


McCLELLAN'S, June 27, 1862-1 p.m.
(Received 3 p.m.)
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    Your dispatch of noon received. I thank you for it. We are contending at several points against superior numbers. The enemy evince much desperation, but as we have no choice but to win, you may be sure that we will do all that can be expected. Thus far we have been successful, but I think the most severe struggle is to come. The enemy neglect White House thus far and bestow his whole attention on us.
    If I am forced to concentrate between the Chickahominy and James, I will at once endeavor to open communication with you. All re-enforcements should for the present go to Fort Monroe, to which point I will send orders. It is absolutely certain that Jackson, Ewell, and Whiting are here. This may be the last dispatch I send you for some time. Will beg that you put some one general in command of the Shenandoah and of all troops in front of Washington for the sake of the country. Secure unity of action and bring the best men forward. Good-by, and present my respects to the President.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.


McCLELLAN'S, June 27, 1862-3 p.m.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    We have been fighting nearly all day against greatly superior numbers. We shall endeavor to hold our own, and if compelled to fall back, shall do it in good order, upon James River, if possible. Our men fight like veterans, and will do all that men can do. If we have to fall back on James River, supplies should be passed up to us under protection of the gunboats as rapidly as possible.
    McClellan has telegraphed you several times to-day. You may rely upon it the rebels are concentrating their greatest efforts at this juncture.


MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

CAMP LINCOLN, June 27, 1862-4.30 p.m.
General FITZ JOHN PORTER,
Commanding Fifth Corps:
    Your dispatch of 4.10 received. Send word to all your troops that their general thanks them for their heroism, and says to them that he is now sure that nothing can resist them. Their conduct and your own has been magnificent, and another name is added to their banners. Give my regulars a good chance. I look upon to-day as decisive of the war. Try to drive the rascals and take some prisoners and guns. What more assistance do you require?
    Ever yours,


McCLELLAN.

CAMP OF PECK'S DIVISION,
June 27, 1862 - 5. 15 p. m.
[Brigadier - General PECK,
Commanding Division:]
    GENERAL: There are no signs of the enemy on the New Market road. Our scouts have advanced to within one mile and a half of New Market. The Quaker and new Charles City roads have been patrolled, and have found no trace of the enemy near our lines.
    I have just returned from the north side of the Chickahominy. All quiet there.


P. KEENAN,


Captain, Commanding Companies, Eight Pennsylvania Cavalry.


CAMP LINCOLN, June 27, 1862-5.5 p.m.
General FITZ JOHN PORTER:
    I am ordering up more troops. Do your best to hold your own and let me know constantly the state of affairs and what you require. Do you need more batteries? You must hold your own until dark.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.
 
JUNE 27, 1862-5.56 p.m.
Captain CHAUNCEY McKEEVER:
    Have just returned from the front, where we have nothing but a stampede since I saw you there, owing to the behavior of the troops occupying the picket line. The first shot from a rebel was sufficient to start regiments.
    In order to preserve quiet to-night, if practicable, I ordered the Fifty-

fifth New York Regiment from the forest, and for it not to return there. I cannot rely on troops I have seen from General Couch's division for any assistance should an advance be made on my front. Of this the spectacle of to-day has fully convinced me. The unusual activity of the rebels, the balloon ascension this morning, the shelling of the woods this evening all along my front, and the display of an unusual force this afternoon indicate that they have it in mind to advance. If so, I should have not less than three brigades to spring to the defenses; now I can be whipped before the reserve will get up. De Russy's battery is also gone when there can be no place at which it is so much needed, as there are so many approaches to my position.
    I wish these suggestions to be well considered. The problem submitted for my opinion is very unlike the one which exists; in fact, I find Casey was whipped in detail. I desire to avoid such a disaster. Another musketry fire has broken out in front, but I really do not know whether it all comes from my troops, the pickets, or not.


JOSEPH HOOKER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.




HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE POTOMAC,
June 27, 1862.
Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH:
I desire you will send some light-draught gunboats at once up the Chickahominy as far as possible, and also that you will forthwith instruct the gunboats in the James River to cover the left flank of this army. I should be glad to have the gunboats proceed as far up the river as may be practicable, and hope they may get up as far as the vicinity of New Market.
    We have met a severe repulse to-day, having been attacked by greatly superior numbers, and I am obliged to fall back between the Chickahominy and the James River. I look to you to give me all the support you can in covering my flank, as well as in giving protection to my supplies afloat in James River.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

 McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
June 27, 1862-8 p.m.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    Have had a terrible contest. Attacked by greatly superior number in all directions on this side; we still hold our own, though a very heavy fire is still kept up on the left bank of Chickahominy. The odds have been immense. We hold our own very nearly. I may be forced to give up my position during the night, but will not if it is possible to avoid it. Had I 20,000 fresh and good troops we would be sure of a splendid victory to-morrow.
    My men have fought magnificently.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS, June 27, 1862.
His Excellency President DAVIS:
    Mr. PRESIDENT: Profoundly grateful to Almighty God for the signal victory granted to us, it is my pleasing task to announce to you the success achieved by this army to-day. The enemy was this morning drive from his strong position behind Beaver Dam Creek and pursued to that behind Powhite Creek, and finally, after a severe contest of five hours, entirely repulsed from the field. Night put an end to the contest. I grieve to state that our loss in officers and men is great. We sleep on the field, and shall renew the contest in the morning.
    I have the honor to be, very respectfully,






R. E. LEE,

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 3, Various.

Hill renewed his attacks at Beaver Dam Creek early in the morning, but Porter had left a token force there and redeployed his forces behind Boatswain's Creek at Gaines Mill.  D. H. Hill and Longstreet made tentative attacks waiting for Jackson's arrival, which finally occurred at 4:30 PM.  The outcomes was in doubt up to the last, when John Bell Hood's Texans broke the line and carried the field.  At this point only one of McClellan's Corp had been tested and he retained a commanding force in front of Magruder and Holmes.  Despite his advantages, and before the assault at Gaines Mill was fairly begun, McClellan had decided by 1 PM to change his base of operations to the James River.  He assessed that White House Landing (his base of supply) was untenable due to the presence of Jackson on his right flank.  Union casualties were nearly 7,000 killed, wounded, and captured.  Confederate losses were just short of 8,000.  Despite Hood's words, his men had not suffered a severe repulseWhat had been defeated was his own strength of will.

Monday, June 25, 2012

June 26, 1862 (Thursday): "Three O'Clock Having Arrived.."

Ellerson's Mill (NPS.gov)

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.
Major-General McCLELLAN:
    Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.
    The later one of 6.15 p.m., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelming by 200,000, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you re-enforcements whenever I possibly can.


A. LINCOLN.

P. S.-General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better toward York River than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CORPS,
June 26, 1862.
Brigadier-General PECK,
Commanding Division:
    GENERAL: I am instructed by the general commanding the corps to state information has been received from headquarters Army of the Potomac to the effect that Jackson is advancing on the right flank of this army toward the White House. The general desires you to direct your pickets to be most vigilant, and report everything of importance that occurs; also that you will have every man's cartridge-box filled with cartridges, your caissons filled, and your command prepared for action, but let them rest and keep fresh. The general is instructed to direct you to guard Bottom's Bridge well and keep a sharp lookout toward White Oak Swamp. A preliminary notice to be vigilant has been sent to General Naglee, to save time.
    Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


C. C. SUYDAM,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS LIGHT DIVISION
           Camp Gregg, February 28, 1863.
GENERAL.....My orders were that General Jackson, moving down from Ashland, would inform General Branch of his near approach.  As soon as Jackson cross the Central Railroad Branch was to cross the Chickahominy, and, taking the river road, push on and clear the Meadown Bridge.  This done, I was to cross at Meadow Bridge, and, sweeping down to Mechanicsville, open the way, open the way for General Longstreet.  It was expected that General Jackson would be in the position assigned him by early dawn, and all my preparations were made with the view of moving early.  General Branch, however, did not receive intelligence from General Jackson until 10 o'clock, when he immediately crossed and proceeded to carry out his instructions.  He was delayed by the enemy's skirmishers and advanced but slowly.....

A. P. HILL,
     Major-General.
 
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862-12 m.
   I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chickahominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's advance guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best to outmaneuver, outwit, and outfight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Honorable E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862-2.30 p. m.
    Your dispatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where re-enforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence according to state of affairs when they arrive.
    It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication more than an hour or two longer.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

(A.P. HILL's report continued).

...Three o'clock having arrived, and no intelligence from Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it.....

JUNE 26, 1862 - 2.15.
General REYNOLDS:
    The enemy is reported to be advancing in force on the Pamunkey road . Withdraw your regiment from the grove. Order Farnsworth to observe the enemy closely and report to you whatever occurs. Have your wagons packed with such baggage as the men do not carry, and a guide detailed to conduct them to General McClellan's headquarters should we advance, or find to necessary to withdraw. Send some of your best officers to observe the enemy. They should be mounted and have with them mounted messengers to bringfrequent reports to keep the major-general commanding fully posted at all times, as the movements of the entire army may depend on the information he may get.


GEO. A. McCALL,
Brigadier - General, Commanding Division.

(HILL's report continued).

....The battle now raged furiously along my whole line.  The artillery fire from the enemy was terrific.  Their position along Beaver Dam Creek was too strong to be carried by a direct attack without heavy loss, and expecting every moment to hear Jackson's guns on my left and in rear of the enemy, I forebore to order the storming of their lines....

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL ARMY CORPS,
Camp near New Bridge, Va., June 26, 1862.
Brigadier-General STONEMAN,
Commanding Forces at rear of Old Church, Va.:
   GENERAL: The commanding general directs that in case the enemy go down toward White House, you retire in that direction with your artillery, infantry, and part of your cavalry. Hold the enemy in check as long as possible and assume a defensive line near Tunstall's, and thus aid the force there intrenching and preparing to defend that line. Direct the rest of the cavalry to retire slowly and resisting upon Cold Harbor. In the event of retiring your forces as above, you will send messengers to notify General Casey at White House, and also to the commanding general, communicating the same information to General Morell and General Sykes on the route; and if he has ample notice of the retreat or probable approach of the enemy, to send in time the trains of the command to the opposite side of the Chickahominy over Sumner's and the upper bridges, or to camp in the valley near those bridges, and keep up frequent communication of your position and movements, those, of the enemy, his strength, artillery, infantry, and cavalry, and, as far possible, his presumed destination.
    Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


FRED. T. LOCKE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
June 26, 1862-7.10 p.m.
General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
    The re-enforcements will be sent to the place you request. We shall have every confidence in your ability to drive Jackson back, and will lose no time in aiding you. My last telegram apprised you of what is being done here.
    With every wish for your success and good fortune (and I have never had any other feeling), I remain, yours, truly,


EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

(A.P. HILL report continued)

...The Thirty-Eight North Carolina, Colonel {William J.} Hoke, and the Thirty-fourth North Colonel, Colonel {Richard W.} Riddick, of Pender's brigade, made a gallant but abortive attempt to force a crossing....Meeting General Ripley, who had just crossed his brigade at the Mechanicsville Bridge, I requested him to turn the enemy's left lower down the crrek.  This was gallantly attempted, but failed, and with heavy loss....

PORTER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 26, 1862-7.40 p.m.
(Received 10.30 p.m.)
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    A very heavy engagement in progress just in front of me. McCall and two brigades of Morell's are fighting gallantly against superior numbers, so far with marked success. There is no longer any doubt as to the strength of attack on this the left bank of the Chickahominy. My men are behaving superbly, but you must not expect them to contest too long against great odds. The engagement is very serious, and is just below Mechanicsville. You may rely upon this army doing all that men can do.
    I still keep communication with White House, but it may be cut any moment, and I cannot prevent it.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 26, 1862-7.50 p.m.
Generals SUMNER, HEITZELMAN, KEYES, HOOKER, SMITH:
    General McClellan just this moment informs me that McCall and two brigades of Morell are hotly engaged near Mechanicsville, so far with marked success. Secesh in large force, but badly beaten. Inform the troops on your side of the river. Please communicate this to your troops.

R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.


(A.P. HILL report continued):

...The battle ceased about 9 o'clock, my brigades resting along the creek, the object of this attack, viz, clearing the way for Longstreet having been fully accomplished.  It was never contemplated that mydivision alone should have sustained the shock of this battle, but such was the case , and the only assistance received was from Ripley.....
   
HEADQUARTERS, June 26, 1862.
Major General B. HUGER,
Commanding, &c.:
    GENERAL: Hold your trenches to-night at the point of the bayonet if necessary. If you discover demonstrations against you and do not feel strong enough, call upon Colonel Rhett for his battalion of infantry armed with muskets. Should there be no indications of the enemy on James River, call on General Wise for such as he can spare. If the enemy should press you and this does not give you force enough, send to the Secretary of War to order Walker's brigade from Drewry's Bluff to join you, if only for to-night.
    I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,


R. E. LEE,
General.

The day begins with the President and McClellan once more at odds and a general feeling of impending disaster pervading Union planning.   Waiting also for the day to get underway is A.P. Hill who will wait, and wait longer still, for Stonewall Jackson before taking the initiative himself and hurling his division at Porter's V Corp, strongly posted behind Beaver Dam Creek at Ellerson's Mill.  A victory is gained by the Union forces, but momentum is lost, and Hill is not wrong in saying his efforts have accomplished the goal of clearing the way for Longstreet.  Whether that was because of the high price paid in blood by Hill's men or by McClellan's having already been morally defeated cannot be said with precision.  Lee closes the day recognizing all has not gone as plan and Huger and Magrudger must defend Richmond at all hazards.



Sunday, June 24, 2012

June 25, 1862 (Wednesday): "If I Had Another Good Division I Could Laugh At Jackson"

Position of Troops June 25 (LOC-Army War College Map-Landers 1874)



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 25 [?], 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
Everything very quiet to-day. I hope to open on enemy's batteries to-morrow morning and to gain important advantages within forty-eight hours-not however bringing us to Richmond, but somewhat nearer, and improving our position. It is again raining, but this will not probably defer movements.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 25, 1862-10.30 a.m.
General FITZ JOHN PORTER:
Have your command under arms ready to move as circumstances may require.
Fighting still in front of Hooker.
R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

REDOUBT Numbers 3, June 25, 1862-1.30 p. m.
We have advanced our pickets on the left considerably, under sharp resistance. Our men behaved very handsomely. Some firing still continues.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Honorable E. M. STANTON.
REDOUBT Numbers 3, June 25, 1862-3.15 p. m.
   The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket lines. Kearny's and one-half of Hooker's are where I want them.
    I have this moment re-enforced Hooker's right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended for to-day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is not a battle; merely an affair of Heintzelman's corps, supported by Keyes, and thus far all goes well. We hold every foot we have gained.
    If we succeed in what we have undertaken it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to this time has been done by General Hooker's division, which has behaved as usual-that is, most splendidly.
    On our right Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 25, 1862- 5.25 p.m.
General SUMNER:
    The general commanding desires you to regard your new line in front as merely a picket line, and your entrenchments as your true field of battle. If your pickets should be hard pressed they will fall back slowly to the entrenchments, firing as they retire.
    He also wishes you to cut away as much of the timber as possible in front of your works, so as to give you a more open space on your front.


R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

Honorable E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862-6.15 p. m.
I have just returned from the field, and find your dispatch in regard to Jackson.  Several contrabands just in give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanower Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond yesterday.
   I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack.
   I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.
    Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for re-enforcements.*




GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

*See Lincoln to McClellan, Part III, p. 259. 

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS,
June 25, 1862-7 p.m.
Major General AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE,
New Berne, N. C.:
    Reports from contrabands and deserters to-day make it probable that Jackson's forces are coming to Richmond and that a part of Beauregard's force have arrived at Richmond. You will please advance on Goldsborough with all your available forces at the earliest practicable moment. I wish you to understand that every minute in this crisis is of great importance. You will therefore reach Goldsborough as soon as possible, destroying all the railroad communication in the direction of Richmond in your power.
    If possible, destroy some of the bridges on the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad and threaten Raleigh.


GEO., B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.


McCLELLAN'S,
June 25, 1862-8 p.m.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:
The following has just this moment received:
A contraband who came into our lines under the fire of our guns to-day says he saw Beauregard and his troops arrive in Richmond.


F. J. PORTER,
Brigadier-General.


This only serves to corroborate previous information received from several sources to-day.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 25, 1862-8.30 p.m.
General SILAS CASEY, White House:
   Information has been received here that the enemy design attacking our communications. Please send out cavalry reconnoitering parties from Tunstall's Station to-morrow morning, above and below the railroad, and direct them to give you timely notice of any approach of rebel forces toward your position, and report to these headquarters all important information you may get regarding the enemy's movements. It is said that Jackson is coming from Gordonsville with the intention of attacking our right flank soon; therefore be vigilant.


R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

PORTER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 25, 1862-10.40 p.m.
(Received June 26-3 a.m.)
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
The information I received on this side tends to confirm impression that Jackson will soon attack our right and rear. Every possible precaution is being taken. If I had another good division I could laugh at Jackson. The task is difficult, but this army will do its best, and will never disgrace the country. Nothing but overwhelming forces can defeat us. Indications are of attack on our front to-morrow. Have made all possible arrangements.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.


JUNE 25, 1862.
General McCLELLAN,
At Porter's Headquarters:
The following received. What shall I say to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman?


R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.


HEINTZELMAN'S, June 25, 18662-9 p.m.
General MARCY:
General Robinson, after he had been re-enforced by a portion of General Birney's brigade, recovered the little ground he had lost and drove the enemy back. We occupy our line of the forenoon, but the rebels are not quite so far back, and seem to be in considerable force in front of General Robinson. The enemy have four pieces of artillery on the Williamsburg road in position. Have advanced it half way across the clearing, and have a large infantry force to support it. There is a strong prospect of their attacking us in the morning. I think General Sumner should have at least a brigade to the left of the railroad to support his picket line, and should push his picket line forward to connect with mine. It is now near half a mile to the rear.


S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier-General.

JUNE 25, 1862-11.
Brigadier-General HEINTZELMAN:
General McClellan desires that you hold the position you now have, if it can be done without undue danger. His order for you to fall back was based on the dispatch front you, that you were too hard pressed. Re-enforcements are being sent up, and General McClellan will start at once.


A. V. COLBURN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1862-11.20 p. m.
Your telegram of 6.15 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the Government to send you any more re-enforcements than has been done have been so distinctly stated to you by the President, that it is needless for me to repeat them.
Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth; Shields' division and Ricketts' division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done.


EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Series I., Vol. 11, Part 1, Pages 37, 38, 255, 258.

The first battle of the Seven Days' occurred at Oak Grove (King's School House).  McClellan had gotten all his force but Porter's V Corp south of the Chickahominy and was close to moving into position to lay siege to Richmond.  Heintzelman's III Corp at Fair Oaks was ordered to drive in the outposts opposite him, and  Hooker's Division moved up at 8 a.m. on the Williamsburg Road. He was checked by heavy forces belonging to Huger's Division.  General Marcy, McClellan's Chief of Staff ordered him to withdraw.  At about 1 P.M. McClellan arrived and renewed the attack.  As it was getting late in the day, operations were halted.


It is fascinating to see the shift in McClellan's mood after receiving word from Stanton that Jackson might be approaching.  McClellan already had learned this the previous day, but hearing it from the authorities in Washington appears to have both galled and alarmed him.  Beauregard, despite the rumors repeated here, was nowhere near Richmond, being in Alabama attempting to recover his health at a hotel and warm springs.  It is also interesting to see Stanton attempting on the administration's behalf to debate culpability at a time when operations were just barely underway against Richmond.  There is also a letter in the O.R. dated June 24th from General Peck describing the conditions of the swamp across country to the James River.  It appears McClellan was contemplating a "change of base" even before contact had been made with the enemy.  In the face of a minor victory, confronted with rumors, the unraveling of George Brinton McClellan was well underway.



 





Saturday, June 23, 2012

June 24, 1862 (Tuesday): Lee Plans An Attack


Slash Church (dhr.va.gov)
GENERAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. ARMY OF THE NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

No. 75. June 24, 1862.
I. General Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from Ashland toward the Slash Church and encamp at some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, will also to-morrow evening take position on the Chickahominy near Half-Sink. At 3 o'clock Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march to General Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance, the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the passage across the bridge opened, General Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point, General D. H. Hill moving to the support of General Jackson and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill. The four divisions, keeping in communication with each other and moving en echelon on separate roads, if practicable, the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharpshooters extending their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor. They will then press forward toward the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear and crippling and arresting his progress.
II. The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder will hold their positions in front of the enemy against attack, and make such demonstrations Thursday as to discover his operations. Should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack, and should an abandonment of his intrenchments by the enemy be discovered, he will be closely pursued.
III. The Third Virginia Cavalry will observe the Charles City road. The Fifth Virginia, the First North Carolina, and the Hampton Legion (cavalry) will observe the Darbytown, Varina, and Osborne roads. Should a movement of the enemy down the Chickahominy be discovered, they will close upon his flank and endeavor to arrest his march.
IV. General Stuart, with the First, Fourth, and Ninth Virginia Cavalry, the cavalry of Cobb's Legion and the Jeff. Davis Legion, will cross the Chickahominy to-morrow and take position to the left of General Jackson's line of march. The main body will be held in reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left. General Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the movements of the enemy on his left and will co-operate with him in his advance. The Tenth Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Davis, will remain on the Nine-mile road.
V. General Ransom's brigade, of General Holmes' command, will be placed in reserve on the Williamsburg road by General Huger, to whom he will report for orders.
VI. Commanders of divisions will cause their commands to be provided with three days' cooked rations. The necessary ambulances and ordnance trains will be ready to accompany the division and receive orders from their respective commanders. Officers in charge of all trains will invariably remain with them. Batteries and wagons will keep on the right of the road. The chief engineer, Major Stevens, will assign engineer officers to each division, whose duty it will be to make provision for overcoming all difficulties to the progress of the troops. The staff departments will give the necessary instructions to facilitate the movements herein directed.
By command of General Lee:


R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Series I., Vol. 11, Part 2, Page 478.

JUNE 24, 1862 - 2.30 p. m.
General H. A. WISE:
GENERAL: I send you a dozen rockets which were brought from General Lee with the order that I should request you to have "three fired at half-past 10 to-night (10.30 p. m.), three more at 3 a. m. to-morrow morning, two at 10 p. m. to-morrow night, and two at 2.30 the next morning. The interval between sending up the rockets should be thirty seconds." The point from which they are to be thrown up is to be left to your selecton. General Lee attaches great importance to this matter, and that there be no difference of time, watch for the rockets on the Charles City road, which are to be sent up at the same hours.
With great respect,


D. H. HILL,
Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 51, Part 2, Page 579.

After Stuart's ride around McClellan's army confirmed the right wing was up in the air, Lee came up with an audacious plan to throw his full force against that Union force.  Holmes and Magruder would be the only force left between McClellan and Richmond.  The plan was sound, but complex and relied a great deal (ultimately too much) on timing between various elements.  Jackson's was given a major role to play, but he was much jaded by his recent travels to and from Richmond and in the coming campaign would not be "Stonewall of the Valley".  The second item here is of interest, although the exact reason for the firing of rockets at these specific times is not clear.  The last of the rockets would get up at about the time Jackson was expected to begin his advance on Pole Green Church, although that is far north of the points described here.

June 23, 1862 (Monday): Vicksburg Reinforced

The "Essex" of Farragut's Command (history.navy.mil)

JUNE 23, 1862.
General WILLIAM PRESTON,
Abbeville:
    General Van Dorn has ordered that your troops proceed with least possible delay to Vicksburg. Copy of last telegram will be furnished. Transportation by rail has been sent you to-night for at least two brigades. Rations have been ordered for ten days. Your mule teams will be disposed of by orders to-morrow morning. Prompt action in necessary.


DANIEL RUGGLES,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.

Series I., Vol. 17, Part 2, Page 622.

After Farragut captured New Orleans his gunboats sailed unopposed to Vicksburg.  Initially only a brigade manned the works of the city.  Yet, Confederate authorities refused demands of surrender and gradually reinforced the town.  A bombardment started in late May and continued until July 26th without dislodging the Confederate troops.  After that Farragut returned to New Orleans.  The defense of Vicksburg in this period is little noted historically, but it stands in stark contrast to the string of disasters previously experienced by the rebels in the west, when investments had up to this time resulted in the surrender of various garrisons. 

Thursday, June 21, 2012

June 22, 1862 (Sunday): Jackson Vanishes

General Thomas J. Jackson


WAR DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1862.
Major-General BANKS, Middletown:
    I am very glad you are looking well to the west for a movement of the enemy in that direction. You know my anxiety on that point. All was quiet at General McClellan's headquarters at 2 o'clock to-day.


A. LINCOLN.

Series I., Vol. 12, Part 3, Page 423.

BALTIMORE, MD., June 22, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
    I have just returned from Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. I cannot spare the Eighty-seventh Regiment, for the following reasons: We want all the spare regiments to guard the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. I have two and a half regiments at Harper's Ferry that can be relied upon, although two of them are three-months' men, but one of them is not instructed in the drill of the regiment. In order to guard that place I ought to have at least another regiment. I want a regiment to guard Martinsburg and a place called New Creek, both important points, where there is a large amount of public properly, especially at New Creek, where there is property valued at $1,500,000, intended for Fremont's troops. We ought to have at least two companies at the Point of Rocks and two at Monocacy, and certainly one company each at various other points on the road. For Harper's Ferry I intended the Eighty-seventh Regiment, and for Martinsburg and New Creek the Sixty-seventh.
    It is reported by persons considered reliable that Jackson will in a short time attack Banks and his forces. Banks reports his position to be at Middletown. General Sigel, whom I saw to-day at Harper's Ferry (he having met me there at my request), informed me that General Fremont was 5 miles from Banks' command. Sigel also stated that it was reported that Jackson had from 40,000 to 60,000 men and seventy pieces of artillery. This number I consider probably exaggerated.
    The forces under Banks and Fremont amount to about 18,000 effective men, exclusive of Shields' command, ordered by you to march. I saw at Martinsburg some twenty guns of small caliber, intended for Fremont. This battery I ordered forward at once, and it will probably reach General Fremont's camp some time to-morrow. I also saw several Parrott guns on the cars this afternoon, which left for Winchester.
    If Jackson has the number of troops reported, I think we ought to be looking after Washington. I profess not to be an alarmist, but I think we ought to be at least on our guard; and from the rumors of the day my convictions are strengthened, as heretofore expressed, that there should be a reserve corps of 50,000 men placed between here and Washington without delay.


JOHN E. WOOL,
Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 12, Part 3, Page 425.

 At the time of these musings, Jackson's army was near Fredericks Hall (Mineral, Va) about 50 miles west of Richmond.  Jackson was preparing to travel to Richmond for a meeting with Lee and the army's other senior commanders.  Although many modern historians minimize the impact Jackson had on planners in Washington, it is clear they retained anxiety about the safety of Washington and the threat of Jackson's army as late as June 22.  Among the accomplishments of Jackson, one not amply appreciated is the extraordinary feat of disappearing with his army from the Valley without it being revealed to the Union armies anticipating his next moves.


Wednesday, June 20, 2012

June 21, 1862 (Saturday): Subduing Fairfax and Loudon

General James S. Wadsworth


HDQRS. MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 21, 1862. 

Captain S. P. REMINGTON, Scott's Cavalry.
    SIR: You will proceed with your command to the north part of Fairfax County and Loudon County, and having carefully ascertained the names and residences of the leading secessionists you will seize their horses and mules to the number of 100. You will not take the horse or any Union man, and when you are in doubt as to the loyalty of a citizens you will not disturb his property. You will avoid taking the property of families in reduced circumstances, and unless in the case of a disloyal citizens of ample means you will not take all the horses belonging to the family.
    You will arrest any of the justices who recently met with General Asa Rogers to hold a county court whom you may meet with. You will procure your subsistence from disloyal citizens. You will keep a careful record of your proceedings and report to these headquarters on your return.


JAMES S. WADSWORTH,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Official Records, Series II., Vol. 4, Part 1, Page 50.

Wadsworth might have argued he was not violating Articles III and IV of the Constitution since Virginia was in rebellion.  But, according to the theory under which war was being waged, Virginia remained a state and Virginians would have been entitled to all of the Constitution's protections.  Such was the nature of this most peculiar war.  In 1863 the Lieber Code would codify the most aggressive aspects of the Union war effort regarding civilians.  Prior to this date, such questions were dealt with largely at the discretion of individual commanders.

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

June 20, 1862 (Friday): Burnside to Richmond?

General Ambrose Burnside

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
McClellan's, June 20, 1862-1 p.m. 

Major General AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding, New Berne:
    How many troops could you bring to White House and leave everything secure in your present position, and what time would it require to get the disposable troops to Fort Monroe? What is the earliest moment you can move with your present transportation on Goldsborough?
    Answer at once.


GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

 Answer.
    We can put 7,000 infantry in Norfolk in five days, but no artillery, cavalry, or wagons. We can land at a point on the Chowan to attack Petersburg with 7,000 infantry, twelve pieces of artillery, 250 cavalry, and enough wagons for ammunition and four days' provisions in five days.
    We can move on Goldsborough at sixty hours' notice with 10,000 infantry, twenty pieces of artillery, five companies cavalry. From my present information I think we can take Goldsborough and hold it for the present, although 13 miles of the railroad between here and Kinston have been destroyed. At all events we can go to Kinston and repair the railroad and bridges between here and there. We have already built the bridges over the Trent and Batchelder's Creek, and will probably have to built one more bridge of 80 feet at Core Creek and one of 400 feet at Kinston, although the latter is not yet destroyed and we may save it.


[A. E. BURNSIDE,
Major-General.]

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 3, Page 237.

On June 18,  Lee had sent the following message to General Holmes at Petersburg:

GENERAL: By information received direct from Norfolk it is ascertained that at a "council of war," held at Fort Monroe a short time since, General McClellan expressed an inability to take Richmond without the co-operation of General Burnside, and that the force of the latter should advance by way of James River, landing and taking the batteries at Drewry's Bluff in rear, the gunboats being unable to reduce them.

It is interesting to think how Lee came by this information, which precedes the letter from McClellan to Burnside.  In Lee's letter he goes on to speculate Burnside is already on the way.  Ultimately, Burnside did not join in the Seven Days campaign. 


 

Monday, June 18, 2012

June 19, 1862 (Thursday): The Engineers Bridge the Chickahominy




HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE,
Camp Lincoln, Va., June 19, 1862. 

GENERAL: Since my last report, of June 7, the Engineer Brigade has been engaged chiefly in the construction of a permanent bridge across the Chickahominy nearly opposite Dr. Trent's. This bridge was commenced June 9, and completed so as to allow the passage of teams June 14. It was subsequently covered with earth, and the approaches, constructed under Colonel Alexander by other regiments, were completed on the 16th and 17th instant. The dimensions of the bridge are as follows: Length, 1,080 feet; roadway, 11 feet; number of cribs, 40; number of trestles, 6. The accompanying drawing will furnish any other details required.* The Third Vermont Regiment, Colonel Hyde commanding, furnished valuable assistance in covering a portion of the crib work after completing excellent approaches on the south side.
For the last week Captain Spaulding, with a detachment of 250 men, has been engaged in constructing an infantry bridge about 1 mile above the permanent bridge. Good progress has been made in the work.
June 17 and 18 several detachments of the brigade, amounting to some 400 men, were engaged in constructing bridges and corduroying on the road leading to the railroad station near Fair Oaks and the road from general headquarters to General Smith's division. I have not yet received the reports of the officers in charge of the work.
    June 19, a detachment of 50 men, with their officers, still engaged on the road to Smith's division; a detachment of 500 men, with their officers, employed constructing fascines; 224 fascines were made on the line of the railroad near Fair Oaks Station.


D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

*Not found.

Series I., Vol. 11, Part 1, Page 149.

No account of the Seven Days battles is complete without an understanding of the role of McClellan's engineers in bridging the Chickahominy River so as to make movement between the two wings of the army possible.  The bridge referred to here is also known as the Woodbury-Alexander Bridge.  It was built at a right angle across the river and flooded bottom land.  The 1,080 foot length included a long run down to the bridge from the north side of the river (running parallel to the river).  The fascines referred to were reinforced cylindrical bundles of sticks which were used to reinforce parts of the bridge.  About 1/4 mile downstream from this bridge is the Grapevine Bridge, much more well known to history as the crossing point for a large portion of McClellan's army during the "change of base".