February 8, 1862 (Saturday): "Your Military Superiors Are Attacked"

Colonel James Allen Hardie

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Washington, January 8, 1862.

Brigadier-General STONE,
Poolesville, Md.:
    I have taken time for reflection on your inquiry. I think you should not apply at this moment. Besides, your military superiors are attacked, and that consideration involves the propriety of abstaining just now.



JAS. A. HARDIE.

Under attack by the Committee on the Conduct of the War and some Northern newspapers, Stone desired a hearing on the Ball's Bluff affair to clear his name.  Hardie, an aide to McClellan, advises against the request on the ground his (Stone's) superiors were under political attack by Republicans and to some extent the Lincoln administration itself.   Stone would have been well advised to ignore Hardie's advice, the next day he would be arrested on McClellan's orders at the behest of the Committee.  Had he spoken on his own behalf it would have been difficult to make a credible case against him.  His silence, and the failure of McClellan to expend political capital coming to his aide made it possible to keep him imprisoned for months without formal charges.  President Lincoln was to deny knowledge of the reason for Stone's arrest.  However, records in the deliberations of the Committee state they visited Lincoln with the evidence they had against Stone just prior to his arrest being ordered.

February 7, 1862 (Friday): Beuregard Assesses Conditions

BOWLING GREEN, KY., February 7, 1862.

[Memorandum.]

At a meeting held to-day at my quarters (Covington House) by Generals Johnston, Hardee, and myself (Colonel Mackall being present par to fthe time) it was determined that, Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, having fallen yesterday into the hands of the enemy, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, not being long tenable, preparations should at once be made for the removal of this army to Nashville, in rear of the Cumberland River, a strong point some miles below that city being fortified forthwith, to defend the river from the passage of gunboats and transports.

   The troops at present at Clarksville should cross over to the south side of that river, leaving only a sufficient force in that town to protect the manufactories and other property, in the saving of which the Confederate Government is interested.

From Nashville, should any further retrograde movement become necessary, it will be made to Stevenson, and thence according to circumstances.

   It was also determined that the possession of the Tennessee River by the enemy, resulting from the fall of Fort Henry, separates the army at Bowling Green from the one at Columbus, Ky., which must henceforth act independently of each other until they can again be brought together, the first one having for object the defense of the State of Tennessee, along its line of operation, as already stated; and the other one of that part of the State lying between the Tennessee River and the Mississippi. But as the possession of the former river by the enemy renders the lines of communication of the army at Columbus liable to be cut off at any time from the Tennessee River as a base by an overpowering force of the enemy rapidly concentrated from various points on the Ohio, it becomes necessary, to prevent such a calamity, that the main body of that army should fall back to Humboldt; and thence; if necessary, to Grand Junction, so as to protect Memphis from either point, and still have line of retreat to the latter place or to Grand, Miss., and, if necessary, to Jackson, Miss.

    At Columbus, Ky., will be left only a sufficient garrison for the defense of the works there, assisted by Hollins' gunboats, for the purpose of making a desperate defense of the river at that point. A sufficient number of transports will be kept near that place for the removal of the garrison therefrom when no longer tenable in the opinion of the commanding officer. Island Numbers 10 and Fort Pillow will likewise be defended to the last extremity, aided also by Hollins' gunboats, which will then retire to the vicinity of Memphis, where another bold stand will be made. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General, C. S. Army. 

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 7, Part 1, Page 862.

Beauregard, having just arrived, sizes up the situation after the loss of Fort Henry.  The line between Columbus and Bowling Green is no longer tenable, and Tennessee is threatened both on the river approaches to Memphis and towards the interior.  Few good options remain, and Nashville must be preserved at all hazards.  It is interesting to note also, Beuregard does not see Donelson as tenable and does not contemplate a reinforcement of the troops already there. 

February 6, 1862 (Thursday): Fort Henry Is Ours

Bombardment of Fort Henry

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

Fort Henry, February 6, 1862.

  Fort Henry is ours.  The gunboats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed.  I think the garrison must have commenced the retreat last night.  Our cavalry followed, finding two guns abandoned in the retreat.

  I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry.

       

              U. S. GRANT,

                                     Brigadier-General.

   Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Saint Louis, Mo.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 7, Part 1, Page 124.

Because of high water in the fort from flooding, only one company of Tennessee artillery was left to oppose the Union flotilla's attack.  The rest of Tilghman's command, about 3,000 troops was withdrawn and headed for Fort Donelson.  Tilghman stayed on, asking the artillery to hold the Union off for an hour.  They did better, actually inflicting some damage on the Union gunboats.  Finally, one of the heavy guns burst and, having exceeded expectations, the sixty men surrendered to Union officers who entered the fort in a rowboat to accept the surrender. 

February 5, 1862 (Monday): "You Must Not Fail."

Civil War Telegraph Operations

SAINT LOUIS, February 5, 1862. 

Major-General McCLELLAN:
Gunboats supplied with temporary crews and in the field. Mortar boats of no use at present. Enlistments of regular crews going on rapidly. Bombardment of Fort Henry now going on. Our troops have landed 3 miles below. 



H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Saint Louis, February 5, 1862. 

Brigadier-General BUELL, Louisville:
Our advance column is moving up the Tennessee-twenty-three regiments. More will soon follow. Can't you make a diversion in our favor by threatening Bowling Green? 



H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General. 


LOUISVILLE, February 5, 1862. 

General HALLECK:
My position does not admit of diversion. My moves must be real ones, and I shall move at once unless I am restrained by orders concerning other plans. Progress will be slow for me. Must repair the railroad as we advance. It must probably be twelve days before we can be in front of Bowling Green. 



D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General, Commanding. 


SAINT LOUIS, February 5, 1862. 

Major-General McCLELLAN:
It is reported that 10,000 men have left Bowling Green by railroad to
re-enforce Fort Henry. Can't you send me some infantry regiments from Ohio? Answer. 




H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General. 


WASHINGTON, D. C., [February] 5-7 p.m.
 
Brigadier General D. C. BUELL, Louisville, Ky.:
Halleck telegraphs that report says 10,000 men left Bowling Green by railroad to re-enforce Fort Henry, and asks for regiments from Ohio. If report true, can you not assist by a demonstration in direction of Bowling Green? Communicate with Halleck and assist him if possible. Please reply. 



GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding. 


WASHINGTON, D. C., February 5, 1862-7 p.m. 

Major General H. W. HALLECK, Saint Louis, Mo.:
Have telegraphed Buell to communicate with you, and suggested demonstration on Bowling Green. Have just moved eight regiments from Ohio into Western Virginia. Cannot well spare more thence from Buell unless absolutely necessary. Please communicate fully with Buell and with me. 



GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding. 


LOUISVILLE, February 5, 1862-12 p.m.
Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
I am communicating with him [Halleck]. Bowling Green is secure from any immediate apprehension of attack by being strongly fortified behind a river, by obstructions on the roads for nearly the whole distance between us (40 miles), and by the condition of the roads themselves; can only be threatened with heavy artillery. No demonstration, therefore, is practicable. I will send him a brigade. 



D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General. 


LOUISVILLE, February 5, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK, Saint Louis:
I will re-enforce your column by a brigade from Green River if you find that you absolutely require it; otherwise I have use for it. Do I understand you are moving up the Tennessee River only? You must not fail. 



D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General. 


SAINT LOUIS, February 5, 1862. 

To the COMMANDING OFFICER AT PADUCAH, KY.,
For General Grant:
Ten thousand men have left Bowling Green to re-enforce Fort Henry. Order forward all your available troops as rapidly as possible. I send down the Fourteenth Iowa to-day, the Forty-third Illinois to-morrow, and the Second Iowa in a few days. 



H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General. 

Series I., Vol. 7., Part 1, Page 584.

Fort Henry was a weak point in a Confederate line stretching from Columbus, Kentucky (Beauregar-12,000 men) and Bowling Green (Hardee-22,000 men).  Albert Sydney Johnston, commanding in the theatre, simply did not have enough force to prevent the line from being punctured at Fort Henry.  Fort Henry was a faulty position, experiencing flooding (so much so it would be completely under water by February 8).  Fort Donelson, to the east, was better situated but also poorly manned.   

Although the Union held great advantages, this correspondence shows the apprehension being experienced by the Union high command, even the day before Grant’s victory.  It also demonstrates the new ability armies now had to communicate in real time over vast stretches by means of telegraph.  Grant and naval commander Foote had a much sounder understanding of the situation than the high command and no apprehension of failure.  Tilghman, with only 4,000 men to cover to two forts, was initially confident of a great victory, but his optimism would soon come face to face with reality.

February 4, 1862 (Sunday): Grant on the Verge of Greatness

USS-Essex-U. S. Naval Historical Center

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

Near Fort Henry, Tenn., February 4, 1862.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, Saint Louis, Mo.:

    This morning the debarkation of one division, under General McClernand, took place 3 miles below Fort Henry, nearly in view of the rebel batteries.  Not having sufficient transportation for all the troops, the larger portion of the steamers have to return to Paducah for the remainder of the command, under General Smith.  I went up on the Essex this morning with Captain Porter, two other iron-clad boats accompanying, to ascertain the range of the rebel guns.  From a point about 1 mile above the place afterwards decided on for the place of debarkation several shells were thrown, some of them making effect inside the rebel fort.  This drew the enemy’s fire, all of which fell far short, except from one rifled gun, which threw a ball through the cabin of the Essex and several near it.

   I expect all the troops by 10 a.m. to-morrow.  Enemy are represented as having re-enforced rapidly the last few days.  General L. Tilghman commands Fort Henry.

U. S. GRANT

Brigadier-General

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 7, Part 1, Page 581.

Reading the matter of fact account of the shells striking the Essex draws attention to how different events could have turned out in the war with a shell hitting or missing a major player in the war.  Grant survived and went on to become a central player in the war.  At this point he was reasonably well regarded, and rapidly gaining acknowledgment for his abilities.  The Fort Henry expedition would mark him for bigger things.

February 3, 1862 (Saturday); "The Great Result"

Lincoln and McClellan

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, February 3, 1862.

   MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River, mine to move directly to a point on the railroads southwest of Manassas.*

  If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

   1^st Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

  2d  Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

  3^d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

  4th.  In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great       line of the enemy’s communications, while mine would?

   5^th.  In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

    Yours, truly,

                                                                                    ABRAHAM LINCOLN

*For the President’s memorandum accompany this note, see under same date in “Correspondence, etc,” post.

Memorandum accompanying letter of President to General McClellan dated February 3, 1862.*
1st. Suppose the enemy should attack us in force before we reach the Occoquan, what? In view of the possibility of this, might it not be safest to have our entire force to move together from above the Occoquan?
2nd. Suppose the enemy in force shall dispute the crossing of the Occoquan, what? In view of this, might it not be safest fore us to cross the Occuquan at Colchester rather than at the village of Occoquan? This would cost the enemy two miles more of travel to meet us, but would, on the contrary, leave us 2 miles farther form our ultimate destination.
3rd. Suppose we reach Maple Valley without an attack, will we not be attacked there in force by the enemy marching by the several roads from Manassas; and, if so, what?

Official Records Series I., Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 41.

McClellan replied to this letter the same day making these points.  1)When he assumed command there was no organized army fit for service. 2)The capital was now secure against attack.  3)He had not been given a force “far exceeding the aggregate” opposed to him.  4)He had voluntarily sent some of his more qualified officers west to Kentucky and Missouri.  5)He sought not just to move, but to achieve a decisive result.  6)The enemy is in anticipation of the move the President proposes.  6)To move forward as described would be to leave the right flank of the advancing army exposed. 7)The results of the President’s plan offer little beyond the field of battle.  The advantages of McClellan’s plan (in his words).  1)The shortest route to the Confederate base of power.  2)Better roads.  3)If beaten, the line back down to Fort Monroe will be secure. 4)The movement better fits with Burnside’s Expedition, Buell’s advance to eastern Tennessee, Hallack’s towards Nashville, and Sherman’s possible move on Charleston from Port Royal.  He closes by saying “Let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished and disregard everything else.”  After this sparring, Lincoln did not press the Occoquon plan, eventually permitting the advance by Fort Monroe up the Peninsula.

February 2, 1862 (Friday): "Old Brains" Has a Headache

General Franz Sigel

SAINT LOUIS, February 2, 1862.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Washington:
GENERAL: I inclose herewith extracts from General Sigel's letters, published in the German papers and translated. The German papers here are filled with anonymous attacks on the Government at Washington and on my administration here, coming, as it is well ascertained, from the German officers under General Sigel's command. They have also held a number of secret meetings in this city for the purpose of organizing a meeting among the foreign troops and an insurrection of the German population. I have succeeded in introducing police officers into some of these meetings, and their reports are conclusive as to the existence of this plot. I send you a copy of a report of a captain of police, who was present at a meeting of this kind on the 26th ultimo. I would remark that most of the officers named were here without my knowledge and contrary to my positive orders. Being ordered to move from Rolla toward Springfield, they left their regiments and came here to stir up mutiny and insurrection. Several of them belong to Sigel's immediate command.
General Sigel's name is put forward first, but he is an instrument rather than the head of these revolutionists. Letters and papers which have fallen into my hands prove that the instigators of this movement are the emissaries of leading politicians of the Fremont party, and it is expected that the result will, be means of the newspaper press, be made to inure to his benefit as against the present administration. The plan, as discussed at one of these secret meetings, was to force the Presidents to make Sigel a major-general, which would make him second in command in this department. He would then claim all the German regiments and the largest portion of the troops in this State. By this means, it was said, the Fremont party would be virtually restored to power here; and, by continually fomenting dissatisfaction among the German troops and German population, they could completely paralyze and control the action of the Government. Moreover, it was said that the General and Abolition press throughout the country would use Sigel as an instrument with which to attack me, and break down, or at lest greatly weaken, my authority and influence in this State, so that, at the proper time, the press the Germans throughout the country could demand my removal and the substitution of Sigel in the command. This having been accomplished, Sigel, his army, and the German press would required the restoration of Fremont. By a joint movement in Congress, by mass meetings, &c., it was thought that the President would finally be forced to yield. I am also told that leading secessionists in this city are cognizant of these movements and assist them indirectly.
Any yielding on the part of the Government to the demands of Sigel's friends will only add to the mutiny and insurrection, for his promotion would be but a single step in the plan. Our only safety is to put it down with a strong hand, and, when we get sufficient proof, arrest the leaders and remove them out of the department. I am fully posted in the matter and am prepared for them, but I must have the support of the Government, and the President should make no appointment of these foreign officers without consulting you. If he had appointed Osterhaus and Albert at the time I recommended they could have been kept out of this faction. Now it is too late, as they are fully committed, and ought not to be appointed. Of course this in intended to be entirely confidential.*
Yours, truly,
H. W. HALLECK.
* See McClellan to Halleck, February 6, 1862. Series I, Volume VII, p. 937.
Official Records, Series I., Vol. 8, Part 1, Page 829.
Sigel, a native German was director of city schools in Saint Louis at the start of the war.  Saint Louis had a large German population and Sigel was very popular with them.  Fremont, who had been removed for incompetence after he failed to move quickly to the aid of Lyons at Wilson’s Creek was highly regarded in the German community dating back to his days as a Presidential candidate.  He represented the western expansion of the country and political power for the nation’s newest immigrants.  His removal for incompetence did not sit well with the German community, or the Blair family who had tremendous influence politically.  Halleck was not an abolitionist, which many of the Germans were, and was a West Point graduate.  "Old Brains" Halleck was undistinguished as a field officer, skilled as an administrator, and as we see here unprepared for the intersection of political and military considerations.