January 16 (Wednesday): Jackson Prepares to Garrison Romney

Fort Mill Trenches Near Romney-Justin A. Wilcox

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,

 Romney, Va., January 16, 1862.

Major THOMAS G. RHETT,

       Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Dept. of Northern Virginia:

     MAJOR:  In consequence of the weather and bad condition of the roads none of General Loring’s command has yet arrived here, though last night the head of the column encamped only 8 miles distant.  Garnett’s brigade arrived yesterday.  At last accounts the enemy were crossing the Potomac into Maryland on the railroad bridge below Cumberland.  Their force in and about Cumberland is from information about 11,000; at

Hancock, 2,000; at Hagerstown, 2,000; at Fredericktown, 8,000.  I have not succeeded in obtaining definite information as to the number in Williamsport.

    Unless otherwise directed, I will proceed to construct winter quarters, and will station General Loring’s troops and General Boggs’ militia brigade in the South Branch Valley; General Garnett’s brigade at Winchester; General Carson’s brigade at Bath, and General Meem’s brigade at Martinsburg.  The cavalry will be distributed along the norther frontier at various points.

   I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

           

                                                                                    T. J. JACKSON,

                                                                        Major-General P. A. C. S., Commanding

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 1034.

That there were sound military reasons for Jackson to hold Romney there is no question.  It severed communication between Rosecrans in Western Virginia and Banks at Fredericktown, relieved a portion of Western Virginia to allowing recruitment in the region, and at least raised the threat of movement against Union forces in the region at some later date.  But the combination of miserable weather conditions and Loring’s failure to inspire his troops with an understanding of the importance of their outpost made for the troubles which would soon come in the form of complaints to Richmond and a disruption of Jackson’s plans.  Some have argued the Stonewall Brigade should have been sent west and Loring to Winchester, but Loring’s force was much the larger and considerable strength would be needed to garrison Romney and threaten the Union forces in the area.

January 15, 1861 (Tuesday): The German Problem

General Franz Sigel

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, January 15, 1862. 

Major-General HALLECK:
MY DEAR SIR: The Germans are true and patriotic, and so far as they have got cross in Missouri it is upon mistake and misunderstanding. Without a knowledge of its contents Governor Koerner, of Illinois, will hand you this letter. He is an educated and talented German gentleman, as true a man as lives. With his assistance you can set everything right with the Germans. I write this without his knowledge, asking him at the same time, by letter, to deliver it. My clear judgment is that, with reference to the German element in your command, you should have Governor Koerner with you; and if agreeable to you and him, I will make a brigadier-general, so that he can afford to so give his time. He does not wish to command in the field, though he has more military knowledge than many who do. If he does into the place he will simply be an efficient, zealous, and unselfish assistant to you. I say all this upon intimate personal acquaintance with Governor Koerner.

Yours, very truly,

 
A. LINCOLN.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 8, Part 1, Page 826.

The German problem referred to involved the pay department in Saint Louis being out of funds and alleged slights against General Franz Sigel, who was criticized for his lackluster performance at Wilson's Creek.  Halleck complained to Washington about politicians in Missouri keeping the German troops in an excited state.  An additional problem was the language barrier between senior officers and the German troops, who often spoke no English.  This letter is a good example of Lincoln's tendency to seek appointment to military posts for politicians who could rally the support of immigrant groups.

January 14, 1862 (Monday): A Plan to Cross the Potomac. On Ice. At Night.

Leesburg Vacinity (Library of Congress)

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

                              Near Centreville, January 14, 1862.

Brig. Gen. D. H. HILL,

         Commanding C. S. Forces, Lessburg, Va:

    GENERAL: Under the supposition that a considerable part of the Federal General Banks’ forces have been diverted either to Hancock or elsewhere, and that circumstances may favor a sudden effective blow at your immediate adversary, General Stone, some clear night, when the passage of the river on the ice shall seem to you practicable and safe, I am instructed to advise you that such are the wishes of the general commanding this army corps, sanctioned by the general commanding the department.

   But preliminary to so grave and important an operation I am directed to say it is essential that the utmost secrecy and circumspection should be observed in all your preparations.  Several reliable and trustworthy guides must be secured, and in the mean time no means should be spared to acquire exact information of the position of General Stone’s forces, his strength, and whether or not his supports have actually been diminished by diversions such as is suspected, whether towards Washington or Hancock.  Nor should there be any doubt as to the soundness and strength of the ice, including its durability for the time needful for such an expedition.

   In the conduct of such an expedition the general has all confidence in your discretion and military ability, but desires me to suggest that you should provided colored lights—lanterns—for signals of recognition.  This can be made, you know, with flannel wrappings.

   Your forces should be kept well in hand and close together; thoroughly informed, once across the river, of the aims of the expedition.  Your men should be inspired with a determination to succeed and to deserve success by coolness and precaution against the casualty of mistaking friends for enemies.  It may be judicious to make a slight detour to take the enemy in reverse, and your point of recrossing must be well guarded and covered by your artillery.

    The ice should be littered with straw, sand, or ashes by a pioneer party.  Finally, ice two inches thick will bear infantry in open order.  The utmost care should be taken to prevent crowding, especially on the return.

    Respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                                                      THOMAS JORDAN

                                                            Assistant Adjustant-General

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 5, Part 1, Page 1033

On the day this was written the temperature at 7 a.m. in Washington was 21 degrees and there were high winds.  This came hard on a warm stretch of four days duration (see the excellent “Civil War Weather in Virginia” by Robert K. Krick).  Jordan was Beauregard’s assistant A.G. and it is not surprising “Old Bory”, who was given to grand schemes, would come up with such an amazing plan.  It is not clear whether he previously had spoken with D. H. Hill on the subject, but it is a suggestion which the aggressive Hill would likely have welcomed.  Crossing the Potomac on ice, at night, seems risky beyond imagining and warmer temperatures the remainder of the month rendered the question moot.