January 23, 1864 (Thursday); 4,800 Hogs Saved

Knoxville, 1856

KNOXVILLE, January 23, 1864.
Major General U. S. GRANT:
    We have secured the whole drove of 4,800 hogs which was threatened with capture. The rebels have ceased to press vigorously. I have no idea that they intend to undertake a siege. It is absolutely necessary that the army have rest. I have therefore ordered the whole to go into quarters, and shall post the different corps so as to hold this place, the line of railroad to Loudon, Loudon itself, [and] the line of river to Kingston. I shall also hold Maryville and surrounding country, and the country south of the French Broad as far up as the cavalry can hold.
    The country north of us cannot be held for want of forage. I have out posts at Clinton and Wheeler's Gap. All the trains will now come by the way of Kingston. I shall push the building of the bridge at this place and Loudon. We are quite secure, I think, in all our arrangements. We have 900,000 rations of meat, of which 400,000 are slated; ten days' rations of coffee and sugar, but none of bread.
    I shall send all the animals to the rear for forage.


     J. G. FORSTER,
     Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol, 32 Part 2, Pages 183-184.

Knoxville was still under threat but Forster had enough troops and there enough from other commands within supporting distance that the threat was not overwhelming.  Longstreet believed he could still take Knoxville provided he could get across Forster's line of supply.  But that would require retaining cavalry needed by Johnston, and moving his command on bad roads in winter conditions.

January 22, 1864 (Wednesday): Short Rations In Lee's Army

Hardtack

GENERAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Numbers 7.
January 22, 1864.
    The commanding general considers it due to the army to state that the temporary reduction of rations has been caused by circumstances beyond the control of those charged with its support. Its welfare and comfort are the objects of his constant and earnest solicitude, and no effort has been spared to provide for its wants. It is hoped that the exertions now being made will render the necessity of short duration, but the history of the army has shown that the country can require no sacrifice too great for its patriotic devotion.
     Soldiers! You tread with no unequal step the road by which your fathers marched through suffering, privations, and blood to independence. Continue to emulate in the future, as you have in the past, their valor in arms, their patient endurance of hardships, their high resolve to be free, which no trail could shake, no bride seduce, no danger appeal, and be assured that the just God who crowned their efforts with success will, His own good time, send down His blessing upon yours.


      R. E. LEE,
      General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 33, Part 1, Page 1117.

Lee was worried about the very survival of the army itself.  The shortage in rations was not, as Lee maintained here, "beyond the control of those charged with its support".  Authorities in Richmond were not without blame for the shortage of rations, even if continued Union incursions made supply more difficult.  War weariness was growing in both north and south.

January 21, 1864 (Tuesday): Hotchkiss, Topographical Engineer

Hotchkiss' Map of the Battle of Cedar Creek (civilwar.org)

STAUNTON, VA., January 21, 1864.
Major General J. A. EARLY,
Commanding Volley District, Harrisonburg, Va.:
    GENERAL: I last night received your letter of yesterday, giving me instructions. I brought my assistants along with me, with the consent of Generals Ewell and Lee, and I have obtained quarters in Staunton, where I can keep them at work and supervise them once a week at least.
    I have a surveyed map of Rockbridge County, and also a survey of portions of Augusta, Bath, and Allegheny Counties, and I shall have them at once put together by my assistants, and so forward the work assigned me. I am now making tracings of the maps I have  to take along with me, that I may verify them; that and other necessary preparations will occupy the rest of this week, and on Monday I shall start, and go first along the line of the North Mountain, by the road nearest to it on the east, and go as far as where the road from the Sweet Springs to Fincastle crossed the same mountain, then come back by the nearest line of parallel roads on the west of the North Mountain, and so back and forth until I reach the Allegheny Mountains, as I suppose by so doing I shall examine all the crossings of the mountains from one parallel valley to another. I think I had better make the main road from Harrisonburg, through Staunton, Lexington, Buchanan, and Fincastle, on the Salem, the limit of the map on the southeast; the road from Dry River Gap to Harrisonburg and the Parkersburg road from Staunton westward the limit on the northeast; the Allegheny Mountains the limit on the southwest, making a section of country 100 miles long and 40 wide, as shown in the inclosed tracing. * Such, I understand, is the intention of your orders when you ask for "a map of Augusta and Rockbridge form Staunton and Lexington westward, and the counties adjoining them on the west," and "ascertain the routes from Covington to Lexington, Buchanan, Fincastle, and Salem. " All the materials from Staunton northeast to the proposed line are now ready to my hand, and only need reduction. If this boundary is not the one you desire, please specify to me a limit. I need a courier or cavalryman to go along with me; it expedites my observations much to have some one to send to ascertain names of houses, &c., while I am taking notes and sketching topography. A courier of Major Allan's (A. D. Moore) desires to accompany me, and General Ewell and Major Allan have consented for him to come, but General Lee has referred the matter to you. I will be obliged to you if you will approve it. I have asked Colonel Imboden to let one of his men accompany me next week, which will, I hope, meet with your approval. I have always had a courier sent with me when on such duty.
    I propose to construct the map on a scale of 1\160000 or 4\10 of an inch to the mile. My address will be Staunton.
    I am, general, you obedient servant,


    JED. HOTCHKISS,
    Captain and Topographical Engineer, Second Corps.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 33, Part 1, Pages 1111-1112.

Hotchkiss had written his name large in history by his work for Stonewall Jackson during his famous Valley campaign.  He continued in the same capacity with Jackson's sucessor's, most notably Jubal Early.  His diary of the war, "Make Me A Map of the Valley" is a very worthwhile acquisition for any student of Jackson, or the war in Virginia generally.

January 20, 1864 (Monday): Lee Contemplates An Attack On New Berne

General George Pickett

HEADQUARTERS, January 20, 1864.
His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President Confederate States:
   Mr. PRESIDENT: I have delayed replying to your letter of the 4th until the time arrived from the execution of the attempt of on New Berne. I regret very much that the boats on the Neuse and Roanoke are not completed. With their aid I think success would be certain. Without them, though the place may be captured, the fruits of the expedition will be lessened and our maintenance of the command of the waters in North Carolina uncertain. I think every effort should be made now to get them into service as soon as possible. You will see by the inclosed letters to Generals Pickett and Whiting the arrangements made for the land operations. The water expedition I am willing to trust to Colonel Wood. If he can succeed in capturing the gun-boats I think success will be ceratin, as it was by aid from the water that I expected Hoke to be mainly assisted.
    In view of the opinion expressed in your letter, I would go to North Carolina myself, but I consider my presence here always necessary, especially now, when there is such a struggle to keep the army fed and clothed. General Early is still in the valley. The enemy there has been re-enforced by troops from Meade's army, and [by] calling down General Averell with his cavalry. I do not know what their intentions are. Report from General Early yesterday stated that Averell with his cavalry had started for Moorefield. I will, however, go to North Carolina if you think it necessary. General Fitz. Lee brought out of Hardy 110 prisoners, 250 horses and mules, 27 wagons, and 460 head of cattle. He captured 40 wagons, but 13 turned over on the mountains and had to be abandoned. He had also to leave behind between 100 and 200 head of cattle. The difficulties he encountered were very great, owing to the extreme cold, ice, storms, &c. Nearly all his men were frost-bitten, some badly; many injury by the falling of their horses. He got within 6 miles of Paddytown, but could not cross the mountains,owing to the icy roads and the smoothness of his horses. He could take with him neither artillery nor wagons.
     I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,


     R. E. LEE,
     General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 33, Part 1, Page 1101-1102.

Ironically, a day after Grant had written Halleck of his proposal for a move on Raleigh by way of Eastern North Carolina, Lee is continuing to press for an attack on Union forces at New Berne, NC.  Neither Grant's nor Lee's proposals would come to fruition.  The Confederate gunboats mentioned would be slow in construction and require troops to defend them.  Yet there was sufficient Confederate force in Pickett's command near to Richmond to allow movement into eastern NC if necessary.  And it does not appear that Grant's proposal was ever seriously considered in Washington, which remained focused on Richmond.

January 19, 1864 (Sunday): Grant Proposes A Move On Raleigh

Dome of the NC Capital, Raleigh

CONFIDENTIAL.] HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Nashville, Tenn., January 19, 1864.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief of the Army, Washington, D. C.:
    GENERAL: I would respectfully suggest whether an abandonment of all previously attempted lines to Richmond is not advisable, and in lieu of these one be taken farther south. I would suggest Raleigh, N. C., as the objective point and Suffolk as the starting point. Raleigh once secured, I would make New Berne the base of supplies until Wilmington is secured.
    A moving force of 60,000 men would probably be required to start on such an expedition. This force would not have to be increased unless Lee should withdraw from his present position. In that case the necessity for so large a force on the Potomac would not exist. A force moving from Suffolk would destroy first all the roads about Weldon, or even as far north as Hicksford. From Weldon to Raleigh they would scarcely meet with serious opposition. Once there, the most interior line of railway still left to the enemy, in fact the only one they would then have, would be so threatened as to force him to use a large portion of his army in guarding it. This would virtually force an evacuation of Virginia and indirectly of East Tennessee. It would throw our armies into new fields, where they could partially live upon the country and would reduce the stores of the enemy. It would cause thousands of the North Carolina troops to desert and return to their homes. It would give us possession of many negroes who are now indirectly aiding the rebellion. It would draw the enemy from campaigns of their own choosing, and for which they are prepared, to new lines of operations never expected to become necessary. It would effectually blockade Wilmington, the port now of more value to the enemy than all the balance of their sea-coast. It would enable operations to commence at once by removing the war to a more southern climate, instead of months of inactivity in winter quarters. Other advantages might be cited which would be likely to grow out of this plan, but these are enough. From your better opportunities of studying he country and the armies that would be involved in this plan, you will be better able to judge of the practicability of it than I possibly can. I have written this in accordance with what I understand to be an invitation from you to express my views about military operations, and not to insist that any plan of mine should be carried out.          Whatever course is agreed upon, I shall always believe is at least intended for the best, and until fully tested will hope to have it prove so.
     I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


     U. S. GRANT,
     Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 33, Part 1, Page 394-395.

It is interesting, given the success Grant ultimately achieved by moving overland to Richmond, that he believed the best course was not such a campaign, but a movement against Raleigh through eastern North Carolina.  His reasoning is sound, and it would have been interesting to see what the result might have been had he been permitted to attempt this strategy.  North Carolina was becoming less solidly bound to the Confederacy, and it is likely a move against it might have caused the loss of the state and many of its troops.

 

January 18, 1864 (Sunday): Ewell's Return Clouded

General R. S. Ewell

HEADQUARTERS, January 18, 1864.
Lieutenant General R. S. EWELL,
Commanding, &c.:
    GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 15th, transmitting a communication to you from the Secretary of War, with your reply. I am glad to hear that you now experience no inconvenience from your injury, and hope you may continue to feel none.
    Your answer to the Secretary is such as I would expect from a true soldier and patriot as yourself. But I cannot take upon myself to decide in this matter. You are the proper person, on consultation with your medical advisers. I do not know how much ought to be attributed to long absence from the field, general debility, or the result of your injury, but I was in constant fear during the last campaign that you would sink under your duties or destroy yourself. In either event injury might have resulted. I last spring asked for your appointment provided you were able to take the field. You now know from experience what you have to undergo, and can best judge of your ability to endure it. I fear we cannot anticipate less labor than formerly.
     Wishing you every happiness, and that you may be able to serve the country to the last.  I am, very truly, yours,


     R. E. LEE,
     General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 33, Part 1, Pages 1095-1096.

Ewell had suffered the effects of his injury at Second Manassas for more than a year, had been struck by a ball in his wood leg at Gettysburg, and on the 15th had toppled off his horse in the snow.  He still expressed himself able to carry out his duties, but clearly Lee had doubts.  During the Overland Campaign in 1864 he would find ample reason to believe his doubts justified.  Ewell was not physically fit for field duty and his physical problems seemed to combine with a lack of decisiveness to make him particularly ineffective as a corp commander.

 

January 17, 1864 (Saturday): A Question of Command

General Samuel Jones

HDQRS. DEPT. OF WESTERN VA. AND EAST TENNESSEE,
Dublin, January 17, 1864.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, C. S. Army:
    GENERAL: On the 6th of September last, under instructions from the War Department, I assumed command of that portion of South-western Virginia embraced in the Department of East Tennessee and all the forces east of Knoxville belonging to that department, and continued to exercise command in that department until, in the course of military operations, Lieutenant-General Longstreet came with his command east of Knoxville. Whilst I was exercising that command the former commander of the department, Major-General Buckner, ordered a number of the officers of the Department of East Tennessee to report to me, among them the military court, medical director, and inspector-general of cavalry of his department. They did so, and have been, and are now, acting under my orders. The Secretary of War has informed me that Lieutenant-General Longstreet having come within the Department of East Tennessee, as a matter of course, commands that department by virtue of his superior rank. But no order having been issued relieving me from the command, all the departmental business is still referred to me. If Lieutenant-General Longstreet is in command of the Department of East Tennessee, I respectfully ask that it may be so announced in orders, and that all officers of that department who have reported to me be ordered to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


     SAM. JONES,
     Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 33, Part 1, Page 1092.

Longstreet was in command of the region he inhabited by virtue of rank, but he likely had little interest in the adminstrative tasks which went with departmental command, his staff being occupied with maintaining an army in the field.  Jones' relations with Longstreet were not entirely cordial in any event.  It seems at this point in the war nobody knew exactly what use was to be made of Longstreet and his command.  The general himself desired to return to the Army of Northern Virginia, believing Richmond had ignored his suggestions for the area and, therefore, he could best be utilized with Lee's army.  Jones service is little known to history, but his command included defense of the vital salt works in the region and he was, by and large, a capable administrator.