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| Area of Lincoln Plan (Click to Enlarrge) Forces would have crossed Occoquan where Highway 1 crosses river and moved upstream to Brenstville, in the rear of Centreville and Manassas |
WASHINGTON, December 10, 1861.
YOUR EXCELLENCY: I inclose the paper you left with me, filled as you requested.* In arriving at the numbers given I have left the minimum number in garrison and observation.
Information received recently leads me to believe that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces nearly, and I have now my mind actively turned toward another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy nor by many of our own people
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General
[inclosure]
If it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac without awaiting further increase of numbers or better drill and discipline, how long would it require to actually get in motion?
If bridge trains ready by December 15, probably 25.
After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join the movement from southwest of the river?
Seventy-one thousand.
How many from northeast of it?
Thirty-three thousand.
Suppose, then, that of those southwest of the river 50,000 move forward and menace the enemy at Centreville. The remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria to Richmond, there to be joined by the whole movable force from northeast of the river, having landed from the Potomac, just below the mouth of the Occoquan, moved by land up the south side of that stream to the crossing point named, then the whole move together by the road thence to Brentsville and beyond to the railroad just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad bridges south and north of the point.
If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac below to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear, or, if the landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in the rear. Both points will probably not be successfully resisted at the same time.
The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too broadly, should fight back slowly into the intrenchments behind them.
Armed vessels and transportation should remain at the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat.
[Indorsement]
Memorandum of the President on campaign of Potomac, without date, but about December 1, 1861; and letter of General McClellan dated December 10, 1861.
*In the enclosure the Roman type indicates President Lincoln’s handwriting and the Italics General McClellan’s.
Official Records, Series I., Vol. 11, Part 3, page 6
McClellan, already turning his mind away from an overland campaign toward Richmond, was now being given military advice from the President in the form of a plan for a turning movement by way of the Telegraph Road. Once the force crossed the Occoquan it would move upriver, placing it in the rear of the Confederates at Manassas. It is interesting to consider how closely this plan matches the one Confederate spies had been warning Beauregard about. The irony is the Confederates were as well informed of the administration’s preferred military option as was McClellan and took the plan more seriously. Would the plan have worked? Johnston abandoned Manassas in March of 1862 without being forced militarily, so a successful move to Brentsville would likely have had the same result. But moving in December over uncertain roads and dividing still relatively green forces in the face of the enemy was by no means a certain path to Richmond and did involve risks. The Confederates most likely would have moved back to the Rappahannock and the stalemate would have continued until warmer weather brought opportunity for active campaigning.
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