Monday, December 1, 1862 (Monday): The Expedition Departs

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 1, 1862.
Major-General BANKS,
Astor House, New York:
    The President has determined to send the Fort Monroe expedition forward without any further delay. It will be ordered to-morrow. Answer whether you will join it personally or not.


    H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief.

Banks' Exedition Off Cape Hatteras  (http://idesweb.bc.edu/becker/)

NEW YORK, December 1, 1862.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
Your dispatch received 8.30. I have made arrangements to sail in North Star from this port Wednesday, but can go to Fort Monroe if necessary. Departure from this port I think most expeditious. Sailing orders were sent to General Emory from here yesterday.


    N. P. BANKS,
    Major-General, Commanding.


NEW YORK, N. Y., December 1, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON:
    The wester to-day has been most unfavorable for embarking troops. Most of the officers are inexperienced, and the consequent delays are most vexatious. Still, a large number of vessels are in the stream ready to sail, and if we have fair weather it will be inexcusable if the fleet does not leave on Wednesday.


    JOHN TUCKER,
   Assistant Secretary of War.

Official Records, Series III., Vol. 2, Part 1, Page 913.

The reach of the Union armies is illustrated by the Banks expedition to New Orleans.  At a time when Burnside was moving on Fredericksburg Banks was taking 20,000 men to a point which was not under any pressing danger.  It would, ultimately, extend the reach of occupying armies in the region and help open a threat to Texas, but the expedition was far from a necessity.  Unlike McClellan, to whom every man taken to another point was an affront, Burnside made no remark upon the loss of troops from Northern Virginia. 

November 30, 1862 (Sunday): Pemberton Caged

General Theoplis Hunter Holmes

ABBEVILLE, MISS., November 30, 1862.
General BRAXTON BRAGG,
Tullahoma, Tenn.:
    I am compelled to fall back for the defense of Vicksburg. The effective force there does not exceed 4,000. General Holmes is doing nothing to assisted me. The enemy is moving form 10,000 to 15,000 from Delta by mouth of Coldwater toward Grenada. Sherman with 20,000 is at Lumpkin's Mill, 12 miles in my front. Grant is moving also with the whole or part of his army, from 35,000 to 40,000, and will doubtless cross a large force at New Albany. Columbus, Miss., is not fortified. Within a few days a large expedition by the Mississippi River will move direct for Vicksburg for a combined land and water attack. You see my situation; it is for you to decide how far you can help me. I am now moving my baggage to Yalabusha.


J. C. PEMBERTON,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
 
My effective force for battle will not exceed 20,000 at this or any other point south.

J. C. PEMBERTON,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.


Grant was beginning his campaign to take Vicksburg.  Pemberton was trying to hold Grant north of Vicksburg.  His 20,000 men were 52 miles away from Greneda, 12 miles away from Lumpkin's Mills, and 25 miles from Grant at New Albany at Abbeville (10 miles South of Oxford).  Hemmed in, he decided to retreat South to Yalabusha (near Coffeeville, Mississippi).  Theopolis Holmes had just been promoted to head the Trans-Mississippi Department, sent West after a lackluster Seven Days Campaign performance.  He was charged with defending the Mississippi River, yet would consistently refuse to send reinforcements to Pemberton. 

November 29, 1862 (Saturday): Amnesty

General Braxton Bragg

GENERAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

Numbers 4.
Murfreesborough, November 29, 1862.
     Gratified beyond expression at the confident tone and fine discipline which pervades his troops, and full of admiration at their fortitude and patient submission to privations, united to their gallantry and heroism in the recent arduous and brilliant campaign, by which so much valuable territory has been redeemed, and so many true and loyal people liberated, the general commanding is induced to publish full pardon to all soldiers absent without authority who shall within a reasonable time return to their command and report for duty. They are urged to avail themselves of this privilege before the inauguration of the new system of military courts established by law as a vigorous and prompt administration of justice to all delinquents. Hereafter no excuse will be allowed those who abandon their colors and leave their comrades to perform their duties and defend their homes.
    Commissioned officers guilty of such offenses are excluded from the benefit of this amnesty, and will not be excused. They are held to be unworthy to command gallant men, and to merit exemplary punishment.
     Vigorous measures have been adopted to arrest all who fail to respond to this last and generous appeal, and they must expect full justice, tempered only with the mercy they have failed to show either to their comrades or cause.
     By command of General Bragg:


    GEORGE WM. BRENT,
    Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 20, Part 2, Page 429.

Bragg's superlatives masked the deeper problem addressed by his missive.  Soldiers were leaving his command to such a degree as to make offensive operations very difficult.  Returning absentees to the ranks was worth the effort at amnesty. 

November 28, 1862 (Friday): Grand Strategy

General J. G. Barnard (Library of Congress)

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1862.
Colonel J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
COLONEL: I herewith transmit a paper,* prepared by Colonel Alexander, respecting the route of approach to Richmond and the construction of roads. I concur with him mainly. I concur in the inadequacy of the single-track railroad from Fredericksburg to Richmond, and I believe the exposure to flank attack will make the communication still more inadequate. This statement of Colonel Alexander, and the experience so far acquired, show the difficulty of moving and feeding an army of adequate numbers to fight the concentrated rebel armies, and to besiege Richmond over any one route. It shows that by whatever route we approach we expose Washington; that we require, to make a sure thing, enormous superiority of numbers in Virginia; that, all things considered, the James River is probably better than any other single line of approach; that it is difficult to handle and feed an army sufficiently large on any one route. I suggest, with diffidence, that the quickest results may be obtained from-while prosecuting with the utmost vigor the attack by the Rappahannock, and thus fixing near that river the bulk of the enemy's forces-throwing an army of, say, 50,000 men upon the south side of the James, at Port Walthall,or somewhere in that vicinity. This force could seize all the routes by which Richmond communicates with the South, and control the navigation of the canal; would have Richmond under its cannon, even if it should fail to force the passage of the river and seize the city itself, and it could not
itself be assailed, except by forcing the passage of the James above Richmond. The rebels would necessarily fall back from the Rappahannock, and thus expose their only remaining route of communication with the Confederacy, that by Gordonsville-Virginia Central Railroad. The magazines and arsenals and foundries of Richmond would be destroyed, and the rebel army would speedily be without supplies of any kind. The plan has the advantage of bringing the Navy into co-operation.
    I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,


    J. G. BARNARD,
    Brigadier-General.
---------------
*See p.1117.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 808.

The war was at a crucial juncture.  The campaigns of Antietam and Perryville had been repulsed and the border states of Maryland and Kentucky were firmly within Union command.  New Orleans was in the hands of the Federals as well as much of the Atlantic Coast.  Lee was concerned with the very option Barnard speaks of, which would have brought a force up the James while Burnside's main body fixed Lee along the Rappahanock or North Anna.  But at this critical juncture the administration not only focused all its force in an overland campaign to Richmond, but also sent 20,000 troops with Banks to New Orleans.  Lincoln seems to have given more thought to Republican demands than practicalities and Halleck acquiesed when he should have been bolder in offering his opinions. 

November 27, 1862 (Thursday): The McDowell Court of Inquiry

General Irwin McDowell

SIXTH DAY.
COURT-ROOM,
November 27, 1862-11 a. m.
* * * * * * *
The court was cleared.
The court was opened, and its decision respecting a plan of investigation announced.
The court, having carefully considered the foregoing proposition of Major-General McDowell, decide to proceed to the investigation in accordance with the following, making hereafter such modifications or amplifications as may be suggested by the course of the proceedings and be deemed necessary:
To examine and inquire into any and all accusations or imputations of treachery or disloyalty on the part of General McDowell, and to examine and inquire into his whole conduct as a general officer since August 24, 1861, being the date on which General McClellan assumed command of the Army of the Potomac.
For the convenience of the investigation the aforementioned time will be divided as follows, being the periods of time when General McDowell commanded:
1st. A division in the Army of the Potomac, under Major-General McClellan, from August 24, 1861, to March 13, 1862.
2nd. The First Army Corps, Army of the Potomac, under Major-General McClellan, from March 13, 1862, to April 4, 1862.
3rd. The Department of the Rappahannock, under the orders of the President and the War Department, from April 4, 1862, to June 26, 1862.
4th. The Third Army Corps, Army of Virginia, under Major-General Pope, from June 26 to September 6, 1862.
With a view to a statement of facts and an expression of opinion the court will-
1st. Examine the correspondence of General McDowell with the enemy's commanders or with any one within the enemy's lines.
2nd. Examine and inquire into the conduct pursued by General McDowell toward the inhabitants of the country occupied by United Stattes forces with reference to themselves or their property.
3rd. Inquire whether General McDowell has fulfilled his duty as a commander to those placed under him and as a subordinate officer to those placed over him, giving heartily, and to the extent of his capacity all the support in his power.
4th. Inquire whether General McDowell has or has not failed to go to the aid of, or send re-enforcements to, a brother commander; and, if he has so failed, for what reasons.
The attention of the court was called to an article in a newspaper of which the following is a copy, and the recorder was directed to summon the writer as a witness to appear before the court:

68 SAINT MARK'S PLACE,
New York, September 24, 1862.
General IRVIN McDOWELL:
SIR: I have recently noticed in the New York Herald your modest request, by letter, that the President would cause a court to be instituted to investigate charges brought against you by a "dying officer," &c.
In your letter you also send forth the following challenge:
"That this subject of my alleged treachery or disloyalty may be fully inquired into, I beg that all officers, soldiers, or civilians who know, or think they know, of any act of mine liable to the charge in question be allowed and invited to make it known to the court."
Now, sir, I don't know what frame of mind you was in when you wrote such a defiant letter. I cannot say you were then under the influence of liquor, as I have seen you at other times, both in the field and out, but that you are one of those brazen-faced Christians who did defiance to truth I have not the least doubt.
And as I have no greater hope than yourself that any such court will be called, I will take this opportunity of making a few brief statements of facts, which you may also deny.
    On the 3rd of July, 1861, I was in Ellsworth's camp; I there visited and heard the sad stores of many sick soldiers-sick, paged, and vomited from living on musty crackers, salt far junk, and bad water. This was all the food allowed them. They offered to pay for vegetables, but the rebels of Alexandria would not sell them. One man was complained of for plucking an ear of corn. You, as a general, instead of seeing to the wants of your army, issued an order to the rebels, authorizing them to shoot any man who would trespass upon their property; but you did not make any provision for the health of your troops. These same men were constantly being shot at while on picket duty, but your peremptory orders were not to return fire upon the rebels.
     A negro servant, owned by Richard Windsor, went to Ellsworth's camp, and informed against his master as being a colonel in the rebel army and then about to go to his regiment. The captain in command went with a squad of his men and overtook Colonel Windsor on the road. He had his carpet-bag, containing his uniform, a brace of pistols, dirk, &c., with him. He offered the captain all his money ($500) if he would let him off, but the captain was one of those who would not be bought. The temper of the rebel then gave way, and he declared that he was a secessionist, and would never be anything else; also that he would soon be out of the scrape. He forthwith wrote a letter to you, general, when you promptly sent orders for your friends's release, at the same time ordering the brave captain into confinement because he had done what he thought was his duty, but whom you never brought to trial.
These, with others, where the causes of mutiny in the regiment, as some may remember. The men declared they would not stand up to be shot whilst they were not allowed to defend themselves.
Is this what you call loyalty? If this alone be true (and I do believe my many authors, both officers and men), I wonder you have escaped hanging.
    If a drunken man is incapable of holding office I am satisfied you are, for I have seen the proofs at Fairfax Court-house and in Washington, and I am sorry to say there are more of the same sort in command of our army, whose time would be short if we had not such a good-natured man for President.
    We have the bravest soldiers the world ever saw, and I wish I could say the same of their leaders; "but it is a long that has no turning."


Your obedient servant,
Colonel R. D. GOODWIN.

The court informed Major-General McDowell that it would receive the depositions of the witnesses named by him on the charge of drunkenness.
    The court instructed the recorder to address a communication to the assistant adjutant-general, Headquarters of the Army, requesting that the following-named witnesses be summoned to appear and give evidence before this court, viz: Major-Generals McClellan, Pope, and Sigel; Brigadier-Generals Ricketts, Roberts, Hartsuff, Haupt, Wadsworth; Cols. E. Schriver, Key, aide-de-camp, morgan, aide-de-camp, Lyle, Nine-teeth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Biddle, Ninety-fifth New York Volunteers, Ruggles, assistant adjutant-general, Buchanan, U. S. Army; Lieutenant-Colonels Myers, assistant quartermaster, Smith, First Ohio Cavalry; Majors. J. C. Willard, Sanderson, commissary of subsistence, S. Breck, assistant adjutant-general, S. F. Barstow, assistant adjutant-general, Tillson, Maine Artillery; Captains Krebbs, Jewett, Cutting, and Hodge.
    The court adjourned to meet to-morrow, the 28th instant, at 11 o'clock a. m.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 12, Part 1, Pages 43-45.

After Second Manassas the public had lost confidence in McDowell.  He was still a favorite of the administration, though, and President Lincoln sent word to McDowell he should request a court of inquiry into charges which had been made against him.  Lincoln believed he could not appoint McDowell to command a large body of troops again without him receiving some sort of public vindication.  The court eventually clear him of all charges, but his reputation was damaged further by the proceedings and he eventually was sent to command the Department of the Pacific. 

Godwin, writing here alleging McDowell's drunkeness was a New York City crackpot who had attempted to raise a regiment and was rebuffed based on his having served time in New York State as a confidence man.  Despite his record, he still held petty posts in the 22nd Ward through the war, including a stint as a supervisor of recruitment in the ward.  It gives something of the tenor of the times that he was held credible by the court.  McDowell was also plauged by allegations he was too sympathetic to Southerners within his lines, had protected the personal possessions of Robert E. Lee's wife when his headquarters were in his home in Arlington, had returned slaves to their masters, and had failed to come swiftly to the aid of Pope at Second Manassas (for which Fitz John Porter was being court martialled).

 

November 26, 1862 (Wednesday): Jackson Called to Fredericksburg

General Thomas J. Jackson

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, November 26, 1862.
Lieutenant General THOMAS J. JACKSON,
Commanding Corps:
    GENERAL: In previous letters I suggested the advantages that might be derived by your taking position at Warrenton or Culpeper, with a view to threaten the rear of the enemy now massed at Fredericksburg. When this movement was first proposed, I thought your route would be by Chester Gap, and its effect upon the enemy would be tested, without imposing additional labor on your corps, leaving you still free to join me, should circumstances render it advisable. As your route has been south of that line, it may now be too late to deviate from your course in time to try the effect upon the enemy, and still enable you to join me before the roads and weather might become so bad as to expose your troops to suffering.
As my previous suggestions to you were left to be executed or not at your discretion, you are still at liberty to follow or reject them; and if you think that no beneficial results can be now attained, as I myself now think probable, I desire you to pursue the best route, by easy marches, to this place, advising me of your approach, that your march may be hastened, if necessary. The enemy is still quiescent in our front, thought, for the last day or two, he has been constructing covers for his batteries, and I think the probability is that he will attempt to cross either here or at some other point on the river; in which case it would be desirable that the whole army should be united.
    I have the honor to be,&c.,


    R. E. LEE,
    General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 1033.

There can be no doubt in the confidence Lee had in Jackson.  Lee allowed him to use his discretion in moving his army, even when he was in a threatened position at Fredericksburg.  However, he tactfully phrased his thoughts in such a way Jackson must surely have read his desires clearly.  It should also be noted Jackson had not acted on Lee's suggestion to move by Chester Gap to Warrenton or Culpepper to see if it had the effect of stalling Burnside's advance.  Instead, Jackson chose to cross the Columbia bridge and move to Madison Court House, too far south to try the question.



 

November 25, 1862 (Tuesday):No Time Should Be Lost

Union pontoon boats ready for transport

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
November 25, 1862-2.20 a.m. (Received 9.30 a.m.)
Brigadier General G. W. CULLUM, Chief of Staff:
E   nough pontoons have arrived to make one bridge, and we hope to have enough for two by daylight. I have selected two places of crossing, which I will report by letter. The train that started from Washington by land had to raft the boats from Occoquan, and send the carriages on alone, but they have not yet arrived. Had they started even on the 16th, they would have had good roads, and would have been in time. I felt it my duty to arrest General Woodbury, and have accordingly done so. We are at work with preparations for throwing the first bridge over, but it cannot be done till we get more carriages, which, I hope, will be here to-day. No time should be lost. The enemy's force is constantly increasing. Will telegraph more fully soon.


     A. E. BURNSIDE,
     Major-General, Commanding.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 798.

Woodbury had been ordered arrested by Burnside based on the delay in moving material for pontoon bridges to Fredericksburg.  The problem appears to have been more of communication than disobedience.   On his arrest Woodbury wrote, "General Halleck had directed me at first by telegraph, afterward verbally, to take bridge material down to Aquia Creek, but no one informed me that the success of any important movement depended in the slightest degree upon a pontoon train to leave Washington by land. Without such instructions, which, I think, should have been made to me, I had no sufficient grounds to seize teams or teamsters in Washington, regardless of forms."

November 24, 1862 (Monday): Johnston to Command Department of the West

General Joseph Johnston

SPECIAL ORDERS, ADJT. AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, Number 275. Richmond, Va., November 24, 1862.
    III. General J. E. Johnston, C. S. Army, is hereby assigned to the following geographical command, to wit: Commencing with the Blue Ridge range of mountains running through the western part of North Carolina, and following the line of said mountains through the northern part of Georgia to the railroad south from Chattanooga; thence by that road to WEST Point, and down the WEST or right bank of the Chattahoochee River to the boundary of Alabama and Florida, following that boundary WEST to the Choctawhatchee River, and down that river to Choctawhatchee Bay (including the waters of that bay) to the Gulf of Mexico. All that portion of country WEST of said line to the Mississippi River is included in the above command. General Johnston will, for the purpose of correspondence and reports, establish his headquarters at Chattanooga, or such other place as in his judgment will best secure facilities for ready communication with the troops within the limits of his command, and will repair in person to any part of said command whenever his presence may for the time be necessary or desirable.
    By command of the Secretary of War:


   JNO. WITHERS,
   Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 24, Part 1, Page 213.

Johnston having returned to health after his wounding at Seven Pines is now named to command the Department of the West.  He is now in charge of Bragg in Tennessee and Pemberton in Mississippi.  Although there is some logic to having a commander over two armies encompassed within such a large territory, there is still animosity between Davis and Johnston and nothing to suggest a change in the nature of their relationship.  Johnston, like Lee, must win Davis' approval for major undertakings.  Unlike Lee, Johnston has no gift for tact and diplomacy. 

November 23, 1862 (Sunday): No Word From Aquia Creek

Union supplies at Aquia Creek

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
November 23, 1862.
Major General GUSTAVUS W. SMITH,
Commanding, &c., Richmond, Va.:
    GENERAL: My letter of yesterday to the Adjutant and Inspector General* contains all the information I possess relative to General Burnside's army. There are no indications of his future movements or plans. His apparent present inaction leads me to apprehend that he may be preparing to transfer his army to some other quarter, as his position is such as to render it extremely difficulty to obtain information as to what may transpire in his rear. Scouts are on the watch, but they have to make so large a circuit, both right and left, that great delay necessarily occurs in receiving the information they obtain. I have therefore thought it advisable to request that you will endeavor to obtain accurate information of what may be transpiring south of James River and to take measures, if possible, to be informed as early as practicable of the approach to our waters of any transports or vessels. I shall endeavor to have watch kept on the Potomac of the movements of vessels down that river, as it is very difficult to approach Aquia Creek.
   I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


   R. E. LEE,
   General.

*See Series I, Vol. XXI, p. 1026. 

Series I., Vol. 18, Part 1, Page 784.

Lee had previously ascertained there was no activity at Alexandria which would indicate troops being withdrawn to put to sea.  But he was still concerned over the possibility of Union troops shifting to North Carolina or Fort Monroe and menacing rail lines leading to Petersburg. Lee could not accurate intelligence from Aquia Creek, which would have shown the federal troops waiting on the movement of pontoon trains to Fredericksburg.

November 22, 1862 (Saturday): "You must be off before Congress meets."

General Nathaniel Banks

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, November 22, 1862.
     MY DEAR GENERAL BANKS: Early last week you left me in high hope with your assurance that you would be off with your expedition at the end of that week or early in this. It is now the end of this, and I have just been overwhelmed and confounded with the sight of a requisition made by you which, I am assured, cannot be filled and got off within an hour short of two months. I inclose you a copy of the requisition, in some hope that it is not genuine - that you have never seen it. My dear general, this expanding and piling up of impedimenta has been so far almost our ruin, and will be our final ruin if it is not abandoned. If you had the articles of this requisition upon the wharf, with the necessary animals to make them of any use, and forage for the animals, you could not get vessels together in two weeks to carry the whole, to say nothing of your 20,000 men; and, having the vessels, you could not put the cargoes aboard in two weeks more. And, after all, where you are going you have no use for them. When you parted with me you had no such ideas in your mind. I know you had not, or you could not have excepted to be off so soon as you said. You must get back to something like the plan you had then or your expedition is a failure before you start. You must be off before Congress meets. You would be better off anywhere, and especially where you are going, for not having a thousand wagons doing nothing but hauling forage to feed the animals that draw them, and taking at east 2,000 men to care for the wagons and animals, who otherwise might be 2,000 good soldiers. Now, dear general, do not think this is an ill-natured letter; it is the every reverse. The simple publication of this requisition would ruin you.
      Very truly, your friend,


      A. LINCOLN.

Series III., Vol. 2, Part 1, Page 862.

Banks was on Long Island preparing an expedition to New Orleans to reinforce that critical city which was under Butler's Union control.  Banks had, in fact, requestioned far more horses and equipment than he could ever take by sea to New Orleans.  He would reply that he was only requisitioning what he would ultimately need and still planned to depart within the week.  Lincoln may sometimes be regarded as an activist President in military affairs, but this letter acknowledges a pertinent fact, namely that the Republican Congress was more than willing to become involved in military matters.  Lincoln wanted the expedition gone before his allies in Congress could find other uses for the troops.

 

November 21, 1862 (Friday): Sumner Reaches Fredericksburg

Pontoon bridges such as would ultimately be established at Fredericksburg

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Camp Fredericksburg, November 22, 1862-8 p.m. 
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:
    GENERAL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the President and Department, that General Burnside's army, apparently in full force, is on the other side of the Rappahannock, opposite this place, stretching from the banks of the river toward Aquia Creek. I have learned from our scouts sent toward the Potomac, but who were unable to reach Aquia, that it is reported by citizens that the enemy were making preparations to reconstruct the wharves at that place, by means of their pontoon trains. I have not heard of a commencement being made to rebuild the railroad. Their immense wagon train is actively engaged, apparently, in provisioning their army, which, during the last three days of rain and could, I know has been a difficult operation, and must have been attended with suffering among the troops. I have with me two brigades of Stuart's cavalry, Pendleton's reserve artillery, and four divisions of Longstreet's corps. The Fifth will be here to-morrow. If the enemy attempt to cross the river I shall resist it, though the ground is favorable for him. Yesterday he summoned the corporate authorities of Fredericksburg to surrender* the city by 5 p.m.,and threatened, in the event of its not being delivered up, to commence to shell the town at 9 a.m. to-day.
    Upon the reference of this communication to me, as I was unable to prevent the city from being commanded, I requested General Longstreet to inform the authorities that they might say that I would not occupy or use the city for military purpose, but that I would resist its occupation by the enemy, and recommended that the women and children be at once removed. Our wagons and ambulance have been employed all last night and to-day in accomplishing this object. This morning the authorities were informed that the bombardment would not commence at the hour threatened, but that a definite answer would be returned in a short time. I have not learned whether it has yet been received.
    General Stuart reports, as the results of his reconnaissance north of the Rappahannock, that Fauquier and Loudoun Counties have been abandoned by the enemy, except the force retained at Harper's Ferry, under Generals Slocum and Geary; that the bridges on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, from the Rappahannock to Bull Run, inclusive, have been destroyed, and the stores at Warrenton Junction and Manassas burned. Two divisions of Sigel's corps (those of Stahel and Carl Schurz) passed through Centreville to Washington. The rest of his corps is with Burnside.
    I have the honor to be, with great respect you, obedient servant,


   R. E. LEE,
   General.

*See demand for surrender of Fredericksburg, November 21-22, 1862, pp.783-788. 

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 1026.

Lee states, "If the enemy attempt to cross the river I shall resist it, though the ground is favorable for him."  It is probably not too much a liberty to take to say Lee is referring to the favorability of the crossing (under cover of guns on Stafford's heights).  After crossing into town the ground favored the defenders on Marye's Heights.  At the point of this writing it was not a certainty Fredericksburg would be the site of battle.  Later, some would lament that Lee gave battle this far north and did not assume a position along the North Anna line where an attacker from the North would have been further from supplies with a longer retreat if defeated.   It is worth noting how early Sumner was able to reach Fredericksburg and how long it was until a battle ultimately occurred, the pontoon bridges not being ready for the crossing on the arrival of the first troops or even soon thereafter.  The lack of preparation by McClellan for any overland advance on Richmond is evident in the lack of preparations at Aquia Creek.

November 20, 1862 (Thursday): Pope Appeals for Justice

General Fitz John Porter

SAINT PAUL, November 20, 1862.
Major General H. W. HALLECK:
    DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 7th received a few days since. I will wait the action of the Government with all the patience that is in my nature. I have the firm conviction that in any report you make of the operations in the East since you assumed command you will do me justice.
    I neither seek popularity nor do I especially desire it, having a consciousness that I do my duty zealously and earnestly. You have yourself pronounced upon the degree of ability and energy with which the Virginia Campaign was conducted. At the same time you will agree that it is beyond measure hard that in the silence of the Government my reputation as a soldier, and in some respects my character as a man, should be blasted in the public mind by the studious, unscrupulous, and vindictive publications against me which have been sowed broadcast over the country. These atrocious slanders, iterated and reiterated without contradiction and in the midst of the profound silence maintained by the Government for so long a time, cannot fail greatly to prejudice the public mind against me, and to make during this long period an impression which it will be next to impossible to eradicate.
    One of the great points made against me and in favor of McClellan is that he took an army which had been defeated and demoralized under my command and immediately marched against the same enemy and defeated him at South Mountain and Antietam. I presume it is unnecessary to tell you that the only troops of the Potomac Army which ever drew triggers under my command were the army corps of Heintzelman and Porter, and the "Reserves" under Reynolds, numbering, all told, about 21,000 men. Of these one-half was commanded by Porter, who did nothing. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Banks were left in the entrenchments at Washington. McDowell's corps, numbering about 11,000, and Porter's corps, unhurt by any actions or operations under my command, were the only portions of the force ever engaged with me that McClellan took with him. They did not number over 21,000 all told, of whom Poeter's whole corps was kept carefully out of action in Maryland.
    Of a piece with this falsehood is the one stating that I had lost numbers of wagons, &c.: utterly and wholly false. My wagon trains were always out of the way and the enemy at no time pressed upon me. No wagons were reported lost to me except some 20 or 30 broken-down, between Centreville and Fairfax Court-House, which I sent back for on Tuesday morning whilst my whole force was at Fairfax Court-House. A report of the quartermaster in charge will exhibit this, and ought to accompany the official reports of corps commanders.
    I say to you, in all views, that unless the Government would have great embarrassment in the future the whole of McClellan's career should be laid bare. The overt act at Alexandria, during the engagements near Centreville, can be fully substantiated by letters from many officers since I have been here, it is quite certain that my defeat was predetermined, and I think you must now be conscious of it. You remember that I expressed to you before I entered Virginia my firm conviction that McClellan would not co-operate with me, nor in fact with any other man, under such circumstances. I had before said the same thing to the President and Secretary of War.
    It is not unnatural that the mere fact of my being called from the West, a stranger, and placed in command of three corps, each commanded by my senior in rank, should have caused jealously and heartburning even in the Army of Virginia, and when to that was added the bitter vindictiveness of the Potomac Army officers, it will be agreed that my position was a hard one. That I did my best, and really succeeded beyond any reasonable expectation, under the circumstances, I think you will admit. This is all I wish made public under the sanction of your authority. I hope and believe you will do it.
    My position here is not pleasant. The creation of a department in this region has inflamed the cupidity of every unscrupulous speculator and trader in this whole country, and every means will be used to get some man of themselves appointed to command, who will minister to their operations. Rice, a reckless and ruined speculator and old Indian trader, is a representative of this band of Malays, and will no doubt again be urged. His appointment will be based upon a knowledge of Indians and Indian character, acquired during many years of unlimited concubinage with Indian women. Should he be successful, many years of border war or ruinous Indian treaties and frauds will follow. Politically he is ruined,and he looks to this position to restore his broken political and material fortunes. Sibley has lived here longer than Rice, has quite as much, if not more, familiarity with Indians, and is, besides, a high-toned man, who has the respect of everybody, as he has conducted a successful campaign against the Indians, and endured all the hardships and exposures of such service. The Appointment of Rice, who had done nothing, will be a great and unmerited humiliation to him.
    I think, perhaps, that the creation of a military department in this region was unfortunate. A brigade or so is enough here, and I suggest that it be a military district and, with Dakota, be placed under command of the department commander in Saint Louis. Everything that can be desired will be thus accomplished and the Government relieved from incessant annoyance.
    As soon as the condemned Indians are disposed of this arrangement can readily be made, and Sibley is undoubtedly the best man to leave here in command. He will have plenty of troops for the spring campaign, which should be made. I have already made Dakota a separate military district, and sent an officer to Sioux City, ont eh Missouri, to command it. My future command or place I leave to yourself without uneasiness, feeling assured that you will do me justice, and that I can rely upon the friendly feeling you have always entertained and manifested.
     Very truly, yours,

    JNO. POPE,
    Major-General.

 Official Records, Series I., Vol. 12, Part 3, Page 826.

Pope would never receive the sort of written vindication he sought from Halleck.  It would have been difficult to accuse McClellan, as does Pope here, of intentionally preventing Pope from being successful against the Confederates during the Second Manassas campaign.  However, Porter (a close friend of McClellan's) was court martialed for failing to promptly move his troops in response to a command from Pope.  For a brief time at the end of 1862 and first few months of 1863 Pope was without a command and likely anticipated a return to a major assignment.  But eventually he was placed back in charge of the same department in Minnesota and served out the war there. 

November 19, 1862 (Wednesday): "The infantry and artillery cannot pass."

Fredericksburg

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Falmouth, Va., November 19, 1862.
    GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on the receipt of the telegram of the General-in-Chief, informing me that the President approved of the plan of operations on this line, arrangements for a move were commenced by drawing in the extreme right to the neighborhood of Warrenton, and, as soon as the whole command was supplied with three or four days' commissary stores and a day or two of forage, the column was moved.
    General Summer, with his two corps, took the road to Falmouth, arriving there with his advance on the night of the 17th. General Franklin, with his two corps, took the road to Stafford Court-House, arriving there last night and General Hooker, with his two corps, and Stoneman's and Whipple's divisions, brought up the rear on all the roads, and arrived at this designated place, within 6 miles of here, opposite the United States Ford, to-day. Pleasonton's and Bayard's cavalry are just beyond Hooker, at Deep Run, picketing all the fords of the Rappahannock, and Averell is at Spotted Tavern, picketing the roads in the direction of Catlett's, Brentsville, and Dumfries. I shall make different arrangements for the cavalry to-morrow, which will be reported to you, as so strong a force is not needed in that direction.
    On the approach of General Sumner to Falmouth, a battery on the opposite side of the town opened upon him, doing but little damage, and was soon silence by Captain Pettit's battery of 10-pounder Parrott guns. General Sumner's two corps now occupy all the commanding positions opposite Fredericksburg, with a battery commanding the railroad for 2 miles after leaving the city, which has the effect to stop the trains that were carrying off the grain and flour from this place.
    The pontoon trains have not yet arrived, and an examination of the ford here to-day demonstrated that the infantry and artillery cannot pass. Be keeping the horses well separated, the cavalry can cross over. I have ordered a reconnaissance to-morrow morning at daylight of the United States Ford, when I hope to be able to cross some cavalry and infantry, with some light pieces of artillery. As soon as the pontoon trains arrive, the bridge will be built and the command moved over.
    The enemy do not seem to be in force on the opposite side, but their pickets extend down to the river. I learn that supplies are being landed with considerable rapidity at Belle Plain and Aquia Crek, and I have directed the different commands to commence supplying themselves at once.
    The work on the railroad bridges and wharf, I understand, is progressing rapidly. I trust the new horses and mules will be hurried along, as we have suffered very much by losses within the last few days. Many of the animals have been without forage for two or three days, as it has been impossible to procure it, the whole country through which we have passed having been completely devastated. I hope to receive an abundant supply at Belle Plain, and when we cross the river it is probable that corn can be found more abundant in that section.
    In addition to the directions given to the main body of the command, I directed the different railroad stations this side of Manassas Junction to be vacated and their guards to fall back on General Sickles, at Manassas Junction; and he was directed, after the removal of public property from that place, to fall back over Bull Run, keeping himself prepared to join this command at an hour's notice, by way of Wolf Run Shoals and Dumfries. I sent him a small regiment of cavalry (the Sixth New York) to picket his front.
General Sigel was directed to move the main body of his force to Centreville, leaving small outposts at Gainesville, Thoroughfare Gap, and Aldie, keeping his cavalry well out. I will report to you from time to time our progress. The delay in the arrival of the pontoon bridge, with the necessary time it will take to get our supplies, will enable the General-in-Chief to visit this place for a day, which I should like very much, as I am very anxious to have a more full consultation than we had at Warrenton.
    I omitted to mention in the body of the dispatch that General Pleasonton had some skirmishing in the rear, but his loss was trifling-2 killed and a few wounded. General Bayard lost 7 of his men, captured through the carelessness of an officer, who is now in arrest. All the wagons and public property have arrived.
    I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


   A. E. BURNSIDE,
   Major-General, Commanding.

   General G. W. CULLUM, Chief of Staff.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 103.

Burnside has now received approval to move overland on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg.  The key sentence in this long letter is "..an examination of the ford here to-day demonstrated that the infantry and artillery cannot pass."  Up to this point Burnside has moved with reasonable speed, but the river was an obstacle which necessitated bringing up pontoon bridges.  Once this was decided upon the timetable for the campaign was driven by logistics and not by strategy.

November 18, 1862 (Tuesday): Lee to Jackson

Alexandria during the Civil War

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Camp near Culpeper Court-House, November 18, 1862-2 p.m.
Lieutenant General THOMAS J. JACKSON,
Commanding,&c.:
    GENERAL: Your letter of the 17th is just received.* I think there must be some mistake about the enemy's being re-enforced at Harper's Ferry, inasmuch as information from Washington states that nearly all the troops near the city have been advanced into Virginia. I fear I neglected to inform you, as I intended to have done, that the force which was said to be threatening Staunton had retired beyond at Alleghanies. I therefore have ordered the First South Carolina Cavalry and Stribling's battery to Gordonsville. I think the force there, with Imboden operating in advance, will be sufficient to protect that place, as in a short time the roads in that country will be impassable.
     If the report that the enemy is returning in force to Middleburg is correct, it must be owing to your presence in the valley and the operations of the cavalry; but, in that event, it would appear that they are in great force at all points from Harper's Ferry to Fredericksburg. There must be error somewhere, and it is important to discover it. In a telegraphic dispatch sent you half an hour since I have you in substance the result of my information. I will report more in detail.
     The reports from our cavalry, individual scouts, and citizens, represent that the enemy has abandoned Warrenton, fallen down to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and is moving in force to Fredericksburg. Their progress and direction is confirmed by their camp-fires at night, which are said to be plainly visible. A large force was reported yesterday, in addition, at Brentsville, it had come from the direction of Alexandria. The cavalry, with light artillery, reached Falmouth yesterday about 3 p.m. Their infantry were said to have reached Hartwood last night; their camp-fires distinctly visible, extending continuously back toward the railroad. An intelligent scout reports this morning that it was Sumner's corps, and that no other troops had passed up to late yesterday. The enemy's cavalry were prevented from crossing the Rappahannock last evening by our troops in Fredericksburg, nor have I yet heard of its occupation. There are in Fredericksburg a regiment of cavalry, one of infantry, and two additional companies, and two light batteries. McLaws' division marched this morning for that place; also Lee's brigade of cavalry, and Ransom's division from Madison. The rest of Longstreet's corps is prepared to move, and only awaits confirmation of intelligence.
    Stuart, with his cavalry, was directed to cross the Rappahannock to-day, and endeavor to ascertain what was in our front and what movements were being made by the enemy. I presume I shall not hear from him till to-morrow; but unless you think it is advantageous for you to continue longer in the valley, or can accomplish the retention and division of the enemy's forces by so doing, I think it would be advisable to put some of your divisions in motion across the mountains, and advance them at least as Sperryville or Madison Court-House. I telegraphed you to this effect to-day. I learn that there are not transports at Alexandria; nothing but a few gunboats and tugs. I see, therefore, no preparation for the transfer of the enemy's troops south of the James River as yet; nor is there anything to develop their ultimate plan. It is possible that the may attempt to seize Winchester, Culpeper, and Fredericksburg, which would embrace their favorite strategic plan of advancing in three columns, but I think by so doing they will much expose themselves. I hope we may be able to take advantage of it.
    I hope more shoes and blankets have arrived for your men, and that you will be enabled to keep them comfortable and in health.
    I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,


   R. E. LEE,
   General.

*Not found.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 1019.

The value of military intelligence is not given enough attention.  Lee knew what ships were at the docks at Alexandria, which let him know his fear of a transfer of Burnside's force to North Carolina or eastern Virginia to move on Petersburg was not valid.  Lee is seen here again giving great leeway to Jackson as to when to rejoin the main body.  But the rapport was such between the two that Lee did not have to make suggestions twice for them to have the force of orders.

 

November 17, 1862 (Monday): Signed "J.D."

Jefferson Davis

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Camp near Culpeper Court-House, November 17, 1862.
Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:
SIR: From the general reports received from the scouts yesterday, it is plain that the enemy is abandoning his position around Warrenton, and does not intend to advance in the direction first assumed. His troops and trains, as far as can be discovered, are moving toward the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; but whether with a view of massing them on that line of communication, to threaten Gordonsville, or to fall down upon Fredericksburg, or to retire toward Alexandria, to be transferred by water south of the James River, I cannot yet discover. The railroad trains are kept in active operation; but it is not known whether they are employed in carrying troops toward Alexandria or in bringing them in this direction. Knowing the difficulties of his pursuing his former route along the Blue Ridge, I have supposed from the half that has taken place, that he intended to march upon Fredericksburg, but have learned of no preparation to rebuild the wharves,&c., at Aquia, or to subsist his army, which would naturally precede such a movement. I think it, therefore, probable that the movement in execution is with a view of transferring the army south of James River, and the appointment of General Burnside to the command favor his supposition. I will give you further information as soon as anything reliable can be ascertained. But in the mean time I beg that every preparation that can possibly be made, with a view of opposing in North Carolina, may be urged forward.
    In the condition in which both corps of this army now are, I do not think it advisable to advance upon the enemy, as it might injure their efficiency in future operations, which I think are threatening us. Partial operations, however, have been and are being made, tending to embarrass and damage the enemy.
I learn that Colonel Imboden was unable to destroy the bridging at Cheat River, in consequence of the strength of the enemy in that quarter, and is in position on the Shenandoah Mountains. He captured one company of the enemy, paroled the men, and brought off their arms and equipments. Colonel Davidson reports that the force which has been threatening Staunton has retired beyond the Alleghanies.
    I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,




   R. E. LEE,
   General.

[Indorsement.]
Write to Governor of North Carolina, giving extract from this letter, and request that measures be taken to hurry forward the conscripts and send back absentees to their regiments.

G. W. R.[RANDOLPH.]

Every effort will be made to hasten the return of absentees and obtain conscripts.
J. D.[DAVIS.]

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 21, Part 1, Page 1015.

It is little commented on that Lee was fixed upon the possibility of Burnside's troops being transferred back again by water to a position threatening Richmond.  Not seeing any evidence of rebuilding at Aquia Creek (the Union supply area north of Fredericksburg) Lee is concerned Burnside could return to Alexandria and embark on an expedition to the coast of North Carolina and then move up to threaten the Confederate rail lines running from the south up to Petersburg.  Davis endorses Lee's comments "J. D." with a note to the Secretary of War to hasten the return of absentees and obtain recent conscripts to reinforce Lee.

November 16, 1862 (Sunday): Longstreet Addresses the Troops

Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet's AAG

GENERAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS, Numbers 49.
November 16, 1862.
    The troops of this command will be held in readiness for battle upon a moment's notice. Commanders will see that provisions, ammunition, and transportation are at hand and in such quantities as may he wanted to meat their necessities. The commanding general relies upon the valor and patriotism of these well tried troops to sustain them in the struggle that they may again be called upon to encounter. Officers, cool and take care of your men. Soldiers, remain steady in your ranks, take good aim, and obey the orders of your officers. Observe these simple injunctions, and your general will be responsible for the issue.
     By command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet:


    G. M. SORREL,
    Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 51, Part 2, Page 645.

Longstreet's orders reflect the belief action was immanent on the 16th.  There had been artillery fire exchanged on the 15th near Warrenton and Union forces were moving, albeit tentatively.  There is a certain amount of grandiosity in Longstreet's statement that if his troops followed a few precepts he would be responsible for the outcome of battle.  But this is not at all atypical of general's remarks to their troops throughout the war.  It perhaps should be left unremarked, but with some difficulty it is not, that Longstreet after the war scrupulously avoided accepting responsibility for any action of his during the war, unless that action was attended with unalloyed victory.

 

November 15, 1862 (Saturday): Lincoln & the Sabbath

Bible used in Lincoln Inauguration (1861_

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, November 15, 1862.
General Order respecting the observance of the Sabbath day in the Army and Navy.
    The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observance of the Sabbath by the officers and men in military and naval service. The importance for man and beast of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that Sunday labor in the Army and Navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity.
    The discipline and character of the national forces should not suffer nor the cause they defend the imperiled, by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High. At this time of public distress adopting the words of Washington in 1776, "men may find enough to do in the service of God and their country without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality." The first general order issued by the Father of his Country after the Declaration of Independence indicates the spirit in which our institutions were founded and should ever be defended: "The general hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as becomes a Christian soldier defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country."


ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Official Records, Series III., Vol. 2, Part 1, Page 783.

New York Tribune of November 14, 1862, reported ``Messrs. Fred. Winston, David Hoodley, Foster, Booth, and another gentleman, representing religious bodies in New-York City, called upon the President and heads of departments today to urge upon him the propriety of enforcing a better observance of the Sabbath in the army. The interviews are represented as agreeable and satisfactory.'' 

November 14, 1862 (Friday): Jackson's Options

Aestham River West of Rappahannock Station (digitalcollections.baylor.edu)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
November 14, 1862.
Lieutenant General THOMAS J. JACKSON, Commanding, &c.:
GENERAL: Your letter of the 10th instant,* by courier, and telegraphic dispatch of to-day have been received. The withdrawal of the enemy from the Blue Ridge and concentration at Warrenton and Waterloo show, I think, that he has abandoned his former base, and assumed that of the Warrenton and Alexandria Railroad. Your presence, then, in the valley seems to be too distant from his line of operations to affect his movements, should you remain quiescent. If you were able, by a movement through Snicker's gap, to threaten his communication north of Manassas Junction, it would have the effect of recalling him. This, in your condition, would be a hazardous movement, as he could bring a force against you too strong for you to resist, and might intercept your return into the valley. I do not see, then, what good your continuance in the valley will effect beyond the support of your troops. It is true, it may prevent the occupation of Winchester by a portion of the enemy's forces, but, in a military point of view, that would accomplish but little beyond the annoyance of the inhabitants, which is much to be lamented. Your detention there, until the occurrence of bad weather and deep roads, might so break down your command as to render it inefficient for further operations, should they become requisite elsewhere. Your remaining in the valley was base upon the supposition that, by operating upon the flank and rear of the enemy, you might prevent his progress southward, and, so long as you found that this could be effected, I considered it advantageous; but, when this cannot be accomplished, the sooner you make a junction with Longstreet's corps the better. The question now is, whether you can, in the present condition of things, affect the movements of the enemy. He is in a position to move upon Culpepper, using the Orange and Alexandria Railroad as a line of communication, or to march upon Fredericksburg, and establish his base on the Potomac. As you are the best judge of your ability to operate advantageously against him, I have heard of no movement of the enemy as yet below Kelly's for, except a visit of a small party of his cavalry to Fredericksburg, on the 8th, when they charged through the town, but were immediately driven back across the river by our cavalry. General Stuart reports this evening that two brigades of the enemy's infantry are at Jeffersonton. Our cavalry still hold the line of Aestham River to Sperryville. The position of Longstreet's corps remains unchanged since you were last informed.
    I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,


   R. E. LEE,
   General.

*Not found.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 19, Part 2, Page 720.

Lee kept Jackson in the valley for as long as he could, but the risk of his being attacked and defeated in detail by a concentrated Union army was too great.  Lee makes a good appraisal of Burnside's options (to move on Culpepper or Fredericksburg).  If Lee had lost any confidence in Jackson during the Seven Days there is no evidence here, as he is told he is "the best judge of your ability to operate advantageously...."

 

November 13, 1862 (Thursday): Burnside Asks for Approval

Fredericksburg

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
November 13, 1862-6.50 p.m.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
    If possible, can you send me to-night a definite answer as to my plan of operations?


   A. E. BURNSIDE.
   Major-General.

Series I., Vol. 19, Part 2, Page 574.

McClellan had the Army of the Potomac in a relatively good position, with the possibility of it being interposed between Jackson and Longstreet.  But Burnside wanted to shift operations to the east to attack along the line of Fredericksburg to Richmond.  It would take the next four days before Sumner's grand division (two corps) arrived opposite Fredericksburg.  The approval Burnside seeks here would be granted directly by the President the next day.

November 12, 1862 (Wednesday): Riots In Wisconsin

Port Washington WI (portwashington.wi.us)

MADISON, WIS., November 12, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON:
    Very serious disturbances in regard to the draft have occurred in two counties. In Ozaukee County commissioner injured and obliged to flee for his life, and boxes destroyed and houses torn down. I furnished the provost-marshal with 600 men to protect new draft and make arrests. It being impossible to serve notices personally on those drafted, I instructed commissioners to publish by posters or otherwise. Please sanction this course. Provost-marshal has made fifty arrests, and will make more in that and other counties. What shall be done with the men arrested? They ought not to remain in the State. It will take too many to guard them. They are arrested under the proclamation of September 25, for resisting draft.


    E. SALOMON.
    Governor of Wisconsin.

Official Records, Series III., Vol. 2, Part 1, Page 765.

The draft riots in Wisconsin were mainly in communities of German immigrants.  Just having arrived in a new country they were not ready to so quickly leave home and family to fight for a war they most likely did not completely understand.  Order was quickly restored after the riots and they did no long term harm to Wisconsin furnishing its quota of men.  But it was a good illustration early enthusiasm for the war was beginning to wane.

November 11, 1862 (Tuesday): In Pursuit of the Whiskey Party

Fort Snelling Minnesota (Minnesota Historical Society)

MINNEAPOLIS, November 11, 1862.
OSCAR MALMROS, Esq.,
Adjutant-General of the State of Minnesota.
DEAR SIR: Learning it to be my duty to report myself to you I hasten to give you a brief account of my capture and release by a band of Morgan's men in Kentucky. On the 24th of last April I left Fort Snelling as a private in the Second Minnesota Battery, and on the 5th of October while marching through the State of Kentucky with the transportation train, which was some ten days in the rear of the main army, I was detailed by the first lieutenant of Company F, of the Fourth Ohio Cavalry, to follow Hank Gamel, a private in said cavalry, who had taken my horse and left his and gone some four miles off the road after whiskey. I mounted his (Gamel's)horse and in company with Charles L. Ward, private in the Eighth Wisconsin Battery, started in pursuit of the whiskey party. We found on arriving at the first designated place the party (six in number) had gone to another place where whiskey was sold. We accordingly followed on. At noon stopped at a farm-house for dinner and horse feed. While we were eating dinner a party of four men took the side-arms from our saddles and immediately after dinner took us prisoners and robbed us of everything in our possession. They mounted our horses and marched us between them, two horsemen following in the rear, at a quickstep fifteen miles through he hot sun and dust. We were near suffocated. I asked one of them for my handkerchief to wipe the sweat and dust from my eyes, and his answer was, "You d----d Lincolnite, you will soon be where you won't need any eyes. " I once reached my hand to take hold of the stirrup strap, but my hand was knocked off with a revolver he carried in his hand all the way. When they came to a halt I was unable to stand. They for some time refused us any water or any refreshments of any kind. During that night and the next day we were visited by twenty-five or thirty different ruffians, the object of which seemed to be a council to see how they should dispose of us. Many of the party were in favor of hanging us instanter; so unanimous were they in this decision that I did not value my life worth a copper. In fact, we were more dead than alive from their brutal treatment already. After holding their drunken revelry over us for thirty-six hours a better feeling prevailed in the breast of nine of their number. Whether a square and compass marked with indelible ink on either breast of my shirt had anything to do with it I leave for you to judge. At any rate, after signing an interesting document, of which the following is a copy, we were escorted to the Ohio River:

Military pass and parole.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KENTUCKY, C. S. ARMY,
Camp near Bardstown, Ky., October 7, 1862.
Pickets and guards will pass Edward T. Tillotson, a prisoner of war, through our lines to the Ohio River.

By order of Major-General Bragg:
J. M. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant, Commanding Second Texas Rangers.

Oath of allegiance.
I solemnly swear without any mental reservation or evasion that I will support the constitution of the Confederate States and the laws made in pursuance thereof. That I will not take up arms against the Confederate States or give aid or comfort or furnish information directly or indirectly to any person or persons belonging to any of the United States, who are now at war with the Confederate States, and that I will not write or speak against the Government of the said Confederate States: So help me God. It is understood that the penalty for the violation of this parole is death.

E. T. TILLOTSON.

 On reaching the Indiana shore for the first time I learned of the Indian raids in Minnesota. I hastened to the home I left in Wright County eight months ago and found my family, consisting of wife and four children, nowhere to be found. After much trouble I learned they were in Minneapolis, where last night I found them, amongst other refugees, subsisting on the charity of the citizens. Everything at home has been destroyed. I am much worn from exposure and hardship, but hold myself subject to the orders of your department. The reason I have not reported myself in person I think is apparent to every husband and father.
    I am, very respectfully, yours,


    E. T. TILLOTSON.
    P. S. --Your early answer is respectfully solicited.

Official Records, Series II., Vol. 4, Part 1, Page 711.

Tillotson was not well received on his return home.  Rosecrans wrote of the evil of soldiers allowing themselves to be captured and paroled so as to return home to their families and recommended they be arrested on their return.  It is not clear what became of Tillotson, who alludes in his letter to the large scale Indian raids in Minnesota which were violently surpressed by General Pope.  It was undoubtedly difficult to maintain Minnesota troops in the ranks while alarming tales of destruction were coming to them from the home front.

November 10, 1862 (Monday): The Cost of War

Colonel Benjamin F. Larned

PAYMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
November 10, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the transactions of the Pay Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1862:
    It is shown by the tabular statement herewith* that there remained in hands of paymasters on June 30, 1861, applicable to payments in the first quarter of the last fiscal year, the sum of $910,643.34, in addition to which requisitions have been made on the Treasury in their favor, and amounts turned over to them from other sources, inclusive of amounts transferred form one to another or repaid into the Treasury, the sum of $123,452,919.57, making a total to be accounted for of $124,363,562.91, as follows:
Payments to regular troops......................... $5,550,039.54
Payments to volunteers............................. 91,116,610.61
Payments to Military Academy....................... 96,739.10
Amount of requisitions not received by the
paymasters on June 30, 1862....................... 16,070,000.00
--------------
-
Total.............................................. 112,833,389.25
Leaving a balance to be accounted for of........... 11,530,173.66
This balance of $11,530,173.66, together with the sum of $16,070,000 mentioned above, as amount of requisitions not received by paymasters on June 30, 1862, but since drawn out, has been expended in paying the Army, except the amount of $172,700.51, which stands charged against seceded paymasters on the books of this office. Of this amount $16,676.26 remains in the sub-treasury in New York and San Francisco; $31,098.94 has been carried into the Treasury; $95,871 due on account of deceased paymasters (of this amount $73,556.75 stands to the credit of Major Benner in the Treasury, and which the Secretary of the Treasury was requested August 15, 1862, to have covered into the Treasury; the balance of $22,314.25 is due by the estate of Major Gaines, who died at Fort Smith, Ark., in 1860); $21,112 due by paymasters whose appointments were negatived by the Senate or dismissed by sentence of court-martial. The accounts of these officers are now under settlement, and on final adjustment the act of May 15, 1820, makes it the duty of the Comptroller of the Treasury to proceed against them.
The accounts of Deputy Paymaster-General Ringgold and Paymaster Winston are stated to the 30th of April only, their returns for May and June having been lost on steamer Golden Gate and duplicates not yet reached this office.
    The troops have been paid with punctuality whenever funds were furnished for the purpose, nearly all having been paid to June 30, 1862, and many of August 31. The immense amounts called for other purposes delayed the payment to troops in the field longer than
PAYMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
November 10, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the transactions of the Pay Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1862:
It is shown by the tabular statement herewith* that there remained in hands of paymasters on June 30, 1861, applicable to payments in the first quarter of the last fiscal year, the sum of $910,643.34, in addition to which requisitions have been made on the Treasury in their favor, and amounts turned over to them from other sources, inclusive of amounts transferred form one to another or repaid into the Treasury, the sum of $123,452,919.57, making a total to be accounted for of $124,363,562.91, as follows:
Payments to regular troops......................... $5,550,039.54
Payments to volunteers............................. 91,116,610.61
Payments to Military Academy....................... 96,739.10
Amount of requisitions not received by the
paymasters on June 30, 1862....................... 16,070,000.00
--------------
-
Total.............................................. 112,833,389.25
Leaving a balance to be accounted for of........... 11,530,173.66
This balance of $11,530,173.66, together with the sum of $16,070,000 mentioned above, as amount of requisitions not received by paymasters on June 30, 1862, but since drawn out, has been expended in paying the Army, except the amount of $172,700.51, which stands charged against seceded paymasters on the books of this office. Of this amount $16,676.26 remains in the sub-treasury in New York and San Francisco; $31,098.94 has been carried into the Treasury; $95,871 due on account of deceased paymasters (of this amount $73,556.75 stands to the credit of Major Benner in the Treasury, and which the Secretary of the Treasury was requested August 15, 1862, to have covered into the Treasury; the balance of $22,314.25 is due by the estate of Major Gaines, who died at Fort Smith, Ark., in 1860); $21,112 due by paymasters whose appointments were negatived by the Senate or dismissed by sentence of court-martial. The accounts of these officers are now under settlement, and on final adjustment the act of May 15, 1820, makes it the duty of the Comptroller of the Treasury to proceed against them.
The accounts of Deputy Paymaster-General Ringgold and Paymaster Winston are stated to the 30th of April only, their returns for May and June having been lost on steamer Golden Gate and duplicates not yet reached this office.
The troops have been paid with punctuality whenever funds were furnished for the purpose, nearly all having been paid to June 30, 1862, and many of August 31. The immense amounts called for other purposes delayed the payment to troops in the field longer than
PAYMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
November 10, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the transactions of the Pay Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1862:
It is shown by the tabular statement herewith* that there remained in hands of paymasters on June 30, 1861, applicable to payments in the first quarter of the last fiscal year, the sum of $910,643.34, in addition to which requisitions have been made on the Treasury in their favor, and amounts turned over to them from other sources, inclusive of amounts transferred form one to another or repaid into the Treasury, the sum of $123,452,919.57, making a total to be accounted for of $124,363,562.91, as follows:
Payments to regular troops......................... $5,550,039.54
Payments to volunteers............................. 91,116,610.61
Payments to Military Academy....................... 96,739.10
Amount of requisitions not received by the
paymasters on June 30, 1862....................... 16,070,000.00
--------------
-
Total.............................................. 112,833,389.25
Leaving a balance to be accounted for of........... 11,530,173.66
This balance of $11,530,173.66, together with the sum of $16,070,000 mentioned above, as amount of requisitions not received by paymasters on June 30, 1862, but since drawn out, has been expended in paying the Army, except the amount of $172,700.51, which stands charged against seceded paymasters on the books of this office. Of this amount $16,676.26 remains in the sub-treasury in New York and San Francisco; $31,098.94 has been carried into the Treasury; $95,871 due on account of deceased paymasters (of this amount $73,556.75 stands to the credit of Major Benner in the Treasury, and which the Secretary of the Treasury was requested August 15, 1862, to have covered into the Treasury; the balance of $22,314.25 is due by the estate of Major Gaines, who died at Fort Smith, Ark., in 1860); $21,112 due by paymasters whose appointments were negatived by the Senate or dismissed by sentence of court-martial. The accounts of these officers are now under settlement, and on final adjustment the act of May 15, 1820, makes it the duty of the Comptroller of the Treasury to proceed against them.
The accounts of Deputy Paymaster-General Ringgold and Paymaster Winston are stated to the 30th of April only, their returns for May and June having been lost on steamer Golden Gate and duplicates not yet reached this office.
The troops have been paid with punctuality whenever funds were furnished for the purpose, nearly all having been paid to June 30, 1862, and many of August 31. The immense amounts called for other purposes delayed the payment to troops in the field longer than could have been desired, but every effort has been made by this department under its late and lamented chief,* and since his death, to distribute the funds furnished as impartially as possible.
    Respectfully, your obedient servant,


    CARY H. FRY,
    Acting Paymaster-General, U. S. Army.
---------------
*Published in House Executive Document No. 1, Thirty-seventh Congress, third session, pp.44-49.
---------------
*Colonel Benjamin F. Larned, who died September 6, 1862.

Official Records, Series III., Vol. 2, Part 1, Page 749.

The task of paying such a large army as the Union mustered was daunting.  Although there were delays in making payments, especially early in the war, there was little in the way of abuse of the accounts entrusted to paymasters.  Colonel Larned, a veteran of the War of 1812 who headed the paymasters since 1854, passed away in September of 1862 after a long illness.  Larned was highly regarded as a Christian gentleman, and on his passing a nine gun salute was fired at all installations and flags were flown at half staff.  Badges of mourning were also authorized.  As for the $124 million pay in the fiscal year to Union soldiers, this amount would, adjusted for inflation, equal over $1.5 trillion dollars in current terms.

November 9, 1862 (Sunday): Burnside's Rail Dilmena

One of Haupt's Bridges.

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1862-4.40 p.m.
Major-General BURNSIDE:
    Arrangements in regard to transportation were fully discussed, explanations made, and a programme determined upon between General McClellan his chief quartermaster and commissary, and myself, previous to his removal. As you are now in chief command, I think it proper to report to you, and ask instructions in regard to certain points.
     The road by which your army is to be supplied is a single track, without sidings sufficient for long trains, without wood, and with insufficient supplies of water; a road which has heretofore failed to supply an army of one-fourth the size of that which you command; a road the ordinary working capacity of which is not equal to the half of your requirements, but which, by a combination of good management and good fortune, may be able to furnish your supplies. To do this, it is absolutely necessary that at each and every depot a force should be in readiness to unload a train as soon as it arrives. The contents of cars must be unloaded on the ground, and afterward moved, in necessary, to more convenient points. The force should be sufficient to unload all the cars of a train at once. Railway employes are required to be civil and accommodating, and if they are not, they will be promptly dismissed; but the convenience of

local quartermasters and commissaries must give way before the requirements of a service far more imperative than it has ever been before. Trains have frequently been detained for hours to move supplies for very short distances, to save hauling. I desire, respectfully, but most urgently, to impress upon you the importance of making your orders so peremptory that they dare not be disobeyed, and that cars shall, on their arrival at each and every depot, be immediately unloaded and returned. I say, again, that without this, the supply of your army is impossible. No man living can accomplish it.
    A second point to which I wish to direct your attention is the importance of establishing a depot of reserve supplies at Manassas, to draw upon in case of any break in the road between Manassas and Alexandria; and, as the army advances, depots at intervals of 30 or 40 miles should be made, to guard against the consequences of breaks in the connection. If you advance far, the operation of the road will present greater difficulties; its protection against raids will be almost impossible and the breaks of connection will become frequent, from various causes not dependent on the movements of the enemy.
    The difficulty of operating a long line of railroad with an exposed flank satisfies me that the reconstruction of the Fredericksburg Railroad, so uselessly destroyed, is a military necessity. If this is your opinion, please advise me of the fact, that no time may be lost in preparation. The last time I spoke to General Halleck on this subject, he said that the question of reconstructing this road was not settled; when it was, he would advise me. Since then I have not heard from him, but I am sure that when you advance the Orange and Alexandria alone will be a very insecure reliance.
     The subject of guarding the railroad is a very important one, but no detention of trains by guards on any pretext should be permitted. The proper protection of the road between Alexandria and Manassas requires that the line of the Occoquan should be well watched.
    As other duties will prevent me from seeing you for some days, I hope you will not consider these suggestions and statements as out of place.


     H. HAUPT,
     Brigadier-General, in Charge of Construction and Operation of U. S. Military Railroads.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 19, Part 2, Page 559.

Haupt was an asset of inestimable worth to the Union.  A West Point graduate he was chief of transporation and chief engineer of the Penn Railroad before the war.  In the middle of the war he resigned, saying he was willing to serve without rank or pay so long as he was given complete control of his work.  Here he points out some of the logistical challenges facing a Union commander in moving his forces forward.  The rail capacity in Northern Virginia was not adequate to meet the supply needs of an advancing force.  So a combination of wagon transport and rail was required, but depots must be spotted along the advance to keep the armies fed and moving.