November 9, 1862 (Sunday): Burnside's Rail Dilmena

One of Haupt's Bridges.

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1862-4.40 p.m.
Major-General BURNSIDE:
    Arrangements in regard to transportation were fully discussed, explanations made, and a programme determined upon between General McClellan his chief quartermaster and commissary, and myself, previous to his removal. As you are now in chief command, I think it proper to report to you, and ask instructions in regard to certain points.
     The road by which your army is to be supplied is a single track, without sidings sufficient for long trains, without wood, and with insufficient supplies of water; a road which has heretofore failed to supply an army of one-fourth the size of that which you command; a road the ordinary working capacity of which is not equal to the half of your requirements, but which, by a combination of good management and good fortune, may be able to furnish your supplies. To do this, it is absolutely necessary that at each and every depot a force should be in readiness to unload a train as soon as it arrives. The contents of cars must be unloaded on the ground, and afterward moved, in necessary, to more convenient points. The force should be sufficient to unload all the cars of a train at once. Railway employes are required to be civil and accommodating, and if they are not, they will be promptly dismissed; but the convenience of

local quartermasters and commissaries must give way before the requirements of a service far more imperative than it has ever been before. Trains have frequently been detained for hours to move supplies for very short distances, to save hauling. I desire, respectfully, but most urgently, to impress upon you the importance of making your orders so peremptory that they dare not be disobeyed, and that cars shall, on their arrival at each and every depot, be immediately unloaded and returned. I say, again, that without this, the supply of your army is impossible. No man living can accomplish it.
    A second point to which I wish to direct your attention is the importance of establishing a depot of reserve supplies at Manassas, to draw upon in case of any break in the road between Manassas and Alexandria; and, as the army advances, depots at intervals of 30 or 40 miles should be made, to guard against the consequences of breaks in the connection. If you advance far, the operation of the road will present greater difficulties; its protection against raids will be almost impossible and the breaks of connection will become frequent, from various causes not dependent on the movements of the enemy.
    The difficulty of operating a long line of railroad with an exposed flank satisfies me that the reconstruction of the Fredericksburg Railroad, so uselessly destroyed, is a military necessity. If this is your opinion, please advise me of the fact, that no time may be lost in preparation. The last time I spoke to General Halleck on this subject, he said that the question of reconstructing this road was not settled; when it was, he would advise me. Since then I have not heard from him, but I am sure that when you advance the Orange and Alexandria alone will be a very insecure reliance.
     The subject of guarding the railroad is a very important one, but no detention of trains by guards on any pretext should be permitted. The proper protection of the road between Alexandria and Manassas requires that the line of the Occoquan should be well watched.
    As other duties will prevent me from seeing you for some days, I hope you will not consider these suggestions and statements as out of place.


     H. HAUPT,
     Brigadier-General, in Charge of Construction and Operation of U. S. Military Railroads.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 19, Part 2, Page 559.

Haupt was an asset of inestimable worth to the Union.  A West Point graduate he was chief of transporation and chief engineer of the Penn Railroad before the war.  In the middle of the war he resigned, saying he was willing to serve without rank or pay so long as he was given complete control of his work.  Here he points out some of the logistical challenges facing a Union commander in moving his forces forward.  The rail capacity in Northern Virginia was not adequate to meet the supply needs of an advancing force.  So a combination of wagon transport and rail was required, but depots must be spotted along the advance to keep the armies fed and moving.