July 2, 1863 (Thursday): "This is a good point for observation."

Little Round Top (cr.nps.gov)

ROUND TOP MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863-11. 55 a. m.
General BUTTERFIELD:
     The rebels are in force, and our skirmishers give way. One mile west of Round Top signal station, the woods are full of them.


     JEROME,
     Lieutenant, Signal Officer.

CEMETERY SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863-12. 35 p. m.
General BUTTERFIELD:
    Numerous fires, apparently from the burning of wagons south-southeast from here. A wagon train can be seen in the same direction. I think our trains are being destroyed.


     BABCOCK,
     Captain, Signal Officer.

ROUND TOP MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863-1. 30 p. m.
General BUTTERFIELD:
A heavy column of enemy's infantry, about 10, 000 strong, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right.


    HALL.
    Captain, Signal Officer.

[JULY 2], 1863.
General HOWARD:
     Over a division of the rebels is making a flank movement on our right; the line extends over a mile, and is advancing, skirmishing. There is nothing but cavalry to oppose them.


      A. B. JEROME,
     First. Lieutenant, Signal Officer.

ROUND TOP SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863-2. 10 p. m.
General BUTTEFIELD:
Those troop were passing on a by-road from Dr. Hall's house to Herr's tavern, on the Chambersburg pike. A train of ambulances is following them.


     HALL,
     Captain, Signal Officer.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, PA.,
July 2, 1863-3 p. m. (Received July 3, 10. 20 a. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
     I have concentrated my army at this place to-day. The Sixth Corps is just coming in, very much worn out, having been marching since 9 p. m. last night. The army is fatigued. I have to-day, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I having a strong position for defensive. I am not determined, as yet, on attacking him till his position is more developed. He has been moving on both my flanks, apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed attacking, to allow the Sixth Corps and parts of other corps to reach this place and to rest the men.
     Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster. I will endeavor to advise you as often as possible. In the engagement yesterday the enemy concentrated more rapidly than we could, and toward evening, owing to the superiority of numbers, compelled the Eleventh and First Corps to fall back from the town to the heights this side, on which I am now posted. I feel fully the responsibility resting upon me, but will endeavor to act with caution.


     GEO. G. MEADE,
     Major-General.

SIGNAL STATION NEAR WADSWORTH'S HEADQUARTERS, July 2, 1863-4. 35 p. m.
Captain NORTON:
One regiment rebel infantry has just come out of the woods into a field east- northeast from here. The enemy's sharpshooters are in the woods at the foot of this hill. I can see sixteen guns, not in position-eight north-northwest and eight northeast from here. Very respectfully,


      N. HENRY CAMP,
      Lieutenant, Signal Officer.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 2, 1863-5. 30 p. m.
Commanding Officer Twelfth Corps:
     The signal officer reports that a heavy column of infantry is moving round to the right, and in front of Slocum's corps. By command of Major-General Meade:


     S. WILLIAMS,
     Assistant Adjutant-General.

ROUND TOP MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863.
Captain HALL:
     Saw a column of the enemy's infantry move into woods on ridge, 3 miles west of the town, near the Millerstown road. Wagon teams, parked in open field beyond the ridge, moved to the rear, behind woods. See wagons moving up and down on the Chambersburg pike, at Spangler's. Think the enemy occupies the range of hills 3 miles west of town in considerable force.


      NORTON,
      TAYLOR,
    
      Signal Officer.

[P. S.]-This is good point for observation.

SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863.
General MEADE:
Millerstown Cross-Roads is about 8 miles, a little south of west from the signal station 1 1/2 miles to the south of this house.


      L. B. NORTON,
     Captain, and Chief Signal Officer.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 2, 1863-8 p. m. (Received July 3, 5. 15 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
     The enemy attacked me about 4 p. m. this day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded. Among the former are Brigadier-Generals Paul and Zook, and among the wounded, Generals Sickles, Barlow, Graham, and Warren, slightly. We have taken a large number of prisoners. I shall remain in my present position to-morrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character.


    GEO. G. MEADE,
    Major-General.


Minutes of council, July 2, 1863. *
QUESTIONS ASKED.
1. Under existing circumstances, is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies?
2. It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?
3. If we wait attack, how long?
REPLIES.
GIBBON:
1. Correct position of the army, but would not retreat.
2. In no condition to attack, in his opinion.
3. Until he moves; until enemy moves.
WILLIAMS:
1. Stay.
2. Wait attack.
3. One day.
BIRNEY:
Same as General Williams.
SYKES:
Same as General Williams.
NEWTON:
1. Correct position of the army, but would not retreat.
2. By all means not attack.
3. If we wait, it will give them a chance to cut our line.
HOWARD:
1. Remain.
2. Wait attack until 4 p. m. to-morrow.
3. If don't attack, attack them.
HANCOCK:
1. Rectify position without moving so as to give up field.
2. Not attack unless our communications are cut.
3, Can't wait long; can't be idle.
SEDGWICK:
1. Remain, and wait attack at least one day.
SLOCUM:
Stay and fight it out.
[MEMORANDUM.]+
SLOCUM:
Stay and fight it out.
NEWTON:
Thinks it is a bad position.
HANCOCK:
Puzzled about practicability of retiring; thinks by holding on--- to mass forces and attack.
HOWARD:
Favor of not retiring.
BIRNEY:
Don't know; Third Corps used up, and not in good condition to fight.
SEDGWICK:
Doubtful*

Effective strength about 9, 000, 12, 000, 9, 000, 6, 000, 8, 500, 6, 000, 7000, ; total, 58, 000.

[Indorsement.]
Minutes of council, held Thursday p. m., July 2.

D. B.
M. G., C. of S.

*Original in pencil, and found among General Meade's papers. See circular of March 10, 1864, from Headquarters Army of the Potomac, and replies thereto, pp. 123 et seq., and Butterfield to Williams, and reply, of March 23, 1864, p. 138.
+This memorandum is without a heading in the original.
---Illegible word.

.Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Pages 72-73, Vol. 3, Pages 488-489.

Two distinctly unique views of Day 2 at Gettysburg.  The reports of Union signal officers and the results of a council of war held by Meade at the end of the day.  The perilous position of the Union left becomes clear from the signal officers reports, as does the fact Longstreet's Corp was observed by midday despite his attempts to remain out of view.  The council of war is a good reflection of the condition of Meade's troops after the second day of fighting.