September 27, 1862 (Saturday): "We are greatly deficient.."

Doubleday Hill, Williamsport (steencannons.com)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 27, 1862-10 a. m.
    All the information in my possession goes to prove that the main body of the enemy is concentrated no far from Martinsburg, with some troops at Charlestown; not many in Winchester. Their movements of late have been an extension toward our right and beyond it. They are receiving re-enforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts, perhaps entirely so.
    This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by same mistake of the enemy or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regiments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the old regiments-our main dependence-and in supplying vacancies among the officers by promotion.
    My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side.
Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche, but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and then acting cording to circumstances, viz,moving on Winchester, if from the position and attitude of the enemy we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so, or unless devoting reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops, preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I read it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at once. I have no fears as to an attack on Washington by the line of Manassas. Holding Harper's ferry as I do, they will not run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear while they have the garrison of Washington in their front. I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt in Maryland should the river remain low for a great length of time, and should they receive considerable addition to their force.
    I would be glad to have Peck's division as soon as possible. I am surprised that Sigel's men should have been sent to Western Virginia without my knowledge. The last I heard from you on the subject was that they were at my disposition. In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in number, and it was only by very hard fighting that we gained the advantage we did. As it was, the result was at one period very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day. If the enemy receives considerable re-enforcements and we none, it is possible that I may have too much on my hands in the next battle. My own view of the proper policy to be-pursued, is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else available to re-enforce this army. The railways give us the means of promptly re-enforcing Washington should it become necessary. If I am re-enforced, as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington. Several persons recently from Richmond say that there are no troops there except conscripts, and they few in number. I hope to give you details as to late battles by this evening. I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry.


    GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
    Major-General, Commanding.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 19, Part 1, Page 70.

McClellan outlines here a plan of inaction.  He still imagines Lee his superior in numbers, still commits to no forward movement.  His army was battered and disorganized, but so was Lee's.  There was not in McClellan a will to action.