July 1, 1863 (Wednesday): Contact

Barlow's Knoll After First Day's Battle

HARRISBURG, PA., July 1, 1863-12. 45 a. m. (Received 1. 35 a. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
     Information just received, 12. 45 a. m., leads to the belief that the concentration of the forces of the enemy will be at Gettysburg rather than at Chambersburg. The movement on their part is very rapid and hurried. They returned from Carlisle in the direction of Gettysburg by way of the Petersburg pike. Firing about Petersburg and Dillsburg this p. m. continued some hours. Meade should by all means be informed, and be prepared for a sudden attack from Lee's whole army.


      H. HAUPT,
      Brigadier-General.

(Sent to General Meade be courier from Frederick, at 2 p. m. ; copy to General Schenck.)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Nine Miles east of Middleburg, July 1, 1863-7 a. m.
(Received 4 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
   Dispatches of General Couch and General Haupt received. My positions to-day are, one corps at Emmitsburg, two at Gettysburg, one at Taneytown, one at Two Taverns, one at Manchester, one at Hanover. These movements were ordered yesterday, before the receipt of advices of Lee's movements. Our cavalry, under Kilpatrick, had a handsome fight yesterday at Hanover. He reports the capture of 1 battle-flag, a lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, with 15 or 20 of the enemy killed. The point of Lee's concentration and the nature of the country, when ascertained, will determine whether I attack him or not. Shall advise you further to-day, when satisfied that the enemy are fully withdrawn from the Susquehanna. If General Couch has any reliable force. I shall call upon him to move it to aid me.


     GEO. G. MEADE,
     Major-General, Commanding.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1863-10. 45 a. m.
Major-General MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
     The movements of the enemy yesterday indicate his intention to either turn your left, or to come himself by the South Mountain and occupy Cumberland Valley. Do not let him draw you too far to the east.


     H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief.


TANEYTOWN, July 1, 1863-12 m.
General HALLECK:
Dispatch sent last night giving my position at Emmitsburg, Gettysburg, and Hanover. Ewell is massing at Heidlersburg. A. P. Hill is massed behind the mountains at Cashtown. Longstreet somewhere between Chambersburg and the mountains. The news proves my advance has answered its purpose. I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one. A battle-field is being selected to the rear, on which the army can be rapidly concentrated, on Pike Creek, between Middleburg and Manchester, covering my depot at Westminster. If I am not attacked, and I can from reliable intelligence have reason to believe I can attack with reasonable degree of success, I will do so; but at present, having relieved the pressure on the Susquehanna, I am now looking to the protection of Washington, and fighting my army to the best advantage.

1 P. M.
The enemy are advancing in force on Gettysburg, and I expect the battle will begin to-day.

     GEO. G. MEADE.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 1, 1863.
[General SEDGWICK:]
    DEAR SEDGWICK: I transmit herewith an order directing that General Newton assume the command of the First Corps. General Meade wishes him to proceed to the front with all possible dispatch. It is with great regret I inform you that General Reynolds was killed in the engagement of to-day in front of Gettysburg. We have as yet none of the particulars of his death. There is nothing very recent from the front. The enemy appear to be concentrating, and I suppose to-morrow a great battle will be fought. I remain, very truly, yours,




    S. WILLIAMS.


HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 1, 1863-3. 20 p. m.
     I am satisfied that Longstreet and Hill have made a junction. A tremendous battle has been raging since 9. 30 a. m., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and within short cannon-range of this town. The enemy's line is a semicircle on the height, from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my option, there seems to be no directing person.


      JNO. BUFORD,
      Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

     General Pleasonton.
     P. S. -We need help now.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 1, 1863-6 p. m.
(Received 10. 20 p. m., via Frederick City.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
     The First and Eleventh Corps have been engaged all day in front of Gettysburg. The Twelfth, Third, and Fifth have been moving up, and all, I hope, by this time on the field. This leaves only the Sixth, which will move up to-night. General Reynolds was killed this morning early in the action. I immediately sent up General
Hancock to assume command. A. P. Hill and Ewell are certainly concentrating; Longstreet's whereabouts I do not know. If he is not up to-morrow, I hope with the force I have concentrated to defeat Hill and Ewell. At any rate, I see no other course than to hazard a general battle. Circumstances during the night may alter this decision, of which I will try to advise you. I have telegraphed Couch that if he can threaten Ewell's rear from Harrisburg without endangering himself, to do so.


     GEO. G. MEADE,
     Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS, Taneytown, July 1, 1863-7. 30 p. m.
Major-General SEDGWICK:
    GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs me to say that a general battle seems to be impending to-morrow at Gettysburg; that it is of the utmost importance that your command should be up. He directs that you stop all trains that impede your progress, or turn them out of the road. Your march will have to be a forced one to reach the scene of action, where we shall probably be largely outnumbered without your presence.
      If any shorter road presents itself, without difficulty in getting up, you will use your discretion in taking it, and report the facts to these headquarters. General Sykes has been ordered up from Hanover to Gettysburg, and General Slocum from Littlestown; General Hancock's corps from here. The whole army are there (Gettysburg), or under way for that point. The general desires you to report here in person, without delay, the moment you receive this. He is waiting to see you here before going to the front. I am, very respectfully,


      DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
      Major-General, Chief of Staff.

[P. S.]-The trains will all go to Westminster and Union Bridge, as ordered.



WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1863-9. 15 p. m.
Major-General MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
     Yours of 12 m. received. Your tactical arrangements for battle seem good, so far as I can judge from my     knowledge of the character of the country; but in a strategic view are you not too far east, and may not Lee attempt to turn your left and cut you off from Frederick? Please give your full attention to this suggestion. Lowell's cavalry was sent this morning to escort the stores from Harper's Ferry. This will relieve General French to obey your orders. The destruction of unguarded property on the canal along the Potomac has been terrible. Will not Frederick become a better base of supplies than Westminster? In anticipation of this, I have directed General Schenck to guard that road as well as he can. I have ordered General Couch to co-operate with you as far as possible; but I fear very little reliance can be placed on his troops in an emergency.


     H. W. HALLECK,
     General-in-Chief.

GREENWOOD, July 1, 1863.
Brigadier General J. D. IMBODEN, Commanding, &c:
     GENERAL: I have received your letter of 7 a. m. yesterday, from near Mercersburg. I regret the capture of Captain Irwin and part of his company at McConnellsburg, especially as it appears to have
been the result of want of proper caution on his part. I hope it will have the effect of teaching proper    circumspection in future.
      Upon arriving at Chambersburg to-day, I desire you to relieve General Pickett, who will then move forward to this place. You will, of course, establish guards on the roads leading to your position, and take every precaution for the safety of your command. Obtain all the flour that you can load in your wagons from the mills in your vicinity, and if you cannot get sufficient, I believe there are 700 or 800 barrels at Shippensburg, about 10 miles north of Chambersburg, on the Carlisle road. You must turn off every body belonging to the army on the road to Gettysburg. The reserve trains of the army are parked between Greenwood and Cashtown, on said road, and tomorrow I desire you to move up to this place, establish yourself so as to command the cross-roads and roads leading into town, throw out pickets on the roads to Shippensburg, New Guilford, Chambersburg, and Greencastle, and establish a separate picket at Greencastle, to turn off all persons seeking the army by the direct road from Greencastle to Greenwood. It will be necessary for to have your men well together and always on the alert, and to pay strict attention to the safety of the trains, which are for the present placed under your charge, and upon the safety of which the operations of this army depend.
     You will at the same time have an opportunity of organizing your troops, refreshing them for a day or two, and getting everything prepared for active operations in the field, for which you will be speedily wanted.
Sent word to General Pickett at this place to-morrow, which is 8 miles from Chambersburg, the hour when you will arrive here, in order that he may be prepared to move on your arrival. My headquarters for the present will be at Cashtown, east of the mountains.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


     R. E. LEE,
     General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 1, Pages 70-72, Series I, Vol. 3 Pages 464, 467, 474, 924, 947, 948.


The facts of the first day at Gettysburg are so well known as to need no restatement.  But it is instructive to read these messages in light not of how events transpired, but of what was known at the time.

June 30, 1863 (Tuesday): Not Going to be Outflanked by Hooker

Chambersburg, PA

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 30, 1863-10. 45 a. m.
Major-General COUCH:
    I am in position between Emmitsburg and Westminster, advancing upon the enemy. The enemy (A. P. Hill) holds Cashtown Pass, between Gettysburg and Chambersburg. Their cavalry, three to five brigades, are on my right, between me and the Northern Central.
     My force is tolerably well concentrated, moving with all the speed that the trains, roads. and physique of the min will bear. I am without definite and positive information as to the whereabouts of Longstreet and Ewell. The latter I presume to be in front of you. The army is in good spirits, and we shall push to your relief or the engagement of the enemy as circumstances and the information we receive during the day and on the marches may indicate as most prudent and most likely to lead to ultimate success. I am anxious to hear from you, and get information of the dispositions of the enemy and his movements, so far as you know them. If you are in telegraphic communication or otherwise with Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, I should like supplies and shoes accumulated, to be thrown to me on the line of the Northern Central or the Susquehanna, as circumstances may require or my movements may make most desirable. Please communicate my dispatch to the General-in-Chief; my communications with him are intercepted by the cavalry of the enemy on my right. Can you keep the enemy from crossing the river? Very respectfully, &c.,



     GEO. G. MEADE,
     Major-General, Commanding.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Taneytown,
June 30, 1863-11. 30 a. m.
General [REYNOLDS]:
    Your dispatch is received. The enemy undoubtedly occupy the Cumberland Valley, from Chambersburg, in force; whether the holding of the Cashtown Gap is to prevent our entrance, or is their advance against us, remains to be seen. With Buford at Gettysburg and Mechanicstown, and a regiment in front of Emmitsburg, you ought to be advised in time of their approach. In case of an advance in force either against you or Howard at Emmitsburg, you must fall back to that place, and I will re-enforce you from the corps nearest to you, which are Sickle's, at Taneytown, and Slocum's, at Littlestown. You are advised of the general position of the army. We are as concentrated as my present information of the position of the enemy justifies. I have pushed out the cavalry in all directions to feel for them, and so soon as I can make up any positive opinion as to their position, I will move again. In the meantime, if they advance against me, I must concentrate at that point where they show the strongest force. Please get all the information you can, and post yourself up in the roads and routes of communication. The only news we have beyond yours is that Stuart, with a large cavalry force, was in Westminster last night, and moved toward Gettysburg. Supposed the same force that has been ravaging in our rear.
     Truly, yours,


     GEO. G. MEADE,
     Major-General.

P. S. -If, after occupying your present position, it is your judgement that you would be in better position at Emmitsburg than where you are, you can fall back without waiting for the enemy or further orders. Your present position was given more with a view to an advance on Gettysburg, than a defensive point.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,
Gettysburg, June 30, 1863.
     I entered this place to-day at 11 a. m/   Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement on account of the enemy's advance upon this place. He had approached to within half a mile of the town when the head of my column entered. His force was terribly exaggerated by reasonable and truthful but inexperienced men. On pushing him back toward Cashtown, I learned from reliable men that [R. H]. Anderson's division was marching from Chambersburg by Mummasburg, Hunterstown, Abbottstown, on toward York. I have sent parties to the two first-named places, toward Cashtown, and a strong force toward Littlestown. Colonel Gamble has just sent me word that Lee signed a pass for a citizen this morning at Chambersburg. I can't do much just now. My men and horses are fagged out. I have not been able to get any grain yet. It is all in the country, and the people talk instead of working. Facilities for shoeing are nothing. Early's people seized every shoe and nail they could find.
     I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    JNO. BUFORD,
    Brigadier-General of Volunteers.
     General Pleasonton.

[P. S]-The troops that are coming here were the same I found early this morning at Millesburg or Farfield. General Reynolds has been advised of all that I know.

[Indorsment]

This information contradicts Kilpatrick's, of Lee being in Berlin.


      A. PLEASONTON,
     Major-General, Commanding.

HARRISBURG, PA., June 30, 1863.
(Received 5. 30 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
As telegraphed previously, part of the rebel forces, if not all, have fallen back toward Chambersburg, passing Shippensburg last night in great haste. I expect every moment to hear that my cavalry, under General Smith, has reoccupied Carlisle. My latest information is that Early, with his 8,000 men, went toward Gettysburg or Hanover, saying they expected to fight a great battle there. At Carlisle they said they were not going to be outflanked by Hooker.


     D. N. COUCH,
     Major-General.


HARRISBURG, PA., June 30, 1863.
(Received 6. 15 p. m.)
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
     Scouts report a force of rebels having left Carlisle this morning by the Baltimore pike, and that Ewell, from    York, went northwesterly, which would unite their two forces.


     D. N. COUCH,
     Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Pages  67, 419, 420, 434. 023.

The armies are moving toward each other without full information as to where the various elements are located.  As seen by the dispatches, rebel troops were often not even aware of the Union change in command.  Contact is less than 24 hours away at Gettysburg.

June 29, 1863 (Monday): Attack Richmond?

Defenses of Richmond

WHITE HOUSE, VA.,
June 29, 1863-10. 45 a. m.
(Received June 30, 9 a. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    I called to-day a council of my general officers. There were present Major-General Peck and Brigadier-Generals Gordon, Terry, Getty, Harland, and Foster. I submitted to them the proposition whether it would be advisable, with the force I have, to make an attack on Richmond. Their opinion, without knowing mine, was promptly and unanimously given in the negative. I have deemed it proper to advise you of the result of my consultation with them, and of my concurrence with them. I have planned a very important movement, which will be made the day after to-morrow, and will occupy four days. A demonstration against Richmond will be made at the same time. Wise is at Bottom's Bridge, and Pickett between Hanover Junction and Richmond. Our pickets are in sight of the enemy, near Tunstall's Station. It ha been raining most of the day. I will write you by mail.


     JOHN. A. DIX,
     Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Page 412.

Lost sight of in most accounts of the Gettysburg campaign is the presence of Union troops so near to Richmod.  Dix had perhaps 20,000 men with which to threaten the capital, the Confederacy a lesser number, much of which consisted of scratch troops put together on an ad hoc basis.  When Dix speaks of Pickett at Hanover Junction, it is of a small portion of his command retained for the defense of Richmond when they were recalled from around Petersburg.  Could Dix have taken Richmond?  The works around the city would have represented a significant obstacle, but the atempt should perhaps have been made for at least the psychological impact on the administration and public opinion.

June 28, 1863 (Sunday): "..move in the direction of Gettysburg."

General Richard S. Ewell

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

           Chambersburg, June 28, 1863, 7.30 a.m.

Lieut. Gen. R. S. EWELL,
            Commanding Corps:

   GENERAL:  I wrote you last night, stating that General Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and is advancing by way of Middletown, the head of his column being at that point in Frederick County.  I directed you in that letter to move your forces to this point.  If  you have not already progressed on the road, and if you have no good reason against it, I desire you to move in the direction of Gettysburg, via Heidlersburg, where you will have turnpike most of the way, and you can thus join your other divisions to Early's, which is east of the mountains.  When you come to Heidlersburg, you can either move directly on Gettysburg or turn down to Cashtown.  Your trains and heavy artillery you can send, if you think proper, on the road to Chambersburg.  But if the roads which your troops take are good, they had better follow you.*

     R. E. LEE,
          General.

* Noted in letter-book as copied from memory.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Page 944.

Ewell was farthest in advance and, on reports of Hooker crossing the Potomac, had to be called back closer to the main body of Lee's army.  Notice here how many of Lee's instructions are either conditional or permit discretion.

June 27, 1863 (Saturday): Hooker Releived

General George Meade

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 27, 1863
GENERAL-IN-CHIEF AND WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington:
    General Hooker personally has just left here for Harper's Ferry, where he will be about 11 o'clock, Point of Rocks about 10 a. m., and at Frederick to-night. Copies of all dispatches should be sent to Frederick and Harper's Ferry up to 11 a. m., and after that to Frederick. The staff are just leaving here for Frederick.


     DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
     Major-General, Chief of Staff.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 27, 1863-10. 30 a. m.
General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:
    Major [James C.] Duane and Captain [George H.] Mendell were ordered to your army, and it is presumed that they are en route. I do not know where they now are, unless in your army. Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity.


     H. W. HALLECK,
     General-in-Chief.


SANDY HOOK, June 27, 1863
(Received 2. 55 p. m.)
Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find 10, 000 men here, in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river, and, as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service. Now they are but a bait for the rebels, should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War and His Excellency the President.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.


SANDY HOOK, June 27, 1863-1 p. m.
(Received 3 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
 

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 27, 1863-8 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:
Your application to be relieved from your present command is received. As you were appointed to this command by the President, I have no power to relieve you. Your dispatch has been duly referred for Executive action.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1863.
Major General GEORGE G. MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
    GENERAL: You will receive with this the order of the President placing you in command of the Army of the Potomac. Considering the circumstances, no one ever received a more important command; and I cannot doubt that you will fully justify the confidence which the Government has reposed in you. You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him so as to give him battle. All forces within the sphere of your operations will be held subject to your orders. Harper's Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders. You are authorized to remove from command, and to send from your army, any officer or other person you may deem proper, and to appoint to command as you may deem expedient. In fine, general, you are intrusted with all the power and authority which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief can confer on you, and you may rely upon our full support. You will keep me fully informed of all your movements, and the positions of your own troops and those of the enemy, so far as known. I shall always be ready to advise and assist you to the utmost of my ability. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Pages 59-61.

Hooker went to Harper's Ferry to determine whether to withdraw the force there.  In the meantime he was ordered to defend Maryland Heights.  This took 10,000 men (of questionable value to begin with) away from him while still requiring him to leave sufficient force to cover Washington and Baltimore.  Believing his forces too much divided with Lee on the move, Hooker asked to be relieved.  It appears, from contemporary testimony, Lincoln had already decided in the morning to replace him.  Thus the Army of the Potomac changed commanders within within a week of the Battle of Gettysburg.
 

June 26, 1863 (Friday): Hooker AWOL?

The Winder Building (Halleck's HQ)

POOLESVILLE, June 26, 1863-6 p. m.
Major T. T. ECKERT:
     Dispatch* received. My compliments to the President, and inform him that I had not that honor.


     JOSEPH HOOKER,
     Major-General.


June 26, 1863-8 p. m. (Received 9. 10 p. m.)
His Excellency President LINCOLN:
     You need not believe any more than you choose of what is published in the Associated Press dispatches concerning this army tomorrow. Was it from the newspapers that you received a report, or an idea, that I was in Washington last night?


     JOSEPH HOOKER,
     Major-General.


WASHINGTON, June 27, 1863-8 a. m.
Major-General HOOKER:
    It did not come from the newspapers, nor did I believe it, but I wished to be entirely sure it was a falsehood.


     A. LINCOLN

 *Not found. Probably this refers to a report that General Hooker was in Washington on the night of the 25th. See dispatch, following, from Hooker to the President, June 26, 1863, 8 p. m.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Page 58.

Lincoln liked Hooker, but he had doubts.  There were reports in the newspapers on the 26th that Hooker was absent from the army without authority, visiting Washington.  In a conversation with the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, he would betray some doubts about Hooker.  The next morning (the 27th) Lincoln responded as shown here.  The day after, Hooker requested to be relieved and Lincoln accepted, replacing him with Meade. 

June 25, 1863 (Thursday): "...standing on my head or my feet."

General Joseph Hooker

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 24, 1863.
Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    The aspect of the enemy is not much changed from yesterday. Ewell, I conclude, is over the river, and now is up the country, I suppose, for purposes of plunder. The yeomanry of that district should be able to check any extended advance of that column, and protect themselves from their aggression.
    Of the troops that marched to the river at Shepherdstown yesterday, I cannot learn that any have crossed, and as soon as I do I shall commence moving, myself, and, indeed, am preparing my new acquisitions for that event; the others are ready. General French is now on his way to Harper's Ferry, and I have given directions for the force at Poolesville to march and report to him, and also for all of Stahel's cavalry, and, if I can do it without attracting observation, I shall send over a corps or two from here, in order, if possible, to sever Ewell from the balance of the rebel army, in case he should make a protracted sojourn with his Pennsylvania neighbors.
    If the enemy should conclude not to throw any additional force over the river, I desire to make Washington secure, and, with all the force I can muster, strike for his line of retreat in the direction of Richmond.
   I cannot learn the strength of Heintzelman's and Schenck's commands, nor where they are stationed, and hence I send my chief of staff to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also to start out a column of about 15, 000 men on the National road as far as Frederick City. In any contingency, whether of an advance or retreat of the enemy, the defense of Washington or Baltimore, this amount of force should be there, and they should be held in readiness to march, which fact I will not be able to know until I put them on the road. I will send the best officers I have to command this body. I desire that instructions may be given Generals Heintzelman and Schenck to direct their commands to obey promptly any orders they may receive from me.
Last evening the colonel commanding at Poolesville responded to his orders to march that he did not belong to my command, but would refer his orders to General Heintzelman. Such delays may bring us reverses.     When these instructions are given, I shall not be necessitated to repeat orders to any part of my command to march on the enemy.
      Allow me to suggest that the new troops arriving in Baltimore and Washington be at once put in the defenses, and the old ones, excepting those serving with the artillery, be put in marching condition. If this should be done quickly, I think that we may anticipate glorious results from the recent movement of the enemy, whether he should determine to advance or retreat.
    I request that my orders be sent me to-day, for outside of the Army of the Potomac I don't know whether I am standing on my head or feet.
    I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General, Commanding.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Pages 57-58.

Hooker had been informed directly by Lincoln he answered to Halleck.  Despite this, he still wanted to be in control of other forces in the Area outside the Army of the Potomac.  Like McClellan before him his focus strayed from the task at hand to questions of authority.  

June 24, 1863 (Wednesday): Stuart Makes Arrangements

General B. H. Robertson

HDQRS. CAV. DIV., ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 24, 1863.

Brigadier General B. H. ROBERTSON,
Commanding Cavalry:
    GENERAL: Your own and General Jones` brigades will cover the front of Ashby`s and Snicker`s Gaps, yourself, as senior officer, being in command.
    Your object will be to watch the enemy; deceive him as to our designs, and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.
    After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper`s Ferry, cross the Potomac, and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.
    As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise ordered by General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, or myself, hold the Gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.
    If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the Valley clear of what pertains to the army, and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it.
     You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.
    I send instructions for General Jones, which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency of your command, and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses, and to marching off of the turnpike.
    In case of an advance of the enemy, you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions and,if possible, you will prevent him from gaining possession of the Gaps.
     In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can, compatible with previous instructions.
    You will have with the two brigades two batteries of horse artillery.
    Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


     J. E. B. STUART,
    Major-General, Commanding.


[P. S.]-Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to-morrow morning, unless compelled to do so.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Page 928.

Robertson had a relatively small command of two North Carolina cavalry brigades.  His command and that of Grumble Jones were to hold the gaps until the Union Army followed Lee North and then to move on to the Confederate right flank and communicate with the commands in that area. Staying on the right and in communication is what Stuart himself was supposed to be doing.  But he took a wider circuit east than intended by Lee.

 

June 23, 1863 (Tuesday): The Culpeper Plan

Hanover Court House, Virginia

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 23, 1863.
His Excellency President DAVIS, Richmond:
    Mr. PRESIDENT: The season is now so far advanced as to render it improbable that the enemy will undertake active operations on the Carolina and Georgia coast before the return of frost. This impression is confirmed by the statements contained in Northern papers, that part of General Hunter`s force had gone to re-enforce General Banks, and that Admiral Foote, the successor of Admiral DuPont in the command of the South Atlantic fleet, lies dangerously ill, a circumstance that will tend further to embarrass any designs the enemy may entertain of operating against the cities of the seaboard. Federal papers of the 19th allude to the frequent arrival or departure of troops and munitions at Old Point, and those of the 20th announce the arrival of General Peck and staff in Washington, without indicating the object of his visit, further than it may be connected with the movements just referred to.
    At this distance, I can see no benefit to be derived from maintaining a large force on the southern coast during the unhealthy months of the summer and autumn, and I think that a part, at least, of the
troops in North Carolina, and of those under General Beauregard, can be employed at this time to great advantage in Virginia.
    If an army could be organized under the command of General Beauregard, * and pushed forward to Culpeper Court-House, threatening Washington from that direction, it would not only effect a diversion most favorable for this army, but would, I think, relieve us of any apprehension of an attack upon Richmond during our absence. The well known anxiety of the Northern Government for the safety of its capital would induce it to retain a large force for its defense, and thus sensibly relieve the opposition to our advance. Last summer, you will remember, that troops were recalled from Hilton Head, North Carolina, and Western Virginia for the protection of Washington, and there can be little doubt that if our present movements northward are accompanied by a demonstration on the south side of the Potomac, the coast would be again relieved, and the troops now on the Peninsula and south of the Potomac be withdrawn.
    If success should attend the operations of this army, and what I now suggest would greatly increase the probability of that result, we might even hope to compel the recall of some of the enemy`s troops from the west. I think it most important that, whatever troops be used for the purpose I have named, General Beauregard be placed in command, and that his department be extended over North Carolina and Virginia. His presence would give magnitude to even a small demonstration, and tend greatly to perplex and confound the enemy. Of course, the larger the force that we can employ the better, but should you think it imprudent to withdraw a part of General Beauregard`s army for the purpose indicated, I think good results would follow from sending forward, under General Beauregard, such of the troops about Richmond and in North Carolina as could be spared for a short time.
     The good effects of beginning to assemble an army at Culpeper Court-House would, I think, soon become apparent, and the movement might be increased in importance as the result might appear to justify. Should you agree with me, I need not say that it is desirable that the execution of the plan proposed should immediately begin. The enemy will hear of it soon enough, and a proper reticence on the part of our papers will cause them to attribute greater importance to it. I need not mention the benefit that the troops themselves would derive from being transferred to a more healthy climate.
     Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


     R. E. LEE,
     General.

* See Davis to Lee, June 28, Part I, p. 76, and Cooper to Lee, June 29, Part I, p. 75.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Pages 924-925.

Davis reacted, through Seddon, with some surprise.  Seddon said Davis was "embarrassed" to learn of the Culpeper plan as he was heretofore unaware of any such design by Lee.  In any case, the authorities at Richmond were still concerned about Union forces east of Richmond under Dix.  Although they were few in number, small bodies of Union cavalry had already made themselves a concern by coming closer and closer to Richmond.  In a fact noted by Seddon, 1,000 Union horsemen had gotten to Hanover, causing much consternation, immediately after the force guarding the city north of Richmond had been sent off to Lee.  There would be no more troops given to Lee for his campaign.

June 22, 1863 (Monday): "I have not heard from him since."

Sketch of 1st Virginia Cavalry

HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1863-3. 30 p. m.
Lieutenant General R. S. EWELL,
Commanding, &c.:
     GENERAL: I have just received your letter of this morning from opposite Shepherdstown. Mine of to-day, authorizing you to move toward the Susquehanna, I hope has reached you ere this. After dispatching my letter, learning that the enemy had not renewed his attempts of yesterday to break through the Blue Ridge, I directed General R. H. Anderson`s division to commence its march toward Shepherdstown. It will reach there to-morrow. I also directed General Stuart, should the enemy have so far retired from his front
as to permit of the departure of a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across the Potomac, and place himself on your right and in communication with you, keep you advised of the movements of the enemy, and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I have not heard from him since. I also directed Imboden, if opportunity offered, to cross the Potomac, and perform the same offices on your left. I shall endeavor to get General Early`s regiments to him as soon as possible. I do not know what has become of the infantry of the Maryland Line. I had intended that to guard Winchester.
     I am, most respectfully, yours,


      R. E. LEE,
      General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Page 915.

Lee believes he has already directed Stuart to take the route indicated, but Longstreet (who held the note from Lee) did not give it to him until 7 p.m. on this date.  Stuart did, in fact, make the Hopewell Gap, but then went further east and subsequently did not maintain contact with Ewell.  As to as collecting supplies for the army, perhaps this phrase was taken by Stuart to a degree to authorize his subsequent "wagon hunting" expedition.     

June 21, 1863 (Sunday): Pemberton Plots An Escape

Defenses and Siege Lines Around Vicksburg

VICKSBURG, June 21, 1863.

General Johnston:
    Your dispatches of the 14th and 16th received.  If it is absolutely impossible, in your opinion, to raise the siege with our combined forces, and that nothing more can be done than to extricate the garrsion, I suggest that, giving me full information in time to act, you move by the north of the railroad, drive in the enemy's pickets at night, and at daylight next morning engage him heavily with skirmishers, occupying him during the entire day, and that on that night I move by the Warrenton road, by Hankinson's Ferry, to which point you should previously send a brigade of cavalry, with two field batteries, to build a bridge there, and hold that ferry; also Hall's and Baldwin's, to cover my crossing at Hankinson's.  I shall not be able to move with my artillery or wagons.  I suggest this as the best plan, because all the other roads are too strongly intrenched and the enemy in too heavy force for a reasonable prospect of success, unless you move in sufficient force to compel hm to abandon his communications with Snyder's, which I still hope we may be able to do.  I await your orders.  Captain [J. M.] Couper understands all my views, and will explain further.

     J. C. PEMBERTON.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 24, Part 3, Page 969.

Johnston had advocated Pemberton not retreat into Vicksburg and now he was there did little to relieve him.  Here Pemberton draws up a plan to remove the garrison during a diversion by Johnston.  In the end, Johnston could not organize his forces so as to accomplish Pemberton's relief, and the Confederacy would lose not only Vicksburg, but 30,000 soldiers

June 20, 1863 (Saturday): Lee Looks West

The Union Army at Edwards Ferry (Harpers Weekly)

BERRYVILLE, June 20, 1863.

General Samuel Jones,
   Commanding, &c, Dublin, Va:
   GENERAL:  General Milroy has been driven out of Winchester and Martinsburg with a loss of about 4,000 prisoners, thirty pieces of cannon, a large wagon train, &c., and has crossed the Potomac, occupying with the rest of his troops Maryland Heights, retaining a mere picket in Harper's Ferry.
   The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad has been cut by our cavalry east of the Pont of Rocks, and General Imboden has destroyed the important bridges over the Little Cacapon, Patterson's Creek, North and South Branches of the Potomac, &c., and the tanks, depots, engines, &c., from Cacapon to Cumberland, included.
   General Hooker has abandoned the line of the Rappahannock, and fallen back toward the Potomac.
   General Ewell's corps is in Maryland, and his advanced cavalry occupies Chambersburg.
    I think the present offers to you a favorable time to threaten Western Virginia, and, if circumstances favor, you might convert the threat into a real attack.  A more favorable opportunity will probably not occur during the war, and, if you can accomplish nothing else, you may at least prevent the troops in that region from being sent to re-enforce other points.
   I would recommend, therefore, that you unite all your available forces, and strike at some vulnerable point.
   Wishing you great success, I am, general, with great respect, your obedient servant.

     R. E. LEE,
          General.

Official Records, Series I., Volume 27, Part 3, Page 906.

It is often overlooked that other theaters of the war were affected by the Gettysburg campaign.  The Union still had a sizable force in eastern Virginia with which to threaten Richmond, and the Confederates retained a small army under Jones with which communication to Western Pennsylvania and Ohio could be threatened in West Virginia.  Lee's style of management, his tendency to give orders which left commanders with flexibility in execution of his orders, is on full display here.

June 19, 1863 (Friday): "The movements of General Hooker's army are not yet ascertained."

Castleman's (Snicker's) Ferry (usgwararchives.net)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 19, 1863---7 a.m.

Lieut. Gen. R. S. EWELL
Commanding, &c.:
    GENERAL: Your two letters of the 18th instant (one from 4 miles north of Winchester and one from 4 miles north of Martinsburg) have been received.
   Hood's division was sent yesterday from Upperville to replace Early's, in order that you might have with you your whole corps to operate with in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but later in the day the reprts from General Stuart indicated that the enemy were moving up the roads concentrating at  Snickersville, with the view of forcing a passage through the mountains to ge into your rear, and Hood was directed to cross Snicker's Ferry, and hold Snicker's Gap, as we had only cavalry on that route.  Longstreets corp has been operating with a view to embarrass the enemy as to our movements, so as to detain his forces east of the mountains, until A. P. Hill could get up to your support.  But should the enemy force a passage through the mountains, you would be separated, which it is the object of Longstreet to prevent, if possible.  Anderson's division ought to be within reach to-day, and I will move him toward Berryville, so as either to relieve Early or support Hood, as circumstances may require.  I very much regret that you have not the benefit of your whole corps, for, with that north of the Potomac, should we be able to detain General Hooker's army from following you, you would be able to accomplish as much, unmolested, as the whole army could perform with General Hooker in its front.  Not knowing what force there is at Harper's Ferry, or what can be collected to oppose your progress, I cannot give definite instructions, especially as the movements of General Hooker's army are not yet ascertained.  You must, therefore, be guided in your movements by controlling circumstances around you, endeavor to keep yourself supplied with provisions, so far as your judgment may seem fit.  If your advance causes Hooker to cross the Potomac, or separate his army in any way, Longsteet can follow you.  The last of Hill's divisions had, on the evening of the 18th, advanced a few miles this side of Culpeper Court-House, en route to the Valley.  I hope all are now well on their way.  As soon as I can get definite information as to the movements of General Hooker and the approach of General Hill, I will write to you again.
   I am, very respectfully, and truly,


   R. E. LEE,
   General.

Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Page 905.

Hooker did not know where Lee was, but Lee also did not know the exact disposition of Hooker's forces.  The fear was that, by forcing a passage of the mountains, Union forces could interpose between the Confederate corps and defeat them in detail.  Once Lee knew for sure Hooker was north of the Potomac, a more rapid advance north could occur.  Meantime, Ewell was free to press northward, Longstreet would gaurd the gaps, and Hill would continue to march from Culpeper to the Valley.

June 18, 1863 (Thursday): "All is yet mere conjecture..."

Aldie Battlefield (CivilWarAlbum.com)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 18, 1863.
{Received 7. 50 a. m.

Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    At my last advises from Pleasonton, he had captured 8 officers and the greater portion of two squadrons of Fitz Lee's brigade of Stuart's cavalry, and driven them out of Aldie. My instructions to him were to find out what was behind them. At 1 a. m. we received advises that looked as though White, with 400 cavalry, was at Point of Rocks. The Twelfth Corps was immediately ordered to Leesburg, and to hold it and the fords of the Potomac in that vicinity. I ought to have had a large cavalry force and two regiments of infantry at the mouth of the Monocacy last night. Having no means of telegraphic communication there, I am unadvised as to their arrival, and unable to give them orders by telegraph. A bridge sufficient to cross the Potomac is also to be at that point at noon today.


      JOSEPH HOOKER,
      Major-General.


WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 18, 1863 - 11 a. m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:
     I can get no information of the enemy other than that sent to you.
     Rumors from Pennsylvania are too confused and contradictory to be relied on. Officers and citizens are on a big stampede. They are asking me why does not General Hooker tell where Lee's army is; he is nearest to it. There are numerous suppositions and theories, but all is yet mere conjecture. I only hope for positive information from your front. General Heintzelman has a signal line to Sugar Loaf Mountain, and is directed to send you all the information heobtains. General Kelly is observing the passes west of the Shenandoah, and will give you, through General Schenck, all information he can get. He is very reliable.


    H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Page 50.

Aldie controlled the Snicker's Gap Turnpike and Ashby's Gap Turnpike crossroads.  Pleasonton moved Gregg's Division of cavalry there in an attempt to penetrate the Confederate screen and provide information on Lee's deployments.  There they were checked by the 2nd and 3rd Virginia Cavalry under Munford, leaving Hooker still in the dark as to the whereabouts of most of Lee's troops.  It is evident Hooker still regards Lee's activity as primarily consisting of a soon to be launched cavalry raid by Stuart, as opposed to the invasion it would become. 

June 17, 1863 (Wednesday): Longstreet Turns West

Markham, Virginia (http://www.fauquierhistory.com

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Markham, June 17, 1863-3. 30 p. m.
Lieutenant General JAMES LONGSTREET,
Commanding Corps:
    GENERAL: Your note of 10 a. m. to-day just received. I have heard nothing of the movements of General Hooker either from General Stuart or yourself, and, therefore, can form no opinion of the best move against him. If a part of our force could have operated east of the mountains, it would have served more to confuse him, but as you have turned off to the Valley, and I understand all the trains have taken that route, I hope it is for the best. At any rate, it is too late to change from any information I have. You had better, therefore, push on, relieve Ewell`s division as soon as you can, and let him advance into Maryland, at least as far as Hagerstown. Give out it is against Harper`s Ferry. I will send back for A. P. Hill to move by Chester Gap. I wrote to you to-day and yesterday. I shall go from here to the Valley.
     Very respectfully, 


     R. E. LEE,
     General. 

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Page 900.

This memo to Longstreet suggests Lee at least initially desired Stuart to stay to the east of the mountains.  In fact, it appears Longstreet's turn west was not entirely in accordance with Lee's view of the optimal deployment of forces so as to conceal his intentions from Hooker.

 

June 16, 1863 (Tuesday): Hooker Sows the Seeds of his Removal

General Joseph Hooker

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Station,
June 15, 1863-Midnight.
[Received June 16, 1. 15 a. m.]
His Excellency the PRESIDENT:
    I have received your dispatch of this evening. The Army of the Potomac is in this vicinity, excepting the Second and Sixth Corps, and, as they are marching in rear of all the trains, they will not be up before some time tomorrow. Perhaps the Second Corps will not be here until some time during tomorrow night. The First and Eleventh Corps were first to arrive on this line, but I have not yet learned whether they have drawn their supplies in readiness to march tomorrow morning or not. As soon as they are provided, they, as well as the others, will be put an route. I have been informed that the enemy nowhere crossed the Rappahannock on our withdrawal from it, but General Hill's strops moved up the river in the direction of Culpeper this morning, for the purpose, I conclude, of re-enforcing Longstreet and Ewell, wherever they may be. I request that I may be informed what troops there are at Harper's Ferry, and who is in command of them, and also who is in command in this district.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.


FAIRFAX STATION,
June 16, 1863-7 a. m.
{Received 8. 35 a. m.

His Excellency President LINCOLN:
    It appears to me from General Couch's dispatch of last night, * received this a. m., that nearly all the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac should at once be sent into Maryland by the most direct route. General Stahel has an abundance to perform all cavalry duty that will be required south of the Potomac. I merely make the suggestion. If any considerable body of enemy's infantry should be thrown across the Potomac, they will probably take the direction of his advance pickets, and in that event it seems to me that a heavy column of ours should be thrown as speedily as possible across the river at Harper's Ferry, while another should be thrown over the most direct line covering Baltimore and Philadelphia. I only speak with reference to this army, as I know nothing of the location or numbers of troops at the disposal of the Government elsewhere.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.

*See Part III, p. 131. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 16, 1863-9. 40 p. m.
{Received 9. 50 p. m.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT:
     My orders are out to march at 3 o'clock tomorrow morning. It will be likely to be one of vigor and power. I am prepared to move without communications with any place for ten days. I hope to reach my objective point before the arrival of Hill's corps, should it be moving in that direction. If I do not know this fact, I will shortly, but of information to the north of the Potomac I really have nothing. I wish that it might be made the duty of some person in the telegraph office in Washington to keep me informed of the enemy's movements in Maryland.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Station,
June 16, 1863-11 a. m.
His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President, &tc.:
    Please accept my suggestions in regard to what should be done in the spirit with which they were give. They were suggestions merely, for I have not the data necessary to form an enlightened opinion on the case. Upon general principles, I thought those were the movements to make. You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the major-general commanding the army, and I can assure you so long as this continues we may look in vain for success, especially as future operations will require our relations to be more dependent upon each other than heretofore. It may be possible now to move to prevent a junction of A. P. Hill's corps with those of Ewell and Longstreet. If so, please let instructions to that effect be given me. As will appear to you, the chances for my doing this are much smaller than when I was on the Rappahannock, for, if he should hold the passes stoutly, he can cause me delay. You may depend upon it, we can never discover the whereabouts of the enemy, or divine his intentions, so long as he fills the country with a cloud of cavalry. We must break through that to find him.

 
     JOSEPH HOOKER,
     Major-General.


WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 16, 1863-11. 30 a. m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Fairfax Station:
    I do not think there is reliable information that the enemy has crossed the Potomac in any force. Where his main corps are, is still uncertain, and I know of no way to ascertain, excepting through your cavalry, which should be kept near enough to the enemy to at least be able to tell where he is. My suggestion of yesterday, to follow the enemy's advance, by moving a considerable force first to Leesburg, and thence as circumstances may require, is the best one I can make. Unless your army is kept near enough to the enemy to ascertain his movements, yours must be in the dark or on mere conjecture. Tyler is in command at Harper's Ferry, with, it is said, only 9, 000 men, but, according to returns of the 11th, he should have at least 13, 600. Heintzelman, as you must be aware, commands this department. Besides the divisions of Abercrombie and Stahel, near you, he has little or no movable troops. Telegraph direct to him in all matters connected with the use of his troops.


    H. W. HALLECK,
   General-in-Chief.


WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 16, 1863-3. 50 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:
    There is now no doubt that the enemy is surrounding Harper's Ferry, but in what force I have no information. General Schenck says our force there is much less than before reported, and cannot hold out very long.   He wished to know whether he may expect relief. He can hope for none, excepting from your army.


     H. W. HALLECK,
     General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Station,
June 16, 1863-4 p. m.
{Received 4, 50 p. m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
    Just received your telegram. Please inform me whether our forces at Harper's Ferry are in the town or on the height, and, if the latter, whether we hold Bolivar, Loudoun, or Maryland Heights, and which, if any; what bridges at Harper's Ferry, and where; from what direction is the enemy making his attack? I suppose it is a couple of long marches from here for troops without trains, but this, of course, will depend upon the position of the enemy.


     JOSEPH HOOKER,
     Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Station,
June 16, 1863-7. 30 p. m.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
    In compliance with your directions, I shall march to the relief of Harper's Ferry. I put my column again in motion at 3 a. m. tomorrow. i expect to reach there in two days, and, if possible, earlier. The partial rest of today was not lost, being necessary to recruit from forced and heavy marches and fill up supplies. My headquarters at Farrall [?] Station tomorrow night.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.

   {Copy to the President.}



WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 16, 1863-8. 20 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:
    Information of enemy's actual position and force in front of Harper's Ferry is as indefinite as that in your front. Nearly everything is conjecture. The only position of the enemy mentioned is Halltown. The bridges across both rivers at Harper's Ferry are believed to be intact, and most of Tyler's troops on Maryland Heights. Loudoun Heights are not fortified, but swept by Maryland batteries. your questions have been sent to Tyler, and his answer will be forwarded as soon as received. Any troops you can send to his relief should be in motion. a few of the enemy have shown themselves at Poolesville and Point of Rocks. No definite information of his movements from any place.


     H. W. HALLECK,
     General-in-Chief.



WASHINGTON,
June 16, 1863-10 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER:
    To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-Chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but as it seems to be differently understood, I shall direct him to give your orders and you to obey them. 


    A. LINCOLN.
    WASHINGTON, D. C.

 
June 16, 1863-10. 15 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:
    I have given no directions for your army to move to Harper's Ferry. I have advised the movement of a force, sufficiently strong to meet Longstreet, to ascertain where the enemy is, and then move to the relief of Harper's Ferry, or elsewhere, as circumstances might require.    With the remainder of your force in proper position to support this, I want you to push out your cavalry, to ascertain something definite about the enemy. You are in command of the Army of the Potomac, and will make the particular dispositions as you deem proper. I shall only indicate the objects to be aimed at. We have no positive information of any large force against Harper's Ferry, and it cannot be known whether it will be necessary to go there until you can feel the enemy and ascertain his whereabouts. 


     H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief. 


Official Records Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Page 47. 

Hooker had overplayed his hand.  His situation lent confusion, as he frequently recieved direct communication from the President and likely assumed he had more discretion than Lincoln intended.  Halleck played his cards close to his vest, but clearly was no booster of Hooker.  Lincoln finally resolves the situation by restating the obvious, that Hooker answered to Halleck.  It is remarkable in these dispatches the degree to which the administration and generals in the field had simply lost the Army of Northern Virginia, even to the point of not knowing which side of the Potomac it was.  Ewell's Corp was nearing the Potomac, with Rodes already across.  Longstreet had not crossed into the Valley, but was moving north just east of the mountain passes.  And A.P. Hill's Corp was strung out in a wide arc from Fredericksburg to Culpeper.  Jenkins Cavalry was at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and Stuart was near Marshall, headed toward Middleburg.
 

June 15, 1863 (Monday): A Proclamation

President Abraham Lincoln

WAR DEPARTMENT,
June 15, 1863.
By the President of the United States of America.
A PROCLAMATION.
    Whereas the armed insurrectionary combinations now existing in several of the States are threatening to make inroads into the States of Maryland, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, requiring immediately an additional force for the service of the United States: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, and of the militia of the several States when called into actual service, do hereby call into the service of the United States 100, 000 militia from the States following, namely: From the State of Maryland, 10, 000; from the State of Pennsylvania, 50, 000; from the State of Ohio, 30, 000; from the State of West Virginia, 10, 000; to be mustered into the service of the United States forth with, and to serve for the period of six months from the date of such muster into said service, unless sooner discharged; to be mustered in as infantry, artillery, and cavalry, in proportions which will be made known through the War Department, which Department will also designate the several places of rendezvous. These militia to be organized according to the rules and regulations of the volunteer service, and such orders as may hereafter be issued. The States aforesaid will be respectively under the enrollment act for the militia service rendered under this proclamation. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this fifteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh. 


    A. LINCOLN.

    By the President:
    WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
    Secretary of State. 

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Pages 136-137.

There was not a general panic in the North when Lee's Army headed for Pennsylvania, but it could not have gone unnoticed that yet again the Army of Northern Virginia had gone from the hunted to the hunter.  The proclamation reflects the problems which, invasion or no, the United States government was experiencing getting troops to volunteer for service.  War weariness was a definite part of the equation.

June 14, 1863 (Sunday): Halleck Prepares to Defend Pittsburgh

Battle of 2nd Winchester (Hotchkiss Map)

HARPER'S FERRY, W. VA.,
June 14, 1863--9 p.m.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
   Nothing from Winchester to-day, neither from the enemy nor General Schenck.  Heavy firing at Martinsburg heard for one and a half hours, ceasing at dusk.  Telegraphic communication ceased at 7 p.m. and result not known.  Enemy reported at Berryville and Smithfield.
   My force here is not as large as it should be, yet the troops are in good spirits, and will give a good account of themselves.


B. F. KELLEY,
Brigadier-General.


WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 14, 1863--2.20 p.m.

GENERAL W.T.H. BROOKS,
Pittsburgh, Pa.:

   Lee's army is in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley.  Pittsburgh and Wheeling should be put in defensible condition as rapidly as possible.

H. W. HALLECK
General-in-Chief.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 3, Pages 109, 113.

Late to understand the Confederate move north would be more than a cavalry raid, Halleck now had to organize his forces in the field for any eventuality.  As the crow flies, it is roughly 190 miles from Fredericksburg to Pittsburgh.  The trip up to Pittsburgh would have been over rough terrain for much of the way.  Lee was more likely to move, as he did, toward Central Pennsylvania.  Gettysburg lay only 110 miles away over better roads.  One of his aims, as during Imboden's raid during the Chancellorsville campaign, we to break the rail link between Washington and what was then the frontier country of Ohio and Western Pennsylvania.  On this day Ewell was finishing his attacks at Winchester, routing Milroy and taking over 4,000 prisoners.  As seen here Kelley, at Harper's Ferry, was unaware of the situation at Winchester, only 25 miles distant.

June 13, 1863 (Saturday): Lincoln and the Incendiary Shells

General Joseph Hooker

WASHINGTON,
June 13, 1863-11. 30 a. m.
Major-General HOOKER:
     I was coming down this afternoon, but if you prefer I should not, I shall blame you if you do not tell me so.


    A. LINCOLN,
    President.


EXECUTIVE MANSION,
June 12, 1863-2 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER: If you can show me a trial of the incendiary shells on Saturday night, I will try to join you at 5 p. m. that day. Answer.


     A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 12, 1863-6. 20 p. m. (Received 7 p. m.)
ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States:
    If I am not very much mistaken, I shall be constrained to move my army on to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad before that time. I have three corps near there this time. I presume that General Halleck showed you my dispatch of this morning; also please see copy of my dispatch to General Dix of today.


     JOSEPH HOOKER,
     Major-General.

 JUNE 13, 1863.
The PRESIDENT:
     Mr. PRESIDENT: it may be well not to come.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.

JUNE 13, 1863-7 p. m. (Received 7. 45 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK:
    All my sources of information confirm the statement that Longstreet`s and Ewell`s corps have passed through Culpeper and Sperryville, toward the Valley. The instructions of President, approved by yourself, and your original letter of instructions, compel me, in view of this movement of the enemy, to transfer the operations of this army from the line of the Aquia to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Accordingly, directions have been given for the First, Third Fifth, and Eleventh Corps to rendezvous at Manassas Junction with the cavalry. The Second, Sixth, and Twelfth, with the Reserve Artillery, after covering the withdrawal of Government property from depots, have been directed to march to Dumfries, and from thence to be governed by the movements of the enemy, the object being to bring the two wings together as far in advance on that line as tho movements of the enemy will justify. The corps will be withdrawn from their positions on the river to-night, the line being held by pickets until the proper time arrivers for their withdrawal. To-morrow p. m. my headquarters will be at Dumfries.


    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.



    JOSEPH HOOKER,
    Major-General.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Pages 37-38.

Lee has stolen a march on Hooker.  The Union general is making his first moves, but they are without benefit of understanding Lee's full intentions.  Therefore Hooker is keeping his deployed forces close to Washington, lest Lee cross the Potomac, turn southeast and move on the Capital. 

 

June 12, 1863 (Friday): Winchester Imperiled

Star Fort Winchester (http://www.shenandoah.stonesentinels.com)

Baltimore, MD., June 12, 1863-1 a. m.
Major General R. H. Milroy:
    Lieutenant-Colonel Piatt, as I learn by copy of dispatch sent me, which he forwarded to you from Harper's Ferry, misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded his instructions. You will make all the required preparations for withdrawing, but hold your position in the meantime . Be ready for movement, but await further orders . I doubt the propriety of calling in McReynolds' brigade at once. If you should fall back to Harper's Ferry, he will be in part on the way and covering your flank; but use your discretion as to any order to him. Below I give you a copy of the telegram of the General-in Chief. Nothing heard since. Give me constant information.


     Robt. C. Schenck,
     Major-General, Commanding.
 
[Copy of General Halleck's telegram.]

[Washington, June 11, 1863-12 p. m.]
    Harper's Ferry is the important place. Winchester is of no importance other than as a lookout . The Winchester troops, excepting enough to serve as an outpost, should be withdrawn to Harper's Ferry. [The troops at Martinsburg should also be ready to fall back on Harper's Ferry.] No large amount of supplies should be left in any exposed position.]


     H. W. Halleck.
    General-in-Chief.

Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 2, Page 50.

Lee got his army across the mountains and began moving down the Valley (north).  Ewell crossed at Chester Gap and headed for Winchester on the 12th.  Longstreet's Corp was protecting Ashby's and Snicker's Gap.  A.P. Hill was still in Fredericksburg, waiting for Hooker to make a move.  Halleck had been telling Schenck, Milroy's superior, since May to pull back from Winchester.  Schenck, however, believed Halleck was making only a suggestion and left Milroy in his exposed position.  It was a recipe for disaster, with Milroy's three brigades standing between Ewell's Corp and its path north.

June 11, 1863 (Thursday): Hunter Plans Destruction

General David Hunter

PRIVATE.] SAINT NICHOLAS, N. Y., August 31, 1863.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Washington:
    DEAR SIR: From all I can see and hear at the North and from the hopeless state of the rebels I am fully convinced you will shortly be overwhelmed with the cry for "The Union as it was, and the Constitution as it is." Slavery will thus be fixed on us forever, and all our blood and treasure will have been expended in vain. Cannot this be prevented by a general arming of the negroes and a general destruction of all the property of the slaveholders, thus making it their interest to get rid of slavery?
      Let me take the men you can spare from this city, land at Brunswick, Ga., march through the heart of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi to new Orleans, arming all the negroes and burning the house and other property of every slaveholder. A passage of this kind would create such a commotion among the negroes that they themselves could be left to do the rest of that work. I am a firm believer in the maxim that 'Slaveholders have no rights a negro is bound to respect."
     I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 


    D. HUNTER,
    Major-General.

 Official Records, Series III., Vol. 3, Part 1, Page 740.

Hunter had the distinction of traveling with Lincoln when he came to Washington as President in 1861 and going home with his body to Springfield in 1865.  He served in Kansas prior to the war and had corresponded with Lincoln on affairs there.  It may have been there where he developed his views on the limits, or lack thereof, to warfare against the South.  These views were held by many in the Republican Party, but fewer outside it.  Here he expresses a fear held within those circles, that the war would end too early with too little damage inflicted upon the South and its institutions.

June 10, 1863 (Wednesday): A Difference In Strategies

Fort Richardson, Defenses of Washington (NPS.gov)

June 10, 1863-2. 30 p. m. (Received 5. 10 p. m.)

His Excellence the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Mr. PRESIDENT:General Plasonton, by telegram forwarded to the major-general commanding the army this morning, reports that he had an affair with the rebel cavalry yesterday near Brandy station, which resulted in crippling him so much that he will have to abandon his contemplated raid into Maryland, which was to have started this morning. I am not so certain that the raid will be abandoned from this cause. It may delay the departure a few days. I shall leave the calvary, which is all that I have mounted, where they are, near Bealeton, with instructions to resist the passage of the river by the enemy`s forces. If to effect this he should bring up a considerable force of infantry, that will so much weaken him in my front that I have good reason to believe that I can throw a sufficient force over the river to compel the enemy to abandon his present position. If it should be the intention to send a heavy column of infantry to accompany the cavalry on the proposed raid, he can leave nothing behind to interpose any serious obstacle to my rapid advance on Richmond. I am not satisfied of his intention in this respect, but from certain movements in their corps I cannot regard in this respect, but from certain movements in their corps I cannot regard it as altogether improbable. If it should be found to be the case, will it not promote the true interest of the cause for me to match to Richmond at once? From there all the disposable part of this army can be thrown to any threatened point north of the Potomac at short notice, and, until they can reach their destination, a sufficiency of troops can be collected to check, if not to stop, his invasion. If left to operate from my own judgment, with my present information, I do not hesitate to say that I should adopt this course as being the most speedy and certain mode of giving the rebellion a mortal blow. I desire that you will give it your reflection. At present the enemy has one corps of infantry at Gordonsville, with the advance at Culpeper, with the manifest tendency of other corps to drift in that direction. I now have two bridges across the Rappahannock, ready to spring over the river below Fredericksburg, and it is this, I believe, that causes the enemy to hesitate in moving forward. Major-General Dix informs me that he intends moving two columns on James Fiver to-morrow; but if organized to corresponded in numbers to the troops as they have of late been posted, neither column will be successful. The one on the north side of the river will be too small, and on the south side, with his whole column, I question if Richmond can be taken at all, provided 2, 000 or 3, 000 men could be assembled to defend it. The columns should unite at City Point, or below, and move on the north bank of that river. From information. which I deem reliable, the only troops remaining in Richmond is the provost-guard, 1, 500, and all the troops between here and there are brought well to the front. It would be of incalculable service to this army to be transferred to some more remote point from Washington and Alexandria. The stampedes in those towns, gotten up, no doubt, by people in the rebel interest, have their influence on my men, for many of them have no means of knowing whether they are with or without cause. They think there must be some fire where their is so much smoke.


     JOSEPH HOOKER,
     Major-General.

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1863-6. 40 p. m.
Major-General HOOKER:
Your long dispatch of to-day is just received. If left me, I would not go south of Rappahannock upon Lee`s moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take in it twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee`s army, and not Richmond, is your sure objective point. If he comes toward the Upper Potomac. follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight
him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him.


      A. LINCOLN.


WASHINGTON, D. C., June 11, 1863-12. 40 p. m.


Major-General HOOKER,
Army of the Potomac:
      The President has just referred to me you telegram and his reply of yesterday, with directions to say to you whether or not I agree with him. I do so fully.


    H. W. HALLECK,
    General-in-Chief. -


Official Records, Series I., Vol. 27, Part 1, Page 35.

Hooker hoped to have stopped Stuart moving north with Pleasanton's attack on Brandy Station.  But whether or not he did, Hooker believes Lee is moving north.  Rather than follow him on he perferred to immediately steal a march on Richmond.  Lincoln and Halleck didn't agree, thinking of the damage Lee could inflict north of the Potomac during the time it would take Hooker to invest and take Richmond.  Lincoln ignored his own frequent advice to field commanders not to assume the enemy capable of doing things you yourself cannot.  In this case there were still heavy forces within the fortifications of Washington.  It would be no easier for Lee to take Washington than for Hooker to take Richmond.